Abstract
This article deals with the epistemological consistency of synonymy. When synonymy is defined as equality of meaning, it turns out to be a factually impossible relation. Therefore, scholars distinguish between full synonymy (ideal concept) and partial synonymy (real phenomenon). We argue that this distinction must be discarded in order to maintain consistency in synonymy. We propose that synonymy does not consist in the absence of different semantic nuances between meanings, but rather in the condition for finding different semantic nuances between meanings. This condition is interpreted as sharing the same “predicative schema” in the sense of Gaston Gross.
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