Leopoldo Zea on the role of Hegel's Master–Slave Dialectic in the philosophy of Latin American history

Russon's book differs in two ways from other commentaries on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. First, Russon (Univ. of Guelph) considers only the arguments in that text, rather than discussing its literary allusions or historical context. Second, Russon provides independent studies of the arguments in each section of Hegel's text. Whereas it is generally claimed that any part of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit can only be comprehended by understanding the part it plays in the text as a whole, Russon instead tries to investigate the arguments of the individual sections on their own terms. One might think that a disadvantage of Russon's approach would be the difficulty of addressing questions about whether Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has an overall trajectory and structure. Even if that is correct, however, an examination of the details of the arguments in each section compensates. The 15 chapters each focus on a section of Hegel's book, making this an excellent resource in a course on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-level undergraduates through faculty/researchers.

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Rethinking in Seventeen Lectures provides a clear and philosophically engaging investigation of Hegel’s first masterpiece, perhaps the most revolutionary work of modern philosophy. The book guides the reader on an intellectual adventure that takes up Hegel’s revolutionary strategy of paving the way for doing philosophy without presuppositions by first engaging in a phenomenological investigation of knowing as it appears. That preliminary investigation observes how the prevailing view of knowing that condemns cognition to operating with presuppositions proves unable to justify its own knowledge claims and ends up undermining the distinction between knowing and its object on which that view depends. Unlike other studies of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the work rethinks the entire argument with sustained attention to the project that gives the work its revolutionary significance. Free of unnecessary jargon and always focusing on clearly unraveling the argument in its entirety, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Rethinking in Seventeen Lectures, will be indispensable to undergraduate and graduate students of philosophy, Hegel scholars, and anyone interested in tackling the radical project of doing philosophy without foundations.

What happens if we imagine that Hegel's master-slave dialectic occurs between two women? Henry James's The Golden Bowl provides some answers to this question. James's novel portrays an exclusively female master-slave confrontation that is driven by a feminine appropriation of male desire. This appropriation actually mirrors the process in the Phenomenology in which the male domain tries to appropriate the feminine task of alleviating the terror of mortality. However, because this latter process ultimately fails, there is a limit to how much fluidity we can bring to Hegel's gender boundaries. Consequently, The Golden Bowl ends with a reaffirmation of gender divisions.

ABSTRACTThis article examines the figures of life and death as rhetorical and material conditions for self-consciousness and mutual recognition, notoriously described in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. It turns to Hegel's treatment of life and death, concepts that—according to Hegel's mature system—anticipate and prefigure the struggle for recognition and its master-slave dialectic. Part 1 analyzes the Philosophy of Nature, with attention to how the sex relation, species-life, and the diseased body “pathologically” figure the life and death of the nonhuman (animal) organism. Part 2 takes up Hegel's “Anthropology,” which opens his Philosophy of Mind, exploring the problematic relationship between (reproductive) sex and love as an incipient politics of woman, family, civil society, and state. Part 3 brings Hegel's world-historical system into dialogue with contemporary biopolitics, arguing that recognition today is driven by a world-historical discourse on bios and that Hegel's “pathological” figures might occasion a productive critique of affirmative biopolitics.

Notes on Contributors. References. Introduction. 1. Hegel's Phenomenological Method and Analysis of Consciousness: Kenneth R. Westphal (University of Kent, Canterbury). 2. Desire, Recognition, and the Relation between Bondsman and Lord: Frederick Neuhouser (Columbia University, New York). 3. Freedom and Thought: Stoicism, Skepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness: Franco Chiereghin (University of Padua). 4. Challenge of Reason: From Certainty to Truth: Cinzia Ferrini (University of Trieste). 5. Reason Observing Nature: Cinzia Ferrini (University of Trieste). 6. Shapes of Active Reason: Law of the Heart, Retrieved Virtue, and What Really Matters: Terry Pinkard (Georgetown University, Washington, DC). 7. Ethics of Freedom: Hegel on Reason as Law-Giving and Law-Testing: David Couzens Hoy (University of California, Santa Cruz). 8. Hegel, Antigone, and Feminist Critique: Spirit of Ancient Greece: Jocelyn B. Hoy (University of California, Santa Cruz). 9. Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment in The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition: Jurgen Stolzenberg (Martin-Luther-Universitat, Halle-Wittenburg). 10. Morality in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: Frederick C. Beiser (Syracuse University, New York). 11. Religion, History, and Spirit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: George di Giovanni (McGill University, Montreal). 12. Absolute Knowing: Allegra de Laurentiis (SUNY-Stony Brook, New York). 13. Spirit and Concrete Subjectivity in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: Marina F. Bykova (North Carolina State University). General Bibliography. Index of Names. Subject Index. Table of Concordances

In this article I seek to explain Hegel’s significance to contemporary meta-ethics, in particular to Kantian constructivism. I argue that in the master–slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel shows that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity arise at the same time. This point, I argue, shows that there is no problem with taking other people’s reasons to motivate us since reflection on our aims is necessarily also reflection on the needs of those around us. I further explore Hegel’s contribution to the debate about internal and external reasons. I end by arguing that we should understand reasons as historically constructed in the sense that who counts as an intrinsic bearer of value changes over time. I thus argue that the struggle for recognition is in fact the beginning of the long march toward the idea of recognition and the Kantian kingdom of ends. This march, however, is driven by the need to overcome injustice as it is instantiated at the beginning of history by the master’s absolute domination of the slave.

The subject of this paper is the comparison of the master-slave dialectic with the Marxist concept of class struggle. The master-slave dialectic is presented not only in its source – Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit – but also in its reception by later authors: Alexander Kojève and Jacques Lacan. Alexandre Kojève focuses on the resolution of the antago­nism between slave and master in Empire, the society of the Citizen, by which history ends. Lacan proposes considering this theoretical construct from the position of the “death of the master” and in the situation of the “sophisticated domination” (which the slave possesses and through which an immanent break is made in the structure of the master’s absolute knowledge). One of the sources of the concept of class struggle in classical Marxism is the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, which is reconceptualized in a more rev­olutionary, practice-oriented way. Concept of class struggle opposes to the speculative Hegelian construction, which is trying to describe self-consciousness in a more abstract way. Marx also borrows Hegelian terminology from The Science of Logic, because he wants to describe the structure of class as a research object (consciousness that has not come to self-consciousness, the class-in-itself) and as an active, revolutionary subject (consciousness that has entered the struggle for recognition – and thereby has gained self-consciousness, the class-in-itself). A comparative analysis of these concepts allows us to see the sources of the Marxist doctrine of class and class struggle and to open the way of a synthesis between the Marxist and “post-Hegelian” reading of the master-slave dialectic.

This chapter explores the aspect of being a person and acknowledging others as persons and the aspect of being recognized by others as a person, the central questions of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit . It shows that Hegel's topic is a recognition of norms as forms of joint practices rather than recognition of individuals as persons. Recognizing an individual as a person consists at first in recognizing practically the normative forms of personal interactions. The conditions of truth in the case of informative speech acts or claims of knowledge are a most important but special case, fulfillments of intentions and promises are another, fulfillments of conditions of ethics and morality are a third and subjective prudence and practical reason belong to a fourth case. In all these cases, one evaluates proprieties or fulfillment conditions of individual and joint actions as individual or collective performances of certain forms to act. Keywords: ethical laws; forms of joint practices; Hegel; morality; Phenomenology of Spirit

In his Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, which includes his 1930–31 lectures on The Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger states not only that Hegelian phenomenology “begins absolutely with the absolute” but also that this phenomenological beginning is a necessary beginning of Hegel's “system of science.” Although Heidegger acknowledges that the “proper” or “appropriate” beginning or “ground” of this system is the logical beginning (the beginning posited by Hegelian logic), he insists not only that there is also a second beginning of the system, namely, the one provided by The Phenomenology of Spirit, but also that this beginning is necessary. Thus, Heidegger subscribes to the paradoxically sounding thesis that Hegel's system of science must have two beginnings. The chapter attempts, first, to flesh out this thesis and, second, to uncover Heidegger's argument for (or justification of) the claim that the phenomenological beginning is necessary to the Hegelian system of science.

“Phenomenology of Spirit”has an another title, namely the‘science of the experience of consciousness’.Corresponding to this twofoldness of the title, the Phenomenology is, on the one hand, the metaphysics of Subjektität (i.e. of subject-object relationship), and on the other, the metaphysics of intersubjectivity.In I, II and III of the Phenomenology, the fundamentals of the metaphysics of Subjektität are explained with regard to sense, perception and understanding respectively.In V-A, these fundamentals are developed within the element of reason as the synthesis of subject and object.In V-B, C, through the frustration of the metaphysics of Subjektität, Hegel's argument leads to the universal reason which is to grasp the concept of recognition (Anerkennen), as a basis for the metaphysics of intersubjectivity.In IV, the metaphysics of intersubjectivity was generally considered from the viewpoint of the concept of recognition.And this general consideration is developed further in VI as the manifold forms of recognition. Conscience, the highest form in VI, is the conclusion also in VII, and this conscience is the leading thread to the Absolute Knowing.Martin Heidegger defined Hegel's Phenomenology as the metaphysics of Subjektität. This definition is valid only for the introduction, I, II, III and V-A of Hegel's Phenomenology, but the rest (especially IV and VI) belongs to the metaphysics of intersubjectivity. This is the first point to which the present writer is intending to draw special attention in the interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology.The foundation of the metaphysics of Subjektität appears first in VII-A-a (the religion as Light), and it is, in short, based on Hegel's interpretation of the Christian dogma of Creation. This is the second point to which attention is called.

A major criticism of Hegel's philosophy is that it fails to comprehend the experience of the body. In this book, John Russon shows that there is in fact a philosophy of embodiment implicit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Russon argues that Hegel has not only taken account of the body, but has done so in a way that integrates both modern work on embodiment and the approach to the body found in ancient Greek philosophy. Although Russon approaches Hegel's Phenomenology from a contemporary standpoint, he places both this standpoint and Hegel's work within a classical tradition. Using the Aristotelian terms of 'nature' and 'habit,' Russon refers to the classical distinction between biological nature and a cultural 'second nature.' It is this second nature that constitutes, in Russon's reading of Hegel, the true embodiment of human intersubjectivity. The development of spirit, as mapped out by Hegel, is interpreted here as a process by which the self establishes for itself an embodiment in a set of social and political institutions in which it can recognize and satisfy its rational needs. Russon concludes by arguing that self-expression and self-interpretation are the ultimate needs of the human spirit, and that it is the degree to which these needs are satisfied that is the ultimate measure of the adequacy of the institutions that embody human life. This link with classicism - in itself a serious contribution to the history of philosophy -provides an excellent point of access into the Hegelian system. Russon's work, which will prove interesting reading for any Hegel scholar, provides a solid and reliable introduction to the study of Hegel.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has acquired a paradoxical reputation as one of the most important and most impenetrable and inconsistent philosophical works. In this study Michael N. Forster advances his own reading of Hegel's text. His approach differs from that of previous scholars in two crucial ways: he reads it, first as a whole - not piecemeal, as it has usually been analyzed, and second, wihtin the context of Hegel's braoder corpus and the works of other philosophers. Forster concludes that the Phenomonelogy of Spirit emerges as a coherent meditation with a rich array of important and original ideas.

In two different media, poetic drama and philosophic prose, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) explored the same subject: man's perilous journey to discover his consciousness along a course of doubt and despair. Both works developed independently (if works conceived within the same cultural circle may ever be considered to develop independently);. Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes — Phenomenology of Spirit — in a volcanic out-pouring of brilliant madness during a few months in the fall of 1806; Goethe's two part tragedy Faust over a period of more than forty years between before 1790 (Faust ein Fragment von Gothe) and 1832 (Faust: Der Tragodie zweiter Teil).

Like Henry Harris, I began doing intensive research on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in the mid-sixties. I recall going through all the chapters as a graduate student during one academic year, and looking around for commentaries. The only English-language commentary available was Loewenberg's Hegel's Phenomenology: Dialogues in the Life of Mind, which was suggestive of the dialectic taking place in the book, but not much help in getting over the “rough spots”. This gave me an incentive to work through Jean Hyppolite's commentary, not yet translated into English, with my basic reading-knowledge of French. My 1976 Hegel's Phenomenology, Part I: Analysis and Commentary was one of the first in a long line of Anglophone commentaries. Harris in his introduction to Vol. I. mentions this effort at “analysis”, along with Findlay's “analysis” accompanying the 1977 Miller translation of the Phenomenology, as incentives for the inclusion of his own improved running analysis in the present commentary.I have included discussions of numerous partial or complete commentaries on Hegel's Phenomenology in review articles published in 1971 in the American Philosophical Quarterly and (in Spanish) Teorema, in 1979 in the American Philosophical Quarterly, and in 1981 in Hegel-Studien. Harris has the advantage of producing the most recent of all these commentaries, and in a way offers us a compendium of everything that has been done on the Phenomenology. His analysis and commentary includes a survey of the literature, in which almost all previous laborers in the field can find themselves commended or criticized in the endnotes. Thus I find comments like “Kainz has completely misunderstood the argument here” (I, 312), “This is a point which Kainz has grasped more definitely than most commentators” (I, 315), “[Kainz] does not deserve the brickbat Flay hurls at him” (I, 613), and so forth. Other commentators, living and dead – Flay, Pöggeler, Navickas, Kenneth and Merold Westphal, Heidegger, Lauer, Werner Becker, Kojève, Wahl, Hyppolite, Labarrière, Bonsiepen, Forster, Shklar, Solomon, Werner Marx, and Robert Williams (to name just a few!) — are similarly discussed and critiqued. For some of us Anglophone commentators, such remarks may seem like red marks on essays from a patient professor. But certainly no one will mind, since Harris has spent more time and energy on this very specialized project than any of us. In fact, some former commentators almost have a “conflict of interest” in reviewing Harris' work, since so many of us have benefited at various points in our research from Harris' personal support and criticism. But in academics, as in life, mentors cannot always be assured of loyalty.

The opening line of Horkheimer-Adorno's Dialectic of reads, Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. This path of enlightenment is what the interpretations found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Horkheimer-Adorno's Dialectic of have in common. Considered in terms of their broad outlines, these interpretations are the same. They differentiate themselves from one another only in the details. The conceptions of the enlightenment process in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Horkheimer-Adorno's Dialectic of are like perpendicular lines; they begin at the same point and then proceed to move further and further apart. However, even as they move apart, both conceptions still point back to their common origin, and no matter how far from that original point they move, one can still draw two parallel lines that relate them, one connecting the perpendicular lines, the other bisecting their point of origin. What I propose to do in this paper is draw a series of such parallel lines in the hopes of reaching the common point of origin: the concept of enlightenment. I will begin at the limit of enlightenment, the border where enlightenment crosses over into barbarism, and work my way back, step by step, line by line, from the limits of enlightenment to its public face, to its positive aspect, to its negative aspect, and finally to the very heart of enlightenment as conceived by Hegel and Horkheimer-Adorno. In the end, I believe, it will be shown that, while Hegel and Horkheimer-Adorno have different interpretations of how enlightenment plays itself out, they start