Kosterich, Allie (2022). News nerds. Institutional change in Journalism. Oxford University Press

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Esta reseña examina News Nerds: Institutional Change in Journalism, de Allie Kosterich, poniendo de manifiesto su contribución al estudio de la evolución del periodismo en la era digital. Se subraya la figura emergente de los “nerds de las noticias” como nuevos agentes clave de esta transformación, en su integración de capacidades técnicas y narrativas. La crítica valora el enfoque teórico y la estructura analítica de la autora, pero también señala algunos puntos débiles, como su excesivo foco en redacciones de gran escala en Estados Unidos y una atención limitada a contextos diversos o a los dilemas éticos que plantea la digitalización del periodismo.

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