Abstract
I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it.
Highlights
Sometimes we believe p without knowing p
On the corresponding knowledge-first view ( ‘old’), to believe p is to Φ as if p were known, i.e. as if one knew p
An epistemicist about vagueness like Williamson (1996) would hold that whether a borderline case of a vague concept F falls in the extension of that concept cannot be known since knowledge entails safety, that is, that x could not have falsely believed p, and one could have had false beliefs about whether a borderline case of a vague concept F falls in the extension of that concept
Summary
A belief-first view of knowledge predicts this datum On such a view, knowing p is something like the conjunction of believing p with further factors, e.g. truth. A more promising option models a knowledge-first view on truth-first views of belief familiar from, e.g., Braithwaite (1932) and Marcus (1990).4 These views say, roughly, that to believe p is to Φ, for instance, be disposed to act, as if p were true.. Since new avoids under- and overgenerating in the way old does, it is a better starting point for assessing the prospects of going knowledge-first about belief. Whether it yields correct predictions in all cases, and so is plausible, is not my concern here.
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