Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper investigates ruling parties’ calculations in wartime legislative elections. The paper argues that ruling parties’ strategies are shaped by opportunity structures and the party’s desire to protect party insiders, rather than simply by considerations about ‘government-held’ or ‘rebel-held’ territory. Ruling parties may adopt several strategies: (1) ceding seats to popular opposition candidates, even in government-controlled territory; (2) allowing rebels to run on the ruling party’s ticket; and (3) blatant electoral manipulation. Ruling parties may miscalculate, including about how much manipulation the population will countenance. The paper examines these dynamics through a case study of Mali’s 2020 legislative elections.
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