Letras de Pironio IV

Reviewed by: Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies Raymond Hain Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), xxviii + 485 pp. Brian Davies's Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary comes two years after the publication of his delightfully (some would say quixotically) ambitious Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary. Like the first, this second book "aims to be introductory, if also comprehensive, and it does not presume that its reader is already familiar with medieval thinking" (xvii). But while both volumes run close to five hundred pages, the much shorter length of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] allows Davies a little more breathing room, and the result is a smooth and thoughtful overview of the entire text immensely useful for nonspecialists and worth consulting for specialists. After a brief discussion of Aquinas's life and writings, Davies rejects the view that the SCG was written to aid missionaries, Dominican or otherwise, and instead claims (with the help of the opening chapters of the SCG) that Aquinas has provided "an extended essay in natural theology" in books I–III and then offers "defenses of the articles of faith" in book IV. "And that," he concludes, "is all that we can confidently refer to [End Page 1291] when it comes to the question 'Why did Aquinas write the SCG?'" (15). (But why the need to remark in a footnote that Aquinas "does refer to Islam" in these sections, offering "a brief tirade against Mohammed," even though this "little anti-Islamic outburst" is hardly evidence of a missionary purpose? [397]) Of the remaining seventeen chapters, eight address God's existence, nature, and creative power, six address creatures and their relation to God's providential plan, and the final three address the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the sacraments and salvation. Each chapter follows the same plan: a section of the SCG is explained, with copious quotations and sometimes exhaustive (and exhausting) lists of arguments with lots of examples to make Aquinas's claims both clear and attractive. Each expository section is then followed by Davies's own evaluation of the text. These are the most interesting and readable sections (and worth perusing for a specialist working on the topic at hand), and they make many references to contemporary challenges one might offer to Aquinas, as well as arguments in defense of, and occasionally critical of, Aquinas's views. Davies is most comfortable, and confident, in the eight chapters on God. These make up more than one third of his text (though treating about one fifth of the SCG), and an entire chapter is spent on SCG I, chapter 13 (arguments for God's existence). Davies is certain that Aquinas's arguments for God's existence are not obvious failures, but stops short of calling them successful demonstrations. "My view is that [whether or not they are successful demonstrations] is not an easy question to answer since some of the arguments contain stages that are difficult to understand" (45). Like most defenders of Aquinas, he constructs an example of a causal chain with two types of causes. If my hand holds a stack of books, then each book keeps the book above it from falling to the ground. But my hand is a cause of a different sort, something "whose causal power runs through the chain in such a way as to make the members of the chain do what they do or be what they are" (52). But does Davies think the arguments work? As he often does throughout the commentary, he ends only by quoting from another Aquinas scholar, in this case Edward Feser's defense of this type of argument, and then concludes: "I take it that Feser is suggesting that something that actually exists, but does not have to exist, is potentially nonexistent, and that its sheer existence depends on it being actualized by what cannot not-exist" (55). The remaining chapters on God focus on the divine attributes, which flow (as they do in the parallel questions in the Summa theologiae) from...

Michael Torre Aquinas and the Credibility of God I want to set forth what I believe to be Aquinas's view on the credibility of God's existence, and then defend that view and relate it to certain theological points. Regarding the first matter, I will rely chiefly on several chapters from the Summa Contra Gentiles, supplementedby the same material from the first article ofthe Summa Theologiae . I believe Thomas has a clear view on the credibility of God's existence, and that his view is clearly presented to us in the Summa Contra Gentiles. Let us begin, however, with the first article ofthe Summa Theologiae . There, Thomas divides truths about God into two categories: those accessible and those inaccessible to human reason. The former truths about God can be demonstrated by human reason.Were we, however, to rely on demonstration alone as a means to reach these truths, then they would "only be known by aJew, and that after a long time, and with the admixture ofmany errors. Evidently, then, Thomas thinks diat there is another way to divine truths besides rational demonstration. And since God's very existence is one ofthose truths, Thomas here holds that we can become LOGOS 3:2 SPRING 2oOO [?8LOGOS convinced of this in a way other than by such demonstration. Furthermore , this other way—the way of God's revelation—will make such a truth known not only to the few but to die many, and not after a long time but a short one, and not mixed with any error. This doctrine of the Summa Theologiae merely repeats what Thomas had said a few years earlier in die Summa Contra Gentiles. After stating his intention regarding that work in its second chapter, he goes on (in chapter 3) to make the identical distinction regarding divine truths accessible and inaccessible to human reason. Then, in chapter 4, he explains at much greater length the three defects that follow from having to rely on demonstration alone to know God. Thomas there explains whyJew men would come to know God: because they are not disposed to pursue such demonstrations, because ofthe exigencies oflife, and because oflaziness. The lengdi of time needed derives from the profundity of divine truth, the requirement of preparatory study, and the distraction of the passions . And the error likely in such studies would lead many to doubt their veracity, a doubt often heightened by the weakness of our minds. Thomas concludes that, were we left only to demonstrative knowledge of God's existence, "the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of ignorance."2 Strong words indeed, coming from Thomas! As an initial comment, these words of both Summae seem to make it very clear that Thomas, far from relying upon the Quinqué Viae as the main means to our knowledge of God, explicitly rejects diem as die usual way we rightly come to a beliefin God's existence. In the next two chapters, Thomas goes on to detail for us the other way God's existence is made credible to us, die way most do come to a belief in God, namely through divine revelation. In particular, he explains how God reveals Himself, and why it is reasonable for us to believe in Him on the basis of such revelations. This way does not demonstrate die existence of God or anything about God, but it does make that existence credible; diat is, it accords AQUINAS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF GODI09 with a standard ofreasonableness, so diat to believe in God is not"to believe foolishly."3 What is the way, dien, most are led to believe in God, according to Thomas? Through die miraculous. It is because God works miracles that most believe in Him. And it most reasonable diat diey should, for, as he later explains in his discussion ofmiracles, dieir very nature—which is to occur outside die natural order ofevents and causes—requires that God alone be dieir proper cause.4 What miracles lead us to believe in God? Thomas mentions diree fundamental types. First, there is the evidence of prophecy. For instance, Christ's person and action, and His transformative effect upon die world...

In the Summa Theologia I (STI), beginning at question 2, article 3, and in the Summa Contra Gentiles I (CGI), beginning at chapter 13, Aquinas provides five proofs for the existence of God. These proofs are intended to demonstrate that God exists and to provide the foundation for a larger program to demonstrate many other doctrines which are held by faith. However, the program which Aquinas sets up for himself in the two great Summae is trivial and unnecessary if the existence of God is self-evident in such a way that God's existence needs no demonstration. So, as a preamble to the five ways, Aquinas argues that the existence of God is not self-evident in any way that would hinder his program of rational theology.In STI the argument occurs in question 2, article 1, and in CGI it occurs in chapters 10 and 11. Aquinas also argues the same point in Commentum in Primum Librum Sententiarum (CS) distinction 3, question 1, article 2, and in Quaestiones Disputate De Veritate (DV) question 10, article 12.

This paper examines critically Kretzmann's reconstruction of the project of natural theology as exemplified by Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles. It is argued that the notion of natural theology, as understood and advocated by Kretzmann, is particularly indebted to the epistemologically biased natural theology of modernity with its focus on rational justification of theistic belief. As a consequence, Kretzmann's view of the arguments for the existence of God and their place within Aquinas's theological project is insufficiently sensitive to the ontological conception of truth and intelligibility which underlies the argumentation. From his epistemological point of view Kretzmann differs from Aquinas in two aspects. First, he contends that it is not necessary to establish the existence of God with absolute certainty at the outset; one may begin with the hypothesis that there is a God. Second, the arguments do not yet conclude to the existence of God in the specific theistic sense; they show at most the existence of a primary explanatory entity, which may be identified with God later on. Both claims are criticized in the light of a discussion of Aquinas's theological method.

According to Gilson, the proofs for God’s existence are given by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles.1 By so saying, Gilson The Way of the De Ente Et Essentia eliminates, as an intended proof of God’s existence, the argument offered by St. Thomas in his little, early work, the De Ente et Essentia.2 Gilson writes, “Contrary to what we ourselves have once believed, this development is not intended by Thomas Aquinas to be a proof of the existence of God. It is not presented as such in On Being and Essence.”

The Metaphysics of Creation is a continuation of the project begun in The Metaphysics of Theism, moving the focus to the second book of Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. Building upon his account of God's existence and nature, Aquinas argues that the existence of things other than God must be explained by divine creation out of nothing. Arguments follow to identify God's motivation for creating, to defend the possibility of a beginningless universe, and to explain the origin of species. Aquinas focuses exclusively on creatures with intellects, with the result that more than half of his natural theology of creation constitutes a philosophy of mind.

What Has Metaphysics to Do with Wisdom? John Haldane There are two loci of ambiguity in the title of the symposium from which this essay derives—"Is Belief in God Reasonable? Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles in a Contemporary Context."1 The first concerns the opening question, "is belief in God reasonable?" and the second the closing clause "in a contemporary context." I observe this not in the spirit of pedantry, but because I want to consider certain interpretations of what is at issue, ones which may be different from those of other contributors but which are relevant to Aquinas's circumstances and interests and to ours. So far as the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] is concerned, I will touch mainly on issues discussed by Thomas at the outset of book I, in chapters 1–15, which deal with philosophical knowledge of first principles and arguments to the existence of God. First, however, the general issue of reasonable belief. I Concerning the first locus of ambiguity, the question of the reasonability of belief in God is multiply interpretable. It may be treated as relative to a subject's other beliefs and attitudes, where that subject e may be an individual or a group. Given that S believes p and q (and these can each be conjunctions of any number of propositions), is it reasonable for S to believe r? This aspect of relative credibility is itself ambiguous because it [End Page 1249] can be viewed narrowly, without regard to the status of those antecedent beliefs and attitudes, or broadly, as also asking whether those are themselves reasonable. In a court setting, for example, it may be asked whether it was reasonable for someone to have believed (or done) something given their antecedent beliefs, but it may well be countered that this is an insufficient standard of reasonability, since the prior attitudes may be incredible, or credible but irresponsibly held. The issue of reasonable belief, foresight and foreseeability are common courtroom examples. In these respects, then, it may be granted by someone A, who holds that believing in God is not reasonable, that it was nevertheless reasonable for S to do so given S's antecedent beliefs. This need not be a matter of condescension, however, since A may grant that the prior beliefs were themselves reasonable for S to hold, and would also have been reasonable by some more objective standard prevailing at the time or in the circumstances. A "rationalist" objector may counter, however, that this is all beside the point, since the question to consider is not the relative, but the absolute one: is belief in God reasonable? Full stop. I agree that there is nothing to be gained by unconstrained relativizing, but if "absolutism" is the implied contrast, it is over-stated. First, if reasonability is related to having (or having access to) reasons, and to the "quality" of those reasons, then some degree of relativity is entailed, and the only standard of reasonability that can be applied is a contextual one. To ask simpliciter whether it is reasonable to believe p carries an unacknowledged implicit reference either to something such as prevailing commonly held beliefs and associated normal cognitive processes or to an idealized thinker with access to relevant proofs or evidence. On further consideration, however, the latter, somewhat like Adam Smith's "impartial spectator" in ethics,2 tends just to be a more abstract version of the contextually reasonable thinker. There is perhaps a step beyond this, namely to the Omniscient Reasoner (OR) but it is a sophistical move, since it amounts to saying that a belief is reasonable if and only if it would be held by someone who knows everything relevant to its justification. which given that we cannot know antecedently the range of relevant considerations, is for us an inapplicably high standard. There is also some irony in asking if OR would judge belief in God Reasonable since OR would be God or at least God-like in respect of being all-knowing. [End Page 1250] II The other respect in which the question "is belief in God reasonable?" is ambiguous (in this first of the two areas ambiguity noted at the...

This essay is a discussion of Aquinas's argument existence of God as argument is found in his Summa Contra Gentiles. The aim of essay is suggest an approach Aquinas's argument that emphasizes its particular context, where context signifies not so much assumed Aristotelian physics as Aquinas's larger project of carrying out the office of a wise man, namely, to order things. Construing relevant ordering as a making sense of things—indeed of the whole of things—the argument from motion is thus seen as part of an attempt make sense of what, following Aristotle, can be called the whole of life, that whole within which any one of us must live out his or her particular life. Several ideas found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus are introduced in conviction that they may help at least some of us see of conclusion of Aquinas's argument, conclusion, namely, that first principle of whole of being is an unmoved mover—the strangeness of which conclusion, it is argued, is essential its significance.

Dei Filius I:On God, Creation, and Providence Rudi A. Te Velde In this essay, I want to share my impressions of the first chapter of the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius of Vatican I. It begins its declaration of the basic truths of Christian faith in a language which is similar, and probably intended to be similar, to that of a solemn confession of faith: "The holy, catholic, apostolic, and Roman church believes and acknowledges that there is one true living God, creator and lord of heaven and earth."1 It reminds one, in some of its formulations, of the Nicene Creed, but with a remarkable difference: here, in the text of the constitution, the object of the confession is formulated as a proposition about God's existence.2 What is said is not, for example, "I believe in one God, the Father almighty"; but the Church believes and holds it to be true that there exists a God. One can notice a subtle shift from a confession of faith to the proclamation of a (rational) truth. The Pope, gathered with all the bishops of the Church, declares that there exists a God, the one and true living God, a doctrinal statement directed, by implication, against those who dare to deny the existence of God. The opening sentence of chapter 1 corresponds with its canon, which says that, "if anyone denies the one true God, creator and [End Page 823] lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema."3 Thus the constitution says that the "one, true living God" of the biblical faith exists, that this is a truth, and that, as consequence, the opposed thesis of atheism is false and must be rejected. Who is asserting this truth? Who is speaking and with which authority? The text leaves no doubt about the speaking subject. It is the Church, entitled to speak with authority about matters of faith, because it is the Roman Church, holy, catholic, and apostolic. The Church speaks, in the person of the pope, the legitimate successor of St. Peter, with authority granted to her by God himself through his Son Jesus Christ. In the preface preceding chapter 1 of the constitution, it is said that the Church is appointed by God to be "mother and mistress of nations." Hence: She can never cease from witnessing to the truth of God . . . and from declaring it, for she knows that these words were directed to her: "My spirit which is upon you, and my words I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth from this time forth and for evermore" (Is 59:21).4 This gives the pope, sitting in the chair of Peter, the authority of "teaching and defending Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines."5 And the first thing to be declared, as part of the Church's task to proclaim the Catholic truth to all the nations, is to assert the existence of God against the error of atheism. It is important to understand the genre of a dogmatic constitution. It is a document in which the Church, by mouth of the pope together with the bishops, expounds the basic tenets of Christian teaching. The purpose of a dogmatic constitution is to reaffirm the basic truths of Christian doctrine, to clarify the fundamentals of faith in a message to the world. A constitution may be occasioned by actual developments in the world and society, but it speaks as it were from the standpoint of eternity. In case of the constitution Dei Filius, the addressee is the world of the mid-nineteenth century, a time of dominance of scientific reason, of materialism, naturalism, atheism, and not unimportantly, of current forms of idealistic pantheism (Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schelling, the influence of German Idealism in general); what the constitution especially stands opposed to [End Page 824] is the view of supernatural religion as being irrational. For this purpose it wants to reclaim reason and to overcome the disastrous gap between faith and (modern) rationality. The double program underlying the constitution—teaching the Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines—reminds one of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] of Thomas Aquinas.6 The...

Faith within Reason. By Herbert McCabe, edited by Brian Davies

The Metaphysics of Theism presents an explanation and evaluation of Aquinas's natural theology, the paradigm of which is the first book of the Summa contra gentiles. Natural theology provides the traditional and still central means of integrating philosophy with (some of) theology. What makes this enterprise natural theology is its forgoing of appeals to revelation as evidence for the truth of propositions. What makes it natural theology is its agenda to investigate, by means of analysis and argument, not only the existence and nature of God but also the relation of everything else—especially human nature and behaviour—to God, considered as reality's first principle. Natural theology still offers the best route by which philosophers can, as philosophers, approach theological propositions. The one presented in this book undertakes to show that there must be a necessary being that constitutes the ultimate explanation of the universe.

This paper presents hitherto unpublished writings of Kurt Gödel concerning logical, epistemological, theological, and physical antinomies, which he generally considered as “the most interesting facts in modern logic,” and which he used as a basis for his famous metamathematical results. After investigating different perspectives on the notion of the logical structure of the antinomies and presenting two “antinomies of the intensional,” a new kind of paradox closely related to Gödel’s ontological proof for the existence of God is introduced and completed by a compilation of further theological antinomies. Finally, after a presentation of unpublished general philosophical remarks concerning the antinomies, Gödel’s type-theoretic variant of Leibniz’Monadology, discovered in his notes on the foundations of quantum mechanics, is examined. Most of the material presented here has been transcribed from the Gabelsberger shorthand system for the first time.