Le lend-lease américain pour l'Union soviétique

Abstract

American Aid for the Soviet Union under Lend Lease. The article deals with the military and civil aid which the United States made available to the USSR during the Second World War. The authors begins by outlining the historical, political, military and economic circumstances which led up to and accompanied the granting of aid under Lend-lease to the USSR ; the article describes how Lend-lease functioned, and analyses the important part played by the transfer of American technology in the Red Army's potential and its victories. The author takes a fresh look at a number of questions, including particularly the following : Would Stalin have capitulated in 1942 if he had not received immediate aid from abroad ? Could the USSR have fed, clothed and shod its army, transported it and equipped it, without the delivery of 115 million metres of cloth, 14.5 million boots, and shoes, 1 million tonnes of cereals, 2 000 locomotives, 1 1 000 wagons and other rolling-stock ? Could the Red Army have maintained tactical communication among troops dispersed over several fronts without the assistance of some 38 000 radio receiver-transmitters, tens of millions of kilometres of wire and cable ? Could Stalin's headquarters seriously have thought it possible to ensure the security of their northern frontiers, particularly at Murmansk, their main supply port, without having obtained from the Americans the exclusive use of 735 boats and warships ? Could the Battle of Stalingrad ever have proved a turning-point in the war without American technology, without the Fords, Dodges and Studebakers which enabled 10 Russian divisions, organized in the greatest secrecy far from Stalingrad, to be moved up over several hundred kilometres in a single night ? Finally, could the Soviet army in 1945 have moved ahead of the Allied Forces in several East European countries, had it not been for the 12 000 American aircraft, 13 000 combat vehicles (including 6 000 tanks) and 409 000 lorries and other rapid transport vehicles ? The author goes on to assess the value, in monetary and in relative terms, of the American contribution to the successes of the USSR in 1941-45. He calculates this contribution at a minimum of 17.9 % and a maximum of 26.9 % of the Soviet military- financial effort. The value of American aid appears comparable to the value of the net material product of the USSR for 1950. The last two sections of the article examine the question of the final settlement of the Soviet Union's contractual obligations under Lend-lease, and the reasons why the Soviet people are kept uninformed about the part played by the transfer of Western technology in their country. An appendix to the article contains lists of American material supplied to the USSR during the period 1941-45 under Lend-lease.