Legislative Control of Post-Award Procedural Dynamics: Modeling Judicial Behaviors of Post-Award Review Systems in International Commercial Arbitration

Abstract

Ensuring the international enforceability of arbitral awards is an ideal research topic in international commercial arbitration. National legislative control of post-award procedural dynamics in international or domestic categories of arbitration forums becomes the initial conditions for modeling judicial behaviors of post-award review systems in international commercial arbitration. However, building up theories for the national/international legislative design depends on the depth of understanding how the judicial behaviors evolve in post-award review systems. Hence, apart from typical scenarios of legal studies, this thesis applied the legislative modeling as the approach to study the stability of international post-award review systems. The purpose of this thesis is to study the theories-building basis of constructing international enforceable awards. Three research approaches include comparative legal studies, evolutionary dynamics, mathematical modeling. Legislative modeling is based on these approaches for controlling the post-award procedural dynamics, predicting the sustainability of national arbitration laws, analyzing the grounds for international post-award review systems. Firstly, this thesis studied the strategic behaviors in dispute resolution bargaining processes and analyzed the distribution of power in multilateral dispute resolution procedures. Secondly, this thesis modelled the judicial behaviors in evolutionary multilevel hierarchy of orders based on the heuristics decision-makings with the preferences of social agents. Thirdly, this thesis schemed procedural delocalized arbitrations for the national legislative management of arbitration laws. Finally, this thesis explored the theoretical grounds for constructing the international legislative control of post-award review systems. The contributions of this thesis include filling the gaps of traditional research methodologies and interdisciplinary legislative modeling and building three models for finding the equilibria of interests in post-award bargaining processes, showing that the intensity of the vacatur grounds for foreign arbitral awards made great impacts on post-award procedural dynamics, studying the influence of the political control in international post-award review systems. This thesis concluded that finding the preferences of contracts and the strategic equilibria of the parties improved the efficacy of settlement bargaining; for studying the sustainability of national arbitration laws, analyzing the long-term behaviors of post-award review systems was helpful; constructing the international legislative control of post-award review systems was based on the functions of the transnational political agents and the non-state actors. This thesis suggested to ratify the New York Convention and to add the grounds for modifications or corrections on the evident material miscalculation or mistakes and reinterpretations of arbitral awards in Taiwan Arbitration Law.