Judicial and Ethical Dimensions of Sexual Harassment Allegations Against Physicians: A Content Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions in Turkey.

This research discusses the Supreme Court decision Number: 813 K/Pid/2023 regarding the criminal law enforcement of premeditated murder committed by Ferdy Sambo. This decision changed the sentence for convicts from the death penalty to life imprisonment. This penal reduction needs to be studied using a constructivist paradigm. The constructivist paradigm will examine the operation of law in society which is influenced by people's experiences, whether social, religious, cultural, including ideological. The Supreme Court's decision provides legal considerations regarding mitigating reasons for the convict. This is the difference with the decisions of the lower courts. From a constructivist perspective, this is not quite right. It is necessary to state the factors of community experience in making decisions for convicts. Moreover, there was a dissenting opinion by the judge in adjudicating the Supreme Court's cassation decision Number: 813 K/Pid/2023. The difference of opinion is based on legal considerations that the reason for self-defense is forced, the self-respect or honor of the convict does not need to be considered. Then there are allegations of immoral acts whose truth has not been clarified by the convict to the victim. The reality of the experience was not explored enough in the decision, both social factors and environmental factors of the convict.This research discusses the Supreme Court decision Number: 813 K/Pid/2023 regarding the criminal law enforcement of premeditated murder committed by Ferdy Sambo. This decision changed the sentence for convicts from the death penalty to life imprisonment. This penal reduction needs to be studied using a constructivist paradigm. The constructivist paradigm will examine the operation of law in society which is influenced by people's experiences, whether social, religious, cultural, including ideological. The Supreme Court's decision provides legal considerations regarding mitigating reasons for the convict. This is the difference with the decisions of the lower courts. From a constructivist perspective, this is not quite right. It is necessary to state the factors of community experience in making decisions for convicts. Moreover, there was a dissenting opinion by the judge in adjudicating the Supreme Court's cassation decision Number: 813 K/Pid/2023. The difference of opinion is based on legal considerations that the reason for self-defense is forced, the self-respect or honor of the convict does not need to be considered. Then there are allegations of immoral acts whose truth has not been clarified by the convict to the victim. The reality of the experience was not explored enough in the decision, both social factors and environmental factors of the convict.

1. Introduction A stark contrast exists between the widespread application of positive political economy models in the study of the executive and legislative branches of government and the relative dearth of such work on the judiciary. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court is widely regarded as a totally independent body whose rulings are not influenced by political or other outside pressures. Indeed, the dominant political science model of Supreme Court decision making, the attitudinal model, argues that the rules and structures of the U.S. political system allow justices to vote sincerely without constraints from Congress and/or the president (Segal and Spaeth 1993). In contrast to this dominant view, several authors have begun to analyze Supreme Court decisions guided by the positive models of bureaucratic behavior that exist in both the economics and the political science literature. Toma (1991) finds that Congress signals its opinion of the Court's direction through budgetary allocations, and that budget changes have a significant effect on Court decisions. Her more recent work (Toma 1996) focuses on the role of the chief justice as an agent of Congress who reacts to budgetary signals to bring Court decisions in line with congressional preferences. Spiller and Gely (1992) find strong evidence of congressional influence over Court decisions in industrial labor relations cases. Caporale and Winter (1998) find support for the existence of both executive and congressional influence over Supreme Court decisions in criminal procedure cases. This paper investigates possible outside influences on Supreme Court decisions in economic cases. We find that Republican presidents and more conservative leadership of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees are significantly correlated with more conservative Supreme Court economic decisions. In addition, we find that conservative decisions are positively correlated with the fraction of the Court appointed by Republican presidents. This provides strong support for a presidential of appointment channel of judicial influence. Also, we find that the lagged inflation rate significantly influences the direction of the Court's economic decisions. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our results using an alternative measure of congressional ideology. 2. Theories of Supreme Court Behavior The Traditional Legal Model Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the Law. Chief Justice John Marshall, 18241 As recent legal analysts have noted, the vast bulk of legal scholarship and content of law school training largely rests on Justice Marshall's contention.2 Explicitly or implicitly, an assumption is made that court decisions are based centrally on reasoned arguments. This view, in which judges apply neutral principles and logical reasoning to the Constitution, prior precedents, or statutes in resolving cases is labeled the legal Perhaps the clearest proponent and strongest advocate of the traditional model was Christopher Columbus Langdell, the Harvard Law School's first dean.3 For the Langdellian judge, judicial decisions are based on logical reasoning or reasoning by example. Primary importance is placed on textual interpretation and legal precedent. From this framework, decisions can be viewed as inevitable conclusions based on the analysis of earlier cases. Clearly, this model left no room for any expression of judicial individuality or personal ideology. The Attitudinal Model In contrast to the formalism of the traditional model, political scientists have developed an alternative theory of Supreme Court (and other judicial) decision making: the attitudinal model. …

The normative contradiction between Supreme Court Decision Number 23 P/HUM/2024, which raised the age limit for regional head candidates, and Constitutional Court Decision Number 70/PUU-XXII/2024, which precisely nullified the norm regarding the minimum age limit, creates legal uncertainty and potential serious implications for the organization of the Regional Head Elections (Pilkada). This research employs a descriptive analytical method with a normative juridical approach to analyze the legal validity of Supreme Court Decision No. 23 P/HUM/2024 in relation to Constitutional Court Decision No. 70/PUU-XXII/2024 concerning the age limit for candidacy in the 2024 National Simultaneous Regional Head Elections. This approach primarily focuses on the study of library legal materials (secondary sources), which include primary legal materials such as the 1945 Constitution, laws pertaining to the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court, and relevant Supreme Court and Constitutional Court decisions. It also incorporates secondary legal materials in the form of legal scholars' opinions. Data collection was carried out through a literature review (document study), supplemented by limited field study, and analyzed using a qualitative juridical method to formulate answers to the existing legal issues. The research findings indicate that the Supreme Court's (MA) decision regarding the age limit for candidacy registration in the 2024 National Simultaneous Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) lacks binding legal force and there's no legal basis for the MA to review provisions stipulated by Law No. 10/2016 concerning Pilkada. In this instance, the MA has exceeded its authority. Consequently, the legal validity of the MA's decision, in light of the Constitutional Court's (MK) decision on the age limit for Pilkada candidacy registration, is deemed legally invalid under applicable laws and regulations. Therefore, with the MA's decision being invalid, the Constitutional Court's decision is the one that prevails.

Treating incompetent defendants: the Supreme Court's decision is a tough Sell.

This study aims to determine and analyze the authority of the Supreme Court in judicial review of the laws and regulations under the law and the legal consequences of the authority of the Supreme Court to instruct the makers of the regulations, in order to cancel the legal consequences caused by the laws and regulations. tested. The research method used is a normative juridical research type. The results of the study show that 1) The right of judicial review of laws and regulations at a lower level or under the law is the authority of the Supreme Court. The nature of the Supreme Court's Judicial Rights Decision, which is ex nunc or pro future, namely decisions that apply to the future. The Supreme Court in its decision stated that the statutory regulations requested for review were (1) invalid regulations or (2) not applicable to the public and (3) ordered the relevant agencies to revoke them; 2) the legal consequences of the RI Supreme Court decision Number 57/P/HUM/2019 against PKPU No. 3/2019 and PKPU No. 4/2019 that regarding the order to the KPU agency to revoke PKPU No. 3/2019 and PKPU No. 4/2019 which has been canceled within the 90-day deadline, is a logical consequence when a rule has been overturned by the Supreme Court. This provision is a form of affirmation of administrative actions that must be taken by the KPU that issued the regulation. The revocation must be carried out immediately, without the administrative action of the revocation, the Supreme Court's decision Number 57/P/HUM/2019 which has been declared to have no binding legal force is no longer enforceable.Keywords: Authority, Supreme Court, Judicial Review.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES PRESENT important new perspectives on the Little Rock school desegregation crisis. When Arkansas governor Orval E. Faubus, in the name of preserving order, directed the Arkansas National Guard to prevent nine black young people from entering Little Rock Central High School on September 2, 1957, he precipitated a constitutional crisis. Blocking a federal court order upholding the Little Rock School Board's attempted compliance the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions of 1954 and 1955 in Brown v. Board of Education, Faubus placed the governor's police powers at odds city authorities, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the Supreme Court itself. Yet the constitutional issues engendered by Faubus's actions remained abstract to most people except for legal experts. At the time and ever since, it was the practical consequences that garnered public attention: the consequences for the school board's good-faith effort to implement the token desegregation of a single city school in the face of growing hostility on the part of the white community, for Faubus's purported political ambitions, for the Eisenhower administration's inconsistent stance on the Brown decision even as it wrestled a Cold War propaganda battle over the same issue, for the authority of the Supreme Court as it confronted mounting opposition from southern segregationists and their northern conservative sympathizers, and, above all, for the courageous Little Rock Nine, bearing the painful assaults of racial animosity. The three essays that follow suggest how the litigation culminating in Cooper v. Aaron shaped these consequences and their ramifications for decades to come. The Cooper v. Aaron litigation went through several stages. The Supreme Court's Brown decision of 1954, holding that racially segregated public schools were inherently unequal and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, precipitated the Little Rock School Board's efforts to comply. Shortly before the Court handed down the 1955 Brown II order, which required desegregation plans to proceed with all deliberate speed but left their formulation to community school boards-subject to local federal court oversight-Little Rock school officials published a plan that opened only Little Rock Central High to token desegregation, maintained racial segregation at all other schools, and left unstated when those schools might be desegregated. Once the limited scope of desegregation became apparent, the Little Rock branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) rethought its earlier trust in the school board's good faith effort, and, in the name of black parents and children, initiated suit in 1956. Styled Aaron v. Cooper, the case was tried and decided during August 1956. The black litigants lost at trial and upon appeal in April 1957. As the summer unfolded and the nine black students prepared to enter Central, Faubus and city school officials confronted mounting hostility from segregationists. Meanwhile, the federal government declined to become involved. After various public and secret maneuvers, Faubus implemented a strategy defying the federal court's desegregation order. The ensuing three-week crisis culminated in Eisenhower's dispatch of the 101st Airborne to Little Rock, which ended the violence and enforced the court order. Inside Central High, the Little Rock Nine-Minnijean Brown, Elizabeth Eckford, Ernest Green, Thelma Mothershed, Melba Pattillo, Gloria Ray, Terrence Roberts, Jefferson Thomas, and Carlotta Walls-endured continuous harassment. School officials responded by asking the federal court for a two-and-a-half-year delay in implementation of the desegregation decree. Although the local federal court awarded the delay, the NAACP appealed. The U.S. circuit court, sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, upheld the NAACP's argument that Little Rock's desegregation plan had to continue to be enforced. …

Unequal reproductive justice under the law

There are five major Supreme Court precedents related to inheritance and gift taxes for 2022. In this article, the above five precedents were divided into facts, issues, the position of the Supreme Court, and the significance and evaluation of the judgment in chronological order.
 First of all, the Supreme Court's ruling on March 11, 2022, on whether to invalidate the enforcement ordinance related to Article 41 (1) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, reaffirmed the position of the Supreme Court's ruling of 2015Du45700 on April 20, 2017 and the Supreme Court's decision of 2019Du35695 on September 9, 2021. The above judgment is valid in that the scope of gifts through corporations is limited through interpretation. However, it is necessary to review whether it is right to follow the materiality and clarity test of the illegality of administrative disposition.
 Second, the Supreme Court's ruling on the taxation and additional tax on the deeming property registered in name of another person to have been donated related to the acquisition of new stocks on September 15, 2022 is about the legal interpretation of the old tax and gift tax law in which the gift tax payer was in principle a trustee at the time of title trust. The target judgment judged that the case in which the title truster acquired new shares as collateral and transferred them under the same person's name, but before the transfer was made, the case in which the loan was repaid with the sale price of the existing title trust shares was not different. From the perspective of sanctions on the total amount of property that is difficult to grasp by title trust, it must be judged as the subject judgment. In addition, it was confirmed for the first time that the subject judgment should be based on the name trustee to determine whether the additional tax is imposed based on the taxpayer. If the above logic is applied to the current tax increase law, it should be judged based on the title truster who is liable for tax payment.
 Third, the Supreme Court's 2022Du33712 ruling on the scope of cancellation of disposition on May 26, 2022 reaffirms the previous precedent (Supreme Court March 28, 1997) that only the portion exceeding the legitimate tax amount should be canceled if the lawsuit for cancellation of the tax disposition exists. It is reasonable in that there is no need to appeal again for parts that exceed the legitimate tax amount.
 Fourth, the Supreme Court's ruling on November 10, 2022, 2020Du52214 is a precedent on whether to recognize self-gifts related to Article 45-3 of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act (before amended by Act No. 13557 on December 15, 2015). The above ruling is the first case in which the donor and the recipient cannot be said to be the same, even though the controlling shareholders of the beneficiary corporation are shareholders of a related corporation at the same time. Given that agenda regulations that are disadvantageous to taxpayers need to be interpreted in a limited way, it is necessary to review whether the above judgment is correct.
 Finally, the Supreme Court's decision on December 29, 2022 on the method of calculating gift profits according to the comprehensive exchange of stocks followed the previous precedent (the Supreme Court's decision on March 29, 2018) that gift taxes should be levied by applying Article 42 (1) 3 of the former Inheritance Tax Act. In addition, the target judgment clarified the application of Article 31-9(2)5(b) of the Enforcement Decree of the former Inheritance Tax Act (before amended by Presidential Decree No. 20621 on February 22, 2008), which is the basis for calculating the gift property value of a company that becomes a full subsidiary due to stock exchange.

'Abstract idea' exception to patent-eligible subject matter clarified

Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws

Except with regard to the death penalty, the story of modern sentencing reform has not been about constitutional law. While changes in capital sentencing have been required and shaped by interpretations of the Eighth Amendment,1 most other reforms to state and federal sentenc ing systems have been legislative developments driven principally by policy considerations rather than constitutional concerns. Indeed, in numerous cases challenging various sentenc ing laws over the last half century, the Supreme Court regularly upheld a wide array of non capital sentencing systems and often stressed the considerable deference to be shown to legislative judgments in the sentencing arena.2 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey3 has significantly altered this story. In Apprendi, the Court struck down a New Jersey sentencing scheme which raised a defendant's maximum possible sentence based upon a sentencing judge's finding, by a pre ponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's crime was committed with a racially biased purpose. Drawing upon ideas developed in cases from the last two terms interpreting federal statutes,4 the Supreme Court in Apprendi concluded that it is unconstitutional for a legisla ture to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed ... [and] such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.5 In short, the Apprendi Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.6 By establishing this constitutional limitation on the procedures attending a legislative sentencing scheme, Apprendi is indisputably a significant decision for modern sentencing reforms. However, the split 5-4 vote and the five separate opinions delivered by the Justices raise many questions about the exact scope and import of the Court's ruling. Following up our examination of sentencing procedures in Issue 12.4, FSR devotes this issue to an appraisal of the meaning and likely impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi. In this issue, leading academics provide analysis and commentary which helps bring into focus just what the Apprendi decision may entail for federal and state sentencing reform efforts. Our commen tators' examination of Apprendi also reveals that the ultimate meaning and impact of the deci sion will depend not only on the future rulings of federal and state courts, but also on the future work of legislatures and sentencing commissions.

According to the Supreme Court's unanimous decision on August 25, 2022(2017 DA 257067), the general legal principles regarding shared property in civil law cannot be directly applied to the “shared relationship” of collective building land. Therefore, co-owners of divided land, who hold a reasonable share corresponding to the ratio of exclusive parts in the collective building, have a legal authority to use and profit from the entire land according to its intended purpose. As a result, a land co-owner who is not a divided land owner cannot claim unjust enrichment against a divided land owner with a reasonable share based on the land co-owner's share rights. The conclusion of this unanimous decision by the Supreme Court emphasizes the obligation of unjust enrichment for divided landowners based on two factors: (1) the emphasis on the substantive use relationship of land use rights and (2) the economic viability of this conclusion. This perspective appears reasonable.
 The Supreme Court’s viewpoint, as presented in the unanimous decision, assumes the “shared relationship,” which is the typical ownership structure of land use rights in collective buildings. However, it is necessary to examine whether there is a change in legal relationships in cases where non-co-owners divide and separately (or jointly) own rights such as ownership of part of the land, apart from the shared relationship.
 The focus of this paper, the Supreme Court’s decision on November 28, 2019(2017 DA 294608), addresses issues related to unjust enrichment concerning land use rights when a single collective building is situated on multiple separate lots. While acknowledging the legal and economic validity of the unanimous decision, this paper critically analyzes the decision on the obligation of unjust enrichment. It suggests the need for legislative measures to clarify and advance future judgements or legal relationships regarding unjust enrichment in land-use relationships.

There are several decisions of the Constitutional Court (MK) regarding judicial review which are not only difficult to implement in practice but also followed-up in a variety of ways. Several norms in the Criminal Code (KUHP) and the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), are some of those that are often petitioned for review at the Constitutional Court. There are two main problems in this paper, first, how is the implementation of the Constitutional Court decision in a criminal case followed-up by the Supreme Court (MA)? Second, how should the Supreme Court's decision follow-up in criminal cases? This study concludes, first, the follow-up after the Constitutional Court's decision (especially judicial review) in criminal cases by the Supreme Court in the form of Supreme Court Circular Letter (SEMA), Supreme Court Regulations (PERMA), and there are even those who ignore the Constitutional Court's decision because the Supreme Court’s decision still rests on the provisions that have been canceled by the Court. Second, to follow-up on the Constitutional Court's decision by the Supreme Court in a criminal case, a legal product in the form of a Supreme Court Regulation must be issued. This is necessary for the smooth running of the judiciary or to fill legal gaps and loopholes resulting from the Constitutional Court's decision. For this reason, the People's Representative Council (DPR) and the Government should immediately revise the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code so as not to create a legal vacuum, so as to provide justice and legal certainty for the community.

Whether American courts either do or should represent public opinion is a long‐debated issue. Some court rulings agree with nationwide public opinion polls, while others do not. Overall, does the appeals process bring judicial policy‐making more closely into line with American public opinion? Evidence from nationwide polls since the mid‐1930s suggests that U.S. Supreme Court decisions and federal appeals courts decisions better represent American public opinion than do the decisions of federal district courts or of state courts. A lower‐level court decision that agrees with nationwide public opinion is much more likely to be upheld upon appeal by an upper‐level court. The Supreme Court's certiorari decisions disproportionately select for review lower court decisions that disagree with nationwide polls. Five reasons for this pattern are offered.

This study is applied a descriptive-normative method which used to explain, describe, and analyze a particular event that is a proceeding submitted by the plaintiff against environmental pollution and damage, namely landslides on Mount Mandalawangi, using the concept of illegal acts The results of this study are: First, the compensation applied in the case of the Mount Mandalawangi landslide is based on the strict liability principle. The implication of the theory stated that the injured complainant is not required to prove the mistakes made by the defendant. Even if the defendant can prove that he is blameless, but there is a clear and proven impact of the loss in court, the defendant still obliged to pay for the compensation. Secondly, the Supreme Court's cassation decision is in accordance with the provisions of the prevailing laws and regulations in Indonesia, especially in the case of illegal acts, both confirmed in Article 1365 of the Civil Code (KUHPer) or regulated in the Protection Law and Environmental Management (UU-PPLH).Keywords: Environmental law, strict liability, claim for compensation, Supreme Court