Abstract
This study investigates whether legislative pressure influences credit rating agency (CRA) behavior. It covers a time period in which the European Union moves from exerting minimal to intense legislative pressure on CRAs, providing an almost ideal context for analyzing if and how CRAs are affected by this pressure. Two possible outcomes are discussed: 1) more timeliness in the flow of information and 2) more stickiness in the flow of information. The analysis is based on an examination of market reactions following CRA announcements between 2000 and 2019. The results show that the market reactions after CRA announcements decrease when legislative pressure increases. The interpretation is that as legislative pressure increases, the flow of information from CRAs becomes stickier. This confirms that legislative initiatives that put pressure on CRAs have an effect, evidence that legislators’ intention to change behavior by threatening or initiating new regulations works, which confirms assumptions underlying the theory of legislative threats (Halfteck, 2008). A reasonable interpretation of legislators’ push for changes in this context is that they want to see a faster flow of information. The results, however, show the opposite. A plausible explanation for this is increased caution on the part of CRAs because if in retrospect, the information in an announcement turns out to be wrong or misleading, the ensuing criticism could lead to additional pressure.
Highlights
It has been many years since the big corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and Ahold) of the early 21st century and the financial crisis of 2007–2008
This study is based on the question of whether legislative pressure has any influence on the behavior of an actor at the center of the debate about concrete changes in legislation
credit rating agencies (CRAs) are actors within the financial system, and they are generally assumed to contribute to a good information environment
Summary
It has been many years since the big corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and Ahold) of the early 21st century and the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The direct consequences of these events remain and continue in the form of previously initiated and still partially ongoing regulatory processes. Inherent in this reality lies the dynamic between participant bodies and the pressure some of these bodies face. Coffee (2006, 2009) discusses the failure of a group of so-called gatekeepers, auditors, corporate attorneys, securities analysts, and rating agencies in the wake of the Enron scandal (Coffee, 2006) and the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Coffee, 2009).
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