Labelled Sequent Calculi for Lewis’ Non-normal Propositional Modal Logics

In this paper, a proof-theoretic method to prove uniform Lyndon interpolation (ULIP) for non-normal modal and conditional logics is introduced and applied to show that the logics, $\textsf{E}$, $\textsf{M}$, $\textsf{EN}$, $\textsf{MN}$, $\textsf{MC}$, $\textsf{K}$, and their conditional versions, $\textsf{CE}$, $\textsf{CM}$, $\textsf{CEN}$, $\textsf{CMN}$, $\textsf{CMC}$, $\textsf{CK}$, in addition to $\textsf{CKID}$ have that property. In particular, it implies that these logics have uniform interpolation (UIP). Although for some of them the latter is known, the fact that they have uniform LIP is new. Also, the proof-theoretic proofs of these facts are new, as well as the constructive way to explicitly compute the interpolants that they provide. On the negative side, it is shown that the logics $\textsf{CKCEM}$ and $\textsf{CKCEMID}$ enjoy UIP but not uniform LIP. Moreover, it is proved that the non-normal modal logics, $\textsf{EC}$ and $\textsf{ECN}$, and their conditional versions, $\textsf{CEC}$ and $\textsf{CECN}$, do not have Craig interpolation, and whence no uniform (Lyndon) interpolation.

In previous publications, it was shown that finite non-deterministic matrices are quite powerful in providing semantics for a large class of normal and non-normal modal logics. However, some modal logics, such as those whose axiom systems contained the Löb axiom or the McKinsey formula, were not analyzed via non-deterministic semantics. Furthermore, other modal rules than the rule of necessitation were not yet characterized in the framework.In this paper, we will overcome this shortcoming and present a novel approach for constructing semantics for normal and non-normal modal logics that is based on restricted non-deterministic matrices. This approach not only offers a uniform semantical framework for modal logics, while keeping the interpretation of the involved modal operators the same, and thus making different systems of modal logic comparable. It might also lead to a new understanding of the concept of modality.

The topic of this paper may be introduced by fast zooming in and out of the philosophy of information. In recent years, philosophical interest in the nature of information has been increasing steadily. This has led to a focus on semantic information, and then on the logic of being informed, which has attracted analyses concentrating both on the statal sense in which S holds the information that p (this is what I mean by logic of being informed in the rest of this article) and on the actional sense in which S becomes informed that p. One of the consequences of the logic debate has been a renewed epistemological interest in the principle of information closure (henceforth PIC), which finally has motivated a revival of a skeptical objection against its tenability first made popular by Dretske. This is the topic of the paper, in which I seek to defend PIC against the skeptical objection. If I am successful, this means – and we are now zooming out – that the plausibility of PIC is not undermined by the skeptical objection, and therefore that a major epistemological argument against the formalization of the logic of being informed based on the axiom of distribution in modal logic is removed. But since the axiom of distribution discriminates between normal and non-normal modal logics, this means that a potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of being informed among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. And this in turn means that a formalization of the logic of being informed in terms of the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) is still very plausible, at least insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned. In short, I shall argue that the skeptical objection against PIC fails, so it is not a good reason to abandon the normal modal logic B as a good formalization of the logic of being informed.

The topic of this paper may be introduced by fast zooming in and out of the philosophy of information. In recent years, philosophical interest in the nature of information has been increasing steadily. This has led to a focus on semantic information, and then on the logic of being informed, which has attracted analyses concentrating both on the statal sense in which S holds the information that p (this is what I mean by logic of being informed in the rest of this article) and on the actional sense in which S becomes informed that p. One of the consequences of the logic debate has been a renewed epistemological interest in the principle of information closure (henceforth PIC), which finally has motivated a revival of a sceptical objection against its tenability first made popular by Dretske. This is the topic of the paper, in which I seek to defend PIC against the sceptical objection. If I am successful, this means – and we are now zooming out – that the plausibility of PIC is not undermined by the sceptical objection, and therefore that a major epistemological argument against the formalization of the logic of being informed based on the axiom of distribution in modal logic is removed. But since the axiom of distribution discriminates between normal and non-normal modal logics, this means that a potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of being informed among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. And this in turn means that a formalization of the logic of being informed in terms of the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) is still very plausible, at least insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned. In short, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against PIC fails, so it is not a good reason to abandon the normal modal logic B as a good formalization of the logic of being informed.KeywordsModal LogicFactual InformationInformation LogicSceptical ArgumentNormal Modal LogicThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

In this chapter, the principle of information closure (pic) is defined and defended against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of ‘S is informed that p’ among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of ‘S is informed that p’ should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be, insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other words, this chapter argues that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of ‘S is informed that p’, which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.

In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of “\(S\) is informed that \(p\)” among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of “\(S\) is informed that \(p\)” should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of “\(S\) is informed that \(p\)”, which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.

This dissertation is devoted to the study of non-normal (modal) systems for deontic logics, both on the propositional level, and on the first order one. In particular we developed our study the Multi-relational setting that generalises standard Kripke Semantics. We present new completeness results concerning the semantic setting of several systems which are able to handle normative dilemmas and conflicts. Although primarily driven by issues related to the legal and moral field, these results are also relevant for the more theoretical field of Modal Logic itself, as we propose a syntactical, and semantic study of intermediate systems between the classical propositional calculus CPC and the minimal normal modal logic K.

A Tableau Decision Procedure for <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" altimg="si1.gif" overflow="scroll"><mml:mi mathvariant="script">ALC</mml:mi></mml:math> With Monotonic Modal Operators and Constant Domains

A number of significant contributions in the last four decades show that non-normal modal logics can be fruitfully employed in several applied fields. Well-known domains are epistemic logic, deontic logic, and systems capturing different aspects of action and agency such as the modal logic of agency, concurrent propositional dynamic logic, game logic, and coalition logic. Semantics for such logics are traditionally based on neighbourhood models. However, other model-theoretic semantics can be used for this purpose. Here, we systematically study multi-relational structures, whose investigation is still relatively underdeveloped. After a brief introduction to two different versions of multi-relational semantics – which we call strong and weak multi-relational semantics – we proceed to study several modal schemata. Special attention is paid to the schemata CON and D. Finally we offer completeness proofs for several systems using both strong and weak semantic tools: The proofs thus cover both classical systems and N-monotonic systems.

This paper provides a proof-theoretic study of quantified non-normal modal logics (NNML). It introduces labelled sequent calculi based on neighbourhood semantics for the first-order extension, with both varying and constant domains, of monotone NNML, and studies the role of the Barcan formulas in these calculi. It will be shown that the calculi introduced have good structural properties: invertibility of the rules, height-preserving admissibility of weakening and contraction and syntactic cut elimination. It will also be shown that each of the calculi introduced is sound and complete with respect to the appropriate class of neighbourhood frames. In particular, the completeness proof constructs a formal derivation for derivable sequents and a countermodel for non-derivable ones, and gives a semantic proof of the admissibility of cut.

Canonical models are of central importance in modal logic, in particular as they witness strong completeness and hence compactness. While the canonical model construction is well understood for Kripke semantics, non-normal modal logics often present subtle difficulties - up to the point that canonical models may fail to exist, as is the case e.g. in most probabilistic logics. Here, we present a generic canonical model construction in the semantic framework of coalgebraic modal logic, which pinpoints coherence conditions between syntax and semantics of modal logics that guarantee strong completeness. We apply this method to reconstruct canonical model theorems that are either known or folklore, and moreover instantiate our method to obtain new strong completeness results. In particular, we prove strong completeness of graded modal logic with finite multiplicities, and of the modal logic of exact probabilities.

The aim of the paper is to offer a dialogical interpretation of non-normal modal logic which will suggest some explorations beyond the concept of nonnormality. This interpretation will be connected to the discussion of two issues, one more philosophical and the second of a more technical nature: namely a minimalist defence of logical pluralism and the difficulties involved in the application of the so-called Hintikka strategy and hybrid languages while constructing tableau-systems for non-normal modal logics. At the end of the 19 century Hugh MacColl (1837-1909), the father of pluralism in formal logic, attempted in the north of France (Boulogne sur mer) to formulate a modal logic which would challenge the semantics of material implication of the post-Boolean wave. It seems that in some of his various attempts MacColl suggested some systems where the rule of necessitation fails. Moreover, the idea that no logical necessity has universal scope or that no logic could be applied to any argumentative context seems to be akin and perhaps even central to his pluralistic philosophy of logic. Some years later Clarence Irwin Lewis furnished the axiomatics for several of these logics and since then the critics on the material implication have shown an increasing interest in these modal logics called "non-normal". When Saul Kripke studied their semantics of "impossible worlds" as a way to distinguish between "necessity" and "validity" these logics reached a status of some respectability. As is well known, around the 70s non-normal logics were associated with the problem of omniscience in the epistemic interpretation of modal logic, specially in the work of Jaakko Hintikka and Veikko Rantala. Actually impossible worlds received a intensive study and development too in the context of relevant and paraconsistent logics -

In the first part of this paper we analyzed finite non-deterministic matrix semantics for propositional non-normal modal logics as an alternative to the standard Kripke possible world semantics. This kind of modal system characterized by finite non-deterministic matrices was originally proposed by Ju. Ivlev in the 70s. The aim of this second paper is to introduce a formal non-deterministic semantical framework for the quantified versions of some Ivlev-like non-normal modal logics. It will be shown that several well-known controversial issues of quantified modal logics, relative to the identity predicate, Barcan’s formulas and de re and de dicto modalities, can be tackled from a new angle within the present framework.

We introduce Pretopologically-Neighborhoood Modal Logic (PNML), a formal framework for reasoning about local knowledge and uncertainty based on pretopological neighborhood semantics. Unlike classical Kripke or general neighborhood models assuming global structural properties or arbitrary accessibility, PNML restricts neighborhood systems to satisfy the axioms of pretopological spaces, i.e., upward closure and self-inclusion, without requiring intersection stability or closure under arbitrary unions. This enables a finer-grained representation of agents’ information in contexts where only partial or locally available knowledge is relevant. We define the truth conditions for modal operators in terms of pointwise neighborhood filters, introduce a basic axiomatic system and prove its soundness/completeness with respect to the full class of pretopological frames, ensuring that the syntactic and semantic components of the logic are aligned. Then, we examine the expressivity of PNML in relation to both normal and non-normal modal logics, arguing that pretopological constraints introduce structural distinctions not captured by standard neighborhood models, particularly under minimal closure conditions. We present examples illustrating the framework’s utility in modeling observer-dependent scenarios, including epistemic uncertainty, context-sensitive reasoning and localized inference. Notably, PNML may accommodate settings in which traditional modal logic either overgeneralizes or underrepresents the dynamics of localized information. By grounding modal reasoning in pretopological structure, PNML may apply to distributed computing with local inputs, quantum mechanics involving contextual observation, cellular signaling and ecological systems in biology, modal update operations under information change, connections to fixpoint and coalgebraic semantic frameworks, proof systems for local inference and real-world modeling of belief revision and protocol verification.

Modal logics see a wide variety of applications in artificial intelligence, e.g. in reasoning about knowledge, belief, uncertainty, agency, defaults, and relevance. From the perspective of applications, the attractivity of modal logics stems from a combination of expressive power and comparatively low computational complexity. Compared to the classical treatment of modal logics with relational semantics, the use of modal logics in AI has two characteristic traits: Firstly, a large and growing variety of logics is used, adapted to the concrete situation at hand, and secondly, these logics are often non-normal. Here, we present a shallow model construction that witnesses PSPACE bounds for a broad class of mostly non-normal modal logics. Our approach is uniform and generic: we present general criteria that uniformly apply to and are easily checked in large numbers of examples. Thus, we not only re-prove known complexity bounds for a wide variety of structurally different logics and obtain previously unknown PSPACE-bounds, e.g. for Elgesem's logic of agency, but also lay the foundations upon which the complexity of newly emerging logics can be determined.