Liaisons dangereuses: Britain, the US, the Soviet Union and the circulation of knowledge about penicillin (1943-1950).

Hollywood’s Embassies

Science Diplomacy seeks avenues for strengthening humanity and consolidating the existing inter-nation relationships through academic and industrial collaboration between nations on various scientific and technological frontiers. Science and technology are effective tools for addressing global challenges and cross-boundary disputes amicably by promoting international scientific collaboration to harness the potentials of partner countries. In this perspective, we revisit the global developments in science diplomacy and with a particular focus on Nepal, we explore how science diplomacy has been vital for establishing scientific collaborations. The paper also highlights the effort and the role played by the Nepali diaspora for enhancing scientific collaboration and technology transfer between Nepal and the scientifically advanced nations. While further strengthening diplomatic ties that Nepal currently enjoys with friends worldwide, we discuss various policy measures that can leverage scientific output in the country by encompassing scientific and technological collaboration as an integral part of foreign policy. We believe that this paper can also serve as a useful reference to achieve Sustainable Development Goals and combat global challenges such as climate change, natural disasters, and pandemics through science diplomacy and cooperation.

The British film has a lengthy history which can be traced back to the pioneer stage of the medium in the late nineteenth century when Britain, along with the United States, Germany, France and other nations, staked claims to the invention of cinema. Dividing the hundred years plus of that history into ‘eras’, segments of historical time possessing a degree of internal coherence, has been done in a range of ways utilizing a medley of criteria. Many factors influence the construction of historical periods relating to cinema.From general film history comes the broad division common to all national cinemas between silent and sound cinema with the latter divisible further into the classical sound era (1930s-1950s), based on big studio production, and the post studio period (1960s to the present) with its more fragmented structures. Such periods also relate to the significance of cinema-going as a largely urban leisure activity which peaked in the 1940s, declined significantly in the post-war years, then began a kind of recovery in the 1980s in the context of a burgeoning and varied audio-visual environment. Laid upon those divisions are the momentous events of history – the First World War, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Second World War and the Cold War – which had profound effects on the course of international cinema. Laid upon those factors is the history of one national cinema – that of America – which above all others has shaped and determined the course of many national cinemas through its economic, artistic and general cultural influence. The British cinema has been especially susceptible to American influence and one way of writing its history is in terms of the industry’s resistance to Hollywood domination both at the level of political and industrial impact and at the level of cultural influence. From the point of view of aesthetics and film form, film scholars have also devel-oped numerous conceptual schemes for the analysis of the British film. ‘Realism’, despite the somewhat elusive nature of the term, has been particularly important as a central concern for accounts of the national cinema. The cinematic lineage from the 1930s documentarists, led by John Grierson, through the wartime realism of films such as In Which We Serve (1942) and Millions Like Us (1943), to the British ‘new wave’ of working-class orientated films in the early 1960s such as Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1960), and to recent film-makers such as Ken Loach, embodies atraditional view of the development of the British film though one based on a strong set of assumptions about the role of the cinema as social agent. Such assumptions have been challenged by recent writing on the British film and, as Alan Lovell has suggested, the “strongest positive thrust from the new scholarship has been an attempt to validate ‘anti-realist’ film-making” (2009: 7). Raymond Durgnat (1970) and Charles Barr (1977, 1986) have developed a critical strand which interrogated the enshrined status of the ‘realist’ documentary-influenced film. Conceptual couplets such as realism/fantasy, prestige film/genre cinema, documentary/fiction, popular cinema/art film, exterior/interior cinema and other variants enabled British film history to find places for the eccentric vision of Powell and Pressburger, for the Gainsborough costume melodrama, for the crime film, for popular comedies, for the Hammer horror film, and for a strong vigorous popular cinema neglected by orthodox critical opinion and counterposed to the restrained aesthetics of the ‘realist’ film. This chapter divides the history of British cinema into ‘eras’ that can be organizedaccording to some of the institutional and artistic factors, political history, global film history, film form and aesthetics mentioned previously. At various times in its history, the British film industry has been affected by other national industries, especially though not exclusively the American film industry, by domestic government legislation and by artistic currents of influence from popular Hollywood films and from European art cinemas. Like the British body politic, the British film is lodged between America and Europe with the industries of each offering different templates – popular cinema, the art film – for the development of a national cinema with a distinctive identity. In the 1940s, Lindsay Anderson suggested that “the British cinema seems to hover between the opposite poles of France and Hollywood” (1949: 113), while in the 1990s, Christopher Williams suggested that “British film-making is caught between Hollywood and Europe, unconfident of its own identity, unable to commit or develop strongly in either direction” (1996: 193). This chapter will trace the history of British cinema through various phases in which the numerous pressures, strains and influences on the cinematic institution acquire a specific form marking them as distinctive ‘eras’.

Reviews and Short Notices

Gellner, Ernest Encounters with NationalismAnderson, R. D. Education and the Scottish People 1750–1918Mackesy, Piers British Victory in Egypt, 1801: The End of Napoleon's ConquestHopkins, Eric Working‐Class Self‐Help in Nineteenth‐Century England: Responses to IndustrialisationEhrlich, Cyril First Philharmonic: A History of the Royal Philharmonic SocietyGemie, Sharif Women and Schooling in France, 1815–1914: Gender, Authority and Identity in the Female Schooling SectorPanayi, Panikos German Immigrants in Britain during the Nineteenth Century, 1815–1914Willson, F. M. G. Our Minerva: The Men and Politics of the University of London 1836–1858Englander, David and O'Day, Rosemary (eds) Retrieved Riches: Social Investigation in Britain 1840–1914Weston, Corinne Comstock The House of Lords and Ideological Politics: Lord Salisbury's Referendal Theory and the Conservative Party, 1846–1922Burg, Judith (ed.) 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Statecraft and Diplomacy in the Twentieth CenturyQuine, Maria Sophia Population Politics in Twentieth‐Century Europe: Fascist Dictatorships and Liberal DemocraciesLouis, Wm. Roger (ed.) Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in BritainMüller, Klaus‐Jürgen (ed.) The Military in Politics and Society in France and Germany in the Twentieth CenturyPolasky, Janet The Democratic Socialism of Emile Vandervelde: Between Reform and RevolutionBrookshire, Jerry H. Clement AttleeSisman, Adam A. J. P. Taylor: A BiographyProchaska, Frank Royal Bounty: The Making of a Welfare MonarchyBrown, John The British Welfare State: A Critical HistoryHarris, J. P. Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903–1939Murfett, Malcolm H. (ed.) The First Sea Lords: From Fisher to MountbattenFrench, David The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916–1918Constantine, Stephen; Kirby, Maurice W. and Rose, Mary B. 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Few historians would disagree that the fifth marquis of Lansdowne's greatest achievement was the Anglo-French entente of 1904. As with the ‘Peace Letter’ of November 1917, however, in which Lansdow...

Science, technology and innovation collaboration is very important for global responses to the pandemic. This paper discusses the importance of science and technology collaboration in people’s livelihood and examines the areas for collaboration between the UK and China. Finally, it proposes policy recommendations for future collaboration in people’s livelihood between the UK and China.

In 1945 the Saskatchewan Aboriginal veterans from World War II returned to a rapidly changing world. The economy was improving dramatically as expanding industries encouraged unprecedented consumerism. In addition, new social values reflected an optimism for the elimination of the social inequality epitomized by Nazi Germany. The new social consciousness culminated with the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. In Canada the postwar years saw the federal government begin to investigate Indian policy reforms. In Saskatchewan the postwar years ushered in a new optimism epitomized by a new provincial government. In 1944 the people of the province of Saskatchewan elected the first socialist government in North America, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). The CCF, elected on the slogan "humanity first," began examining the possibility of implementing an Aboriginal policy. The change of economic, social, and political environment in Canada immediately after the war added to the excitement brought on by the ending of hostilities. Saskatchewan Aboriginal veterans' active participation in the immediate postwar changes was minimal. It has been accepted in the historical literature that a direct link existed between the participation of Aboriginal people in the Second World War and the emergence of a new political consciousness among Aboriginal people. The assumption is that Indian political organizations that came into existence in Canada generally, and in Saskatchewan specifically, during and after the war were due to the returning Aboriginal veterans. For example, Janet Davison states "during or immediately after the war there was a tremendous upsurge in Indian political activity, resulting in [End Page 685] the formation of many new or reorganized associations. The years 1940–1949 saw 14 new Indian organizations recorded; of these 5 were in Saskatchewan alone."1 The claim that the Indian leaderships emerged after the war ignores their efforts to advance Aboriginal rights prior to the war. Upon closer consideration, it is evident that very few of these organizations owe their formation to returning Aboriginal veterans. Rather, Aboriginal veterans had no direct influence in the creation of the new Indian organizations in Saskatchewan. Between 1945 and 1960 Saskatchewan Aboriginal veterans' social and political activism was in a transitional phase. Aboriginal veterans in the immediate postwar years can be characterized as passive participants in the social and political changes. Passive participation means that the veterans did not guide the changes that occurred but were a powerful image of the "progressive Indian" portrayed by the media. The image of the "Indian warrior" popular before and during the war was transformed into "progressive Indians" after the war. Although in the immediate postwar years Aboriginal veterans concentrated their efforts on readjusting to civilian life, their symbolic stature as "progressive Indians" brought public awareness about Indian rights, which in turn helped to shift the public's attitude about Indians. The existing Indian leadership took advantage of the shifting attitudes to build support for their agenda of Indian rights, which they had been pursuing for a number of years. As a result, even though the veterans were passive in the social and political arena, their existence as a group was crucial in the social and political change of Aboriginal people in Canada in the immediate postwar years.2 This article is divided into four sections. The first section provides an overview of the Aboriginal participation in the Second World War. The number of and reasons for Aboriginal enlistment and Aboriginal protest to compulsory conscription will be discussed briefly. An analysis of Aboriginal veterans' experiences in the immediate postwar period in Saskatchewan will be conducted in the second section. Employment opportunities in the postwar period are contrasted with those in the prewar period, and the impacts of CCF Aboriginal policies on Aboriginal veterans and community response to Aboriginal veterans are all included in this section. The next section will scrutinize how the image...

Reviewed by: Arms, Economics, and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs David Zimmerman (bio) Arms, Economics, and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs. By G. C. Peden. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xiii+384. $99. By trying to link developments in British military technology to economics and strategy between World War I and the height of the cold war, G. C. Peden has attempted a hugely ambitious task. Peden is quite correct in pointing out that Britain remained one of the world's great powers and leading innovators until the rising costs of new weapons systems and the relative decline in the country's economy caused its eclipse in the late 1960s. Though not without its shortcomings, Peden's is a laudable effort. Its great strength is that it puts strategic- and weapons-system acquisition into proper economic context. His account of the relationship of finance to World War II industrial production is the most succinct available, and he deftly deals with the ongoing controversy over Correlli Barnett's harsh critique of Britain's industrial performance. Britain's intent to equip only a fifty-five-division army, explains Peden, meant that it did not need to produce as many tanks as Germany required for its much larger army. Similarly first-rate is Peden's description of Britain's ultimately doomed struggle to keep pace with sophisticated and costly weapons-system development during the cold war. It was the ever-increasing expense of new weapons, as much as Britain's relative decline, that forced the nation to cede its position as a great power. Perhaps nothing is more difficult in writing the history of military technology than tracing the course of a weapon's development from the decision to pursue research to the eventual deployment in combat. Weapons-system acquisition involves complex and ever-changing factors, including military tactical doctrine, strategic threat analysis, interservice rivalries, politics, finance, industrial capacity and capability, and technological and scientific research and development. To attempt an all-encompassing study [End Page 738] such as this is very brave indeed, and an author must be careful not to oversimplify the technological complexities of weapons systems. Unfortunately, Peden's book has a large number of errors, for instance in the account of First and Second World War antisubmarine warfare technology. While correctly pointing out that convoys were the single most important factor in defeating U-boats in 1917–18, Peden gives far too much credit to the development of hydrophones and makes no mention of the invention of active sonar by French scientists. Hydrophones on the whole did not work. Despite the deployment of some 10,000 of these devices, ship-borne hydrophone detection played a role in the sinking of only three or four German submarines. Peden does not cite Willem Hackmann's history of the development of sonar, implying that radio intelligence during World War II consisted primarily of enigma intercepts. But David Syrett has conclusively argued that strategic and tactical high-frequency direction-finding were far more important than decryption in redirecting convoys around submarine patrol lines. Surprisingly, several major themes of Britain's wartime industrial mobilization are not fully explored. Quite correctly, Peden explains that the dominions provided little assistance in the rearmament program of the 1930s. In addressing World War II, however, he makes little mention of the industrial and financial contributions made by Canada, Australia, and other components of the empire, and he does not mention the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, perhaps one of the best examples of successful imperial planning for a long war. Shortcomings in design and industrial-production techniques caused numerous problems in weapons development and manufacturing in the United Kingdom, and in transferring these for overseas production. Peden argues that such issues were no worse than in Germany, but it would be hard to find a German equivalent to the scandalously inferior British tank designs. While this book is not perfect, it is still a very useful study on a very important topic. There is little doubt that Britain's decline as a great power is one of the most important developments of the twentieth century. Peden greatly contributes to our understanding of...

This chapter sheds light on Japanese production networks and markets in machinery industries during crisis, focusing on the effects of the economic crisis and 3.11 disaster from the viewpoint of Japan’s exports. The chapter first decomposes changes in machinery exports into extensive and intensive margins and then examines the probability of trade declines and recoveries in order to capture the natures of international production/distribution networks under the crises (the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake). It also discusses domestic activities as well as the impacts of the 2011 Thailand floods. Moreover, considering that the 2011 earthquake was not only a natural disaster but also a technological disaster that seriously affected Japan’s agriculture and food exports, I also investigate its impact on exports. Whether demand shock or supply shock, disasters and crises revealed the stability and robustness of production networks in machinery sectors. However, their negative impacts are severe and transmitted through production networks at the beginning. I conclude with various policy implications from research on these crises.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries coal played a vital role in Britain’s performance as an industrial nation. Until the advent of cheap oil and natural gas after the Second World War, it was an unrivalled fuel for domestic heating, industrial machinery, sea and land transport, and the production of gas and electricity. And the availability of huge, seemingly limitless and easily accessible, coal reserves, meant that coal-mining became a critical element in Britain’s nineteenth-century supremacy, both as a manufacturer and (through the export of coal to feed the world’s new shipping and railway systems) as the dominating nation in the international economy.

The post-war years and particularly the period since the mid-fifties has seen an unprecendented internationalization of capital in the motor industry. In the first decade after the Second World War, as in the interwar years, the industry was largely nationally based with its principal production centres in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy. Each national industry had its own distinctive characteristics and competition between capitals from different countries was largely confined to third markets (except for the case of US investment in Europe). Since the mid-fifties the motor industry has evolved from a nationally based industry to one based on three major regional centres, North America, Western Europe and Japan, and is increasingly becoming a ‘world industry’. This final development is still by no means complete but the seventies and eighties have seen major steps in this direction.

The changing attitudes to the British bomber offensive against Germany provide a clear example of distortion in hindsight. There were a few pacifist or near pacifist critics during the war but in general the campaign received public support. In the immediate post-war years there was some criticism, mostly on operational grounds, but also a strong show of resentment at the way Bomber Command and Sir Arthur Harris had been slighted in post-war commemorations and honours. Since the 1960s, however, there has been widespread condemnation of the campaign for a complex and sometimes muddled combination of moral, strategic and political reasons. In principle a critical reappraisal is entirely legitimate, but in some cases there has been a marked lack of historical understanding and empathy, both as regards the fraught conditions in which decisions were made and the operational problems in implementing them. There is a certain irony in the tendency to exaggerate Britain’s contribution to the defeat of Germany, in comparison to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, while underrating, and even condemning, Britain’s principal offensive achievement: namely the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. British opinion at all levels has been deeply affected by the pervasive arguments propagated in the inter-war decades about the omnipotence of the bomber and fear that the next major war would begin with immediate cataclysmic bombing of cities with high explosives and poison gas. British governments, and more especially the Royal Air Force as the interested Service struggling to maintain its independent status, had placed great emphasis on Bomber Command, primarily as a deterrent to enemy air attack, but also as a counter-weapon should deterrence fail. In the late 1930s, however, a much higher priority was given to fighter aircraft for home defence, and little thought was given to the huge problems involved in penetrating distant enemy defences, locating legitimate targets and hitting them with sufficiently heavy bombs to inflict significant damage. Consequently when war came Bomber Command was completely unprepared to carry out its offensive role; but in any case Neville Chamberlain’s government during the months of ‘phoney war’ proved unwilling to initiate the bombing of Germany (‘taking the gloves off’ in the idiom of the day) for fear of provoking enemy retaliation. Britain and France generally observed these self-imposed restrictions on bombing, which were confined to clearly defined and specific military targets.

On 26 February 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair faced the largest parliamentary rebellion in over hundred years. Some 120 of his Labour Party colleagues voted against the government's policy of support for US military action against Iraq. Earlier that month, more than one million people had taken to the streets of London to protest against the prospect of war, while respondents to UK Internet poll had voted America the country that posed the greatest threat to world peace. UK's major partners in Europe--France and Germany--also opposed Britain's stance, the government having singularly failed in its self-appointed role of providing bridge of understanding between Europe and the United States. Prime Minister Blair faced personal attacks in the media, being frequently portrayed as America's lap dog; even Nelson Mandela referred to him disapprovingly as the foreign minister of the United States. Prime Minister's political survival itself seemed to be at stake. In the face of such pressures, it would have been understandable if the British government had taken less determined position on Iraq. In spite of the oft-touted British and American governments have not always seen eye-to-eye during international crises. But that was not the case. Notwithstanding dissension and resignations from his Cabinet, Prime Minister Blair's advocacy of the Bush Administration's hard line on Iraq hardly wavered, diplomatic support remained constant and vigorous, and Britain was the only American ally to make sizable military contribution to the campaign. It is not surprising then that Tony Blair has been hailed as hero in the United States, becoming the first Briton since Winston Churchill to be nominated for Congressional Gold Medal. Blair's firm leadership was critical to sustaining the British government's support for US policy in Iraq. For some commentators, the Prime Minister's resolve demonstrated principled, international statesmanship; to others it displayed naive faith in American virtue. Regardless, foreign policy in parliamentary democracy is rarely made at the whim of even powerful personality like Tony Blair. (1) There are many factors beside Blair's leadership that helped to shape the government's thinking. These included the long-standing special Anglo-American relationship, an institutionalized habit of security cooperation between the two countries, an ambitious perception of Britain's role in the modern world, and an apparently genuine conviction that Saddam Hussein's regime posed threat to national security. This article addresses these issues and places them in historical context. It also draws conclusions about the British government's support for US policy on Iraq and its significance for Anglo-American relations in the medium term. A Special Relationship partnership between the United States and United Kingdom has been described as a relationship rooted in common history, common values, and common interests around the globe. (2) It has been become journalistic cliche to refer to this as but such description has been in common usage since first coined by Winston Churchill during his famous Iron Curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. close diplomatic and military relationship between the UK and the United States had its origins in the strategic partnership of the Second World War. It was sustained by common security concerns throughout the Cold War, and was revived in the 1990s by mutual recognition of the need to cooperate against new threats to international peace and stability. After 9/11, Prime Minister Blair's proactive role in the war against terrorism and his strong, supportive line on Iraq brought new vigor to the Anglo-American partnership. On visit to Britain in May 2003, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, not notable Anglophile, exclaimed, The special relationship between the US and the UK is stronger than ever, and Americans are the better for it. …

Reviewed by: The Making of the Indian Working Class: The Case of the Tata Iron and Steel Co., 1880–1946 * Ravi Kalia (bio) The Making of the Indian Working Class: The Case of the Tata Iron and Steel Co., 1880–1946. By Vinay Bahl. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, Calif., and London: Sage Publications, 1995. Pp. 432; tables, notes, bibliography, index. $36. Interpretations of Indian history have been influenced by many Western ideologies; Marxists, Freudians, McLuhanites, Saidians, and subalternists all have their labels for the stage India is in, each group according to its own scheme of evolution. It should thus come as no surprise that Vinay Bahl, in The Making of the Indian Working Class: The Case of the Tata Iron and Steel Co., 1880–1946, acknowledges his intellectual debt to the British Marxist historian E. P. Thompson and makes a particular effort to challenge the prevailing subalternist orthodoxy, which gained legitimacy in the 1980s by focusing specifically on peasant revolts during British rule. Bahl accomplishes [End Page 782] his task with meticulous research and remarkable candor. This volume is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on India’s industrialization and the working-class movement. Bahl argues that the workers at the Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) did not acquire working-class consciousness simply by recognizing themselves as a group. Rather, they acquired that awareness through a complex process in which social, cultural, political, and economic forces of the region interacted with the nationalist movement and global capitalistic trends. The development of the Indian steel industry was not a result of the formulation of Indian venture capital, nor did it develop as a result of the enlightened policy of the British administration. In fact, the Liberal Governor General Lord Ripon’s efforts in the early 1880s to start a steel industry in India were rejected by the home government (p. 55). After 1880, however, when British industrial primacy came to be challenged by Germany and later by the United States (pp. 48-51), the British government found it advantageous to set up a steel industry in India. Unable to attract British capital to invest in Indian steel and burdened by the rising costs of imported steel from Europe and America, the British felt pressure from the growing nationalist movement in India. The British government finally allowed Indian capital to be invested in the steel industry. Other factors facilitating the rise of India’s steel industry were the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885, the introduction of the railways in India after 1900, and the accumulation of surplus capital in India during World War I. In chapters 2 through 7, Bahl discusses the factors promoting the formation of the Indian working class. British policies that contributed to recurring famines created a migratory labor force and surplus labor market in India. At TISCO, the workers were exploited by the management, who closely controlled them by keeping them divided along lines of religion, language, caste, and gender. The Indian National Congress treated TISCO as a “national industry,” but the Tatas did not identify themselves with the congress until it suited their interest. The TISCO workers themselves were slow in developing a class consciousness and were first organized by Western-educated congress leaders. In crushing the labor movement, the TISCO management was assisted by the British, who saw it as a threat to wartime efforts, and by the Indian National Congress, which considered it a challenge to the growing Indian bourgeoisie. Moreover, the congress was anxious to co-opt the workers’ movement before the Communists could do so. As a reaction to these forces, the TISCO workers came to identify themselves as a group and develop a class consciousness. Bahl has consulted a wide range of primary and secondary sources in India and Britain, including private papers of several important leaders, such as Rajendra Prasad, Purshotamdas Thakurdas, M. N. Roy, and Homi Modi. The author also interviewed the late J. R. D. Tata. This book deserves [End Page 783] a wide readership not only among South Asian scholars but also among those interested in comparative and world history. Ravi Kalia Dr. Kalia teaches the history of South Asia at The...