Keith M. Finley . Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight against Civil Rights, 1938–1965 . (Making the Modern South.) Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press . 2008 . Pp. 340. $40.00.

Abstract

This book explores the role that the United States Senate's southern Democratic caucus played in obstructing the achievement of substantive civil rights reform. Keith M. Finley examines all of the rhetorical dimensions of the many arguments marshaled by southern senators against legislation to enact a federal anti-lynching statute, repeal poll taxes, create a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), end segregation in the South, and protect black voting rights. In this detailed assessment of political rhetoric and the legislative process, Finley finds both diversity within southern white opposition to racial change and continuity in how southern senators tried to slow its momentum. His study broadens our perspective on the civil rights movement, reminding us of the importance of national political events and, ironically, the national democratic process that empowered the southern caucus's program of “strategic delay.” Developed primarily by Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, “strategic delay” relied on manipulating Senate rules covering filibustering and cloture to thwart the progress of civil rights legislation from the late 1930s until the mid-1960s. By the 1930s, black voting power outside of the Deep South spurred the realization among members of the southern caucus that civil rights advocates were not going to stop pushing for change no matter how many battles they lost. Continued success in stymieing their program depended upon crafting a lasting coalition across regional and party lines. To attract northern Democrats and conservative Republicans, most southern senators moderated their most venomous racial rhetoric, replacing it with a bevy of legal, constitutional, political, and, upon occasion, even religious arguments. Under Senator Russell's tutelage, the southern caucus also recognized the political utility of compromise. Concessions on smaller, less significant reforms, such as the Soldier Voting Act of 1942, diminished the appearance of knee-jerk obstructionism, earning the goodwill of non-southern senators and making strident opposition to other civil rights legislation more palatable to their colleagues. Softening their racial rhetoric and employing constitutional and political arguments were combined with a masterful manipulation of Senate rules and seniority to become the heart of “strategic delay.” The southern caucus thus hoped to slow the movement for racial reform until it expired from a lack of momentum.