Learning from cases—The Problem of Sharing Knowledge in Psychoanalysis

Abstract

In his posthumously published book Learning from Cases, the British historian of science John Forrester argues for the value of an approach to knowledge based on case histories, with the psychoanalytic case being its exemplary instance. The general argument includes the claim that such cases offer an in-depth engagement with experience that produces modes of understanding additional to other types of scientific reasoning. The psychoanalytic case in particular can demonstrate ways of being, feeling and thinking with general implications for the ‘human sciences’ and yet which tend to be occluded by statistical approaches such as those focused on in psychology. In this paper, I take up Forrester’s arresting account of the value of the individual case and apply it to the study of psychoanalysis itself. Do specific ‘cases’ of psychoanalytic institutional functions, such as those we have been investigating in Brazil, reveal general attributes of psychoanalysis? And to what extent can reports of such ‘cases’ be trusted when there are often problems about confidentiality and ethical concerns that block publication or wide discussion of their findings? One problem with psychoanalytic case reports is that they are often fictitious in their published form; is this also the situation with institutional cases and if so, what can be rescued from them when trying to trace a reliable history of psychoanalysis?