‘“La princesse anglaise”: Lady Burghersh, British diplomats’ wives, and the defeat of Napoleon, 1813–15.’

This essay explores the men who represented England (Britain following the Union of England and Scotland in 1707) between 1689 and 1789. It looks at what they were expected to do, at their origins, and at their careers. Reflecting the relative lack of importance of Switzerland in British diplomacy in the eighteenth century, resident British missions there were infrequent. In addition, most British diplomats sent to Switzerland were of relatively inferior social status, and most were appointed at a very junior diplomatic rank. In conclusion, British diplomacy and diplomats in Switzerland do not easily fit into the “ diplomatic culture ” which some historians have identified as developing in the eighteenth century and which clearly applies to the more important Courts to which Britain sent representatives after 1689.

ABSTRACTThis article takes a broad view of Anglo–Russian relations in the years between the Peace of Paris, 1856, and the death of Viscount Palmerston, 1865, examining the shifts within that period in an essentially high-political diplomatic history. It traces a number of strands in geopolitics, offering a sense of the competing strategies of the European Great Powers, particularly the roles of British diplomats: the private and public communication amongst prime ministers, foreign secretaries, ambassadors, ministers-plenipotentiaries and consular officials concerning British policy towards Russia in the post-Crimean War period. It outlines the principles that underlay that policy and the ways in which the diplomatic network observed the tsar and his advisors and agents, assessed the developing situation in Russia, Central Asia, and the Ottoman Balkans, made decisions, and implemented policy. It focusses on the diplomatists’ attitudes and perceptions—how they thought about Russia and British interests and how they worked to protect them. It also analyses British policy in light of the European dimension. The years 1856 to 1865 not only witnessed Russian attempts to undermine the Crimean settlement, they also saw revisionist Bonapartist France work to destroy the constraining Vienna system of 1815—primarily in northern Italy. These policies complicated British attempts to maintain the status-quo and defend their interests in the East. The evolving situation was highly complex.

The article discusses the goals and objectives of the British diplomats on the “Athos” track in the context of the diplomatic confrontation between Great Britain and Russia which relied extensively on the Church contacts in their Balkan politics. It explores such a little-studied aspect of the Athos problem as the role of Russian and British diplomats in addressing the issue of the Athos monasteries’ properties sequestrated by Alexandru Cuza, prince of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, through the lens of the activities of Sir George Bulwer-Lytton, ambassador to Constantinople, in the 1860s. It uses Lord Bulwer's participation in the work of European commissions and conferences, to illustrate the methods and practices of British diplomats aimed at forcing Russia out of the Balkan region (and even out of the Middle East): such as erosion of the credibility of the Russian Empire, defamation of its representatives in Greek communities and their displacement from principle foreign-policy objectives, and indoctrination into endless conflicts in the multinational environment of Orthodox monasticism on the Holy Mount. It shows that from the mid-19th century one of the primary instruments of British politics not only on Mount Athos, but also in the Orthodox East, as a whole, was the right of British subjects (Ionian Greeks in the case of Athos) to official support and protection of British diplomats, while Russian Athonites were deprived of that right due to the lack of official Russian patronage over Russian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. The confrontation between Great Britain and Russia in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean played a prominent role in the development of Russian-Greek relations and the occurrence of such a phenomenon as “Russian Athos”.

The paper examines the formation of the Soviet state and its place within the European international relations system in the first half of the 1920s both in the context of new principles of interstate and economic interactions and geopolitical transformations triggered by the First World War. In the case of Soviet Russia, the latter implied the need to break international isolation and economic blockade which pushed Soviet leaders to intensify efforts to restore economic and political ties with the Western states after the Civil War and intervention. The paper focuses on the peripeteias of interaction between the Soviet and British diplomacy at the key international summits of 1922 — the Genoa, the Hague, and the Lausanne conferences. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources from the Russian and British archives, as well as the memoirs of the participants, their official and personal correspondence, the author examines the achievements and miscalculations of Moscow and London in attempts to stabilize the Versailles-Washington world order on the eve and during these conferences. The author emphasizes that the Kremlin managed to pave the way for the diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik regime by the leading powers and to take part in the discussion on Black Sea straits regime, while Whitehall managed to strengthen imperial positions both in Europe and in the Middle East, although the prospects of rapprochement between Moscow and Berlin and Ankara remained a major concern for the Foreign Office. However, these conferences failed to address the issue of Russian debts and it continued to be an obstacle to the normalization of bilateral relations. The author highlights a number of other significant factors that affected the outcomes of the conferences: the lack of a coordinated foreign policy approaches both among the Bolsheviks and within the British government, the persistence of stereotypes about the Bolsheviks, as well as an emerging trend towards rapprochement between the vanquished and the revisionist states which was particularly dangerous for the Versailles-Washington order. As for the outcomes of the diplomatic rivalry between Moscow and London, the author concludes that these conferences provided the parties with an invaluable opportunity to discuss the key issues of bilateral relations and European big politics and can rightfully be considered an important step in the development of the post-war international relations from confrontation to constructive interaction.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming the three key dimensions of diplomacy and international relations—bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and public diplomacy—reshaping conflict resolution, negotiations, and global governance. The Russia-Ukraine war serves as a compelling case study illustrating AI’s impact on modern diplomacy. AI-driven tools, including cyber warfare, autonomous weapons, and disinformation campaigns, have significantly influenced the geopolitical landscape. In bilateral diplomacy, AI has improved intelligence gathering and predictive analytics, influencing negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and mediating states. Multilateral diplomacy has seen AI facilitate digital diplomacy, cybersecurity strategies, and global institutional responses. Public diplomacy has been revolutionized by AI-powered propaganda and social media manipulation, shaping public perception and influencing foreign policies. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of AI’s role in diplomacy through the lens of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, citing real-world examples and practical applications. It further highlights the ethical and security risks associated with AI, emphasizing the urgent need for global governance to regulate its use in international affairs.

This research paper explores the defense diplomacy efforts between Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a strategic step to strengthen bilateral relations and increase trust between the two countries. The paper begins by discussing the historical context and the importance of defense diplomacy in the post-World War II era. It then examines the concept of defense strategy and its evolution beyond military operations. The role of diplomacy, particularly soft power diplomacy, is highlighted as an essential tool in international relations. The paper further delves into the concept of defense diplomacy, its peaceful use of armed forces, and its significance in addressing security challenges and building trust among countries. The focus is on the defense diplomacy efforts between Indonesia and the UAE and their impact on regional defense and security cooperation. The researchers employ a qualitative descriptive approach and a case study design to analyze the defense industry and defense cooperation efforts within the perspective of defense diplomacy. The results and discussions section presents an analysis of Indonesia's defense strategy, highlighting the objectives, means, and approaches employed in defense diplomacy with the UAE. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of defense diplomacy in enhancing bilateral relations, promoting regional stability, and leveraging the strengths and resources of both countries in the defense industry.

This article discusses diplomacy and diplomatic missions. Diplomatic missions today fall under several headings. Embassies and consulates (or consulates-general) predominate in bilateral relations, although trade offices and other variations on the consulate also exist. Embassies are led by an ambassador; but between incumbents, and sometimes for reasons of tense relations or worse, they are headed up by a Chargé d’Affaires, ad interim. Staff within embassies fall under three broad headings: diplomatic staff, nearly always from the sending country and with a range of designations; support or administrative staff, also not nationals of the country in which the embassy is established; and support staff who are nationals of the country of accreditation, known as local (or locally engaged) staff. The role of diplomacy in areas such as political relations, goodwill creation, economic interests and trade, trade promotion and policy, and development assistance is also discussed.

Introduction. The article analyzes the main approaches to the interpretation of the concept of "international treaty" and its legislative consolidation in the provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On International Treaties". It is established that since the moment of Ukraine's independence, bilateral agreements have been signed, in particular with NATO, aimed at cooperation in the field of security and defense within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" program. It is noted that after the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine concluded a number of bilateral security agreements, the provisions of which provide for the cooperation of our state with Italy, Canada, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Denmark and Germany. It is determined that the provisions of all these bilateral security agreements, which were concluded between Ukraine and Western partners in 2024, provide for the provision of assistance in various areas, supporting our state in the process of full-fledged protection and restoration of territorial integrity, economic reconstruction and counteraction to Russian aggression. In addition, France, Germany, Denmark and Canada have expressed their readiness to provide macroeconomic and military financial support to Ukraine. Conclusion. The results of the analysis of bilateral security agreements between Ukraine, NATO and individual partner states have established the existence of a single and common aspiration of the international community to counter Russia's armed aggression, ensure peace and order both on the European continent and in the world as a whole. The conclusion of such agreements is a positive indicator for Ukraine in the field of international cooperation with foreign partners, and although these agreements require improvement, they serve as a basis for further formation of the international legal framework for security cooperation of Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine's active dialogue with foreign partners should ensure the unification of efforts to increase the defense capabilities of our state.

Nationalitet og Kirke i Danmark og Slesvig-Holsten i 1770-1920 med særligt henblik på Grundtvigs betydning

Reviewed by: Enterprising Empires: Russia and Britain in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia by Matthew P. Romaniello Eugene Miakinkov Matthew P. Romaniello, Enterprising Empires: Russia and Britain in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2019). Pp. 304; 7 b/w illus., 3 maps, 7 tables. $99.99 cloth. Enterprising Empires: Russia and Britain in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia by Matthew P. Romaniello convincingly challenges the traditional narratives of eighteenth-century Russian economic backwardness, showing that the Russian economy and its trading strategy was as sophisticated and successful as other European states. In the process, this revisionist book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of both the activities of the British Russia Company and the British attempts to break into the Eurasian markets, and, to a lesser extent, the calculus of Russian commerce and trade in the eighteenth century. The interdisciplinarity of this work is commendable: it stands at the intersection of economic history, transnational history, imperial history, and the history of information. It is also exceptionally readable, thanks to the methodological focus on qualitative evidence, which anchors the skillful deployment of lived history through various episodes and characters that move the analysis forward. Along the way, we meet vivid characters including the disaster that was John Elton; the suave Charles Whitworth; Claudius Rondeau; James and Katherine Harris; John Hobart; the [End Page 306] enterprising Peter Dobell; and the merchant family Shairp. In this emphasis on individuals rather than governments, the author follows the approach of the late Arcadius Kahan. The book is organized chronologically. Chapter 1 sets out the seventeenth-century background to Russia's emergence as a dominant supplier of raw materials for England and to the challenges that this new economic position brought to British diplomats and merchants. Chapter 2 covers the period of Peter I's reign. The first decades of the eighteenth century were spent by the British merchants and diplomats trying to secure from Russia a privileged trading treaty with a guarantee of lower customs duties for the British subjects than for other European states. They encountered little success in these negotiations, as there was not much that the British could offer to the young empire, while the Russian raw materials were still in great demand, due to Royal Navy's voracious appetite for pitch, hemp, and tar. It was at this time that the balance of trade began to turn in Russia's favor. Chapter 3 covers the middle decades of the century, including the Seven Years' War. It was a time when the Russian Empire took firmer control of its economy and trade, and as the author writes, was "far more developed than the British had recognized" (108). During this time, Russia moved adroitly to negotiate new contracts with China and Iran. Chapter 4 focuses on the long reign of Catherine II, describing the endless jockeying of French, Dutch, and British diplomats in this period for favorable trade contracts with the Russian empire. This chapter's account on the experiences of a Scottish merchant family engaged in this pursuit clarifies the book's larger argument that personal relationships and interactions carried more weight than international agreements and institutions in the daily lives of members of the merchant community. In this period, the Russian Empire also successfully expanded its trade in the Pacific and in Asia, at the expense of the British, and made advances in regulating its Baltic and Black Sea trade. Chapter 5 extends the previous chapters' focus on British-Russian trade negotiations and practices, discussing the significant challenge posed during the Napoleonic Wars by the United States to British trade interests. However, Chapter 6, the final chapter, shifts our attention quite abruptly from trade between Russia and Britain to trade between Russia and the United States and trade in the Pacific. This chapter is especially insightful, both in its assessment of the operations and struggles of the Russian American Company as it tried to enter new markets in the Pacific and its argument that it a later stage of these struggles would cause the 1867 sale of Alaska. In the Afterword, the author considers the end of the favorable balance of trade that eighteenth-century Russia had enjoyed with Britain. With the...

By the early 1820s, British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was at a crossroads. Historically shaped by the rivalry with France, the course of Britain’s future role in the region was increasingly affected by concern about the future of the Ottoman Empire and fears over Russia’s ambitions in the Balkans and the Middle East. The Regency of Tripoli was at this time establishing a new era in foreign and commercial relations with Europe and the United States. Among the most important of these relationships was that with Britain. Using the National Archive records of correspondence of the British consuls and diplomats from 1795 to 1832, and within the context of the wider Eastern Question, this book reconstructs the the Anglo-Tripolitanian relationship and argues that the Regency played a vital role in Britain’s imperial strategy during and after the Napoleonic Wars. Including the perspective of Tripolitanian notables and British diplomats, it

Throughout much of the nineteenth century relations between Britain and Germany were blessed not only by the absence of any fundamental conflicts of national interest, but also by positive factors tending to encourage friendly ties. Memories of the common struggle against Napoleon, the predominantly Protestant character of tioth countries, and the marriage of Queen Victoria to a German prince all suggested a natural affinity between them. German liberals and conservatives alike found much to admire in English political institutions, while Englishmen in turn approved the steps, however halting, by which many of the German states adopted constitutions and representative institutions.During the late 1840s British statesmen did appear to have recognized the benefits that would accrue for Britain through consolidation of the German Confederation, and there was also some discussion regarding the prospect of an Anglo-Prussian alliance. After 1846, thanks to Palmerston's stridency in the affair of the Spanish marriages, Britain lost the good will of France and thus remained diplomatically isolated in the face of the powerful conservative coalition of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Cadastral tax is long, but not quite glorious history [7]. Some U.S. states implement and enforce it already in final years of eighteenth century. In nineteenth century and also in United States, idea a tax on value of possess land propagated by Henry George – American writer, politician, economist and the most influential proponent implementation this assessment. He argued, that construction tax on value of possessed land they, will eliminate all other taxable [7]. Modernist at that time, cadastre system in Europe, was constructed in mid-nineteenth century, when register of this type created in France and Austria-Hungary. Parallel to these developments in various German states were formed different formal and legal solutions for cadastral tax. However, it only unified in 1936. Currently, system only addictive tax of property values is in many countries of the world including Europe Central, Western and Scandinavia. One of the biggest organizations for people professionally involved in real estate appraisal and taxation is the “International Association of Assessing Officers – IAAO”, aimed at promoting innovation (scientific research) and good practice, as well as providing education on assessing real estate and the taxation policy [1]. In Poland while tax system is dependent on area land and/or superficies a building or premises. Thus, owner of villa with an area equal 200 m2, localized on 10 acres plot in Warsaw’s downtown, are now paying little higher (compared to growth cadastral tax) then this one, which is charged to owner 10 acres plot built detached house with an area of 200 m2, located in eastern part of Poland, even though value of the first property, even ten times value of other property. In this regard, it is fairer cadastral tax, but in addition to its advantages should also take into account quite a lot disadvantages. Prediction its implementation, in terms of empirical data from other European countries, will be answer to question: whether initiation tax of value

This is the second of two articles exploring efforts at bridging the nuclear weapons gap between France and West Germany during the final decade of the Cold War. This gap existed in various ways: in the two countries’ respective international standing, with the relationship between Paris and Bonn complicated by France's possession of nuclear weapons; in their alliance choices, with their differing approaches to NATO military integration and strategy; and in their tactical nuclear military options (inseparable from conventional options), with the two countries fundamentally at odds over desirable procedures. The first article, published in the previous issue of the JCWS, explores the period from 1981 to 1986. This follow-on article covers the years 1986 to 1990. Although ultimately the dilemmas of nuclear sharing proved impossible to resolve, progress was made in the final years of the Cold War in narrowing differences between the two countries, whose bilateral relationship has been crucial for Europe and the West as a whole in the post–Cold War era.

For good reasons, few people think of the GDR as an immigration country. With millions of its citizens voting with their feet until 1961, and the subsequent desperate efforts to literally climb the wall that separated the two German states, the migratory route led out of rather than into the GDR. And yet, there was significant immigration to socialist Germany, most obviously when it came to the millions of Soviet soldiers who were stationed there between 1945 and 1990. By comparison the numbers of students and workers who arrived from other states of the Warsaw Pact or from Third World countries cooperating with East Berlin were fairly inconspicuous. Several tens of thousands took classes at venerable universities such as Greifswald, Jena and Leipzig, while a few hundred thousand came to work; in 1989, a mere 191,000 foreigners were living in the GDR, about half of them contract labourers ( Vertragsarbeiter ), who had been hired through bilateral agreements between their home countries and the GDR, and whose employment was explicitly temporary. Unlike its western counterpart which, after decades of denying reality, finally came to terms with the permanence of immigration in the late 1990s (although the current debate on refugees raises questions if and to what extent this understanding has taken roots), East Germany never turned into an immigration society.