Abstract
This article examines the anticompetitive effects of land use regulation using microdata on midscale chain hotels in Texas. I construct a dynamic entry–exit model that endogenizes hotel chains’ reactions to land use regulation. My estimates indicate that imposing stringent regulation increases costs considerably. Hotel chains nonetheless enter highly regulated markets even if entry probabilities are lower, anticipating fewer rivals and hence greater market power. Consumers incur the costs of regulation indirectly in the form of higher prices.
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