Abstract
Aim.To determine the ratio of the RKKA and Wehrmacht forces as of June 22, 1941 in terms of technical equipment in terms of the main types of expensive and resource-intensive weapons.Methodology.Statistical and comparative analyses of data on production and technical equipment of the main types of expensive and resource-intensive armaments of the Red Army and Wehrmacht for June 22, 1941 and the second half of 1941; analysis of technical specifications and memoirs for expert assessment of the quality of equipment and its competitiveness were carried out.Results.It is concluded that the USSR was prepared for war with Germany to a sufficiently high degree. As of June 22, 1941 the Red Army was not inferior to the Wehrmacht in technical equipment in those types of armaments which were the most costly in production and required for modern warfare - in tanks, aircraft and artillery. The existing problems of the Red Army in technical equipment were the problems of a rapidly growing army, preparing for war as quickly as possible, and these problems were not catastrophic. The USSR economy was able not only to equip the army before the war, but also to compensate considerably for the losses from the first strike within half a year. Having suffered significant losses in men and equipment in the first months of the war, the Red Army showed its ability to fight with what it had and under the conditions that are formed. The Wehrmacht and the German economy could not cope with such challenges.Research implications. The conclusions of the study can be used to continue research on the history of the USSR in the 1930s - early 1940s and to analyze the Great Patriotic War, as well as in teaching the course of Russian history.
Published Version
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