Abstract

Liberal democracies are political systems that uphold three institutional prerequisites: free and free elections; commitment to core political rights such as the freedom of expression, association, and a free press; and the bureaucratic rule of law whereby independent courts act according to the law. This chapter examines Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This chapter also illustrates how the Constitutional Courts of Korea and Taiwan are more activist than their Japanese counterpart—the Supreme Court of Japan. Vis-à-vis Taiwan, its Constitutional Court has invalidated constitutional amendments that attempted to extend the term of existing National Assembly delegates, struck down discriminatory election deposit requirements imposed on independent electoral candidates, and has also expanded the right of its people to engage in peaceful political protests. Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Korea has mitigated the effects of systemic political barriers erected by lawmakers to preserve their incumbency: prohibitive deposits for National Assembly elections, gerrymandering of electoral constituencies, and disenfranchisement of small political parties. In contrast, the JSC is remarkably more subdued and has upheld the constitutionality of almost every legislation that comes its way.

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