Judge Perkins' Criticism of the Y. C. A.

Abstract

In an article in the July-August issue of this JOURNAL, Judge Perkins comments interestingly upon the American Law Institute's proposed Youth Correction Act. His is an important criticism of the proposal because it cogently expresses a type of opposition which must be reasonably dealt with before adoption of the Act can be expected. I believe Judge Perkins would agree with me that condensation of his comment brings it down to an admission that the present method of dealing with known criminals is somewhat stupid and wholly unsatisfactory, but that the method should be left as it is rather than that the provisions of the Youth Correction Act should be adopted. The first of these propositions-that the existing system sadly needs change-I imagine no one would think of disputing. But Judge Perkins' objection to adoption of the proposed Act seems wholly disputable, on two grounds. In the first place, he considers only one aspect of the Act and ignores its other propositions. I hope to show that his criticism of even that aspect is not truly sustained. But for the moment assume that it is sound; it still does not militate against adoption of the rest of the Act, which covers three quite separable and individually maintainable proposals for improvement in the present methods of dealing with convicted criminals. Its fundamental objective-in this sense its one objective-is protection of the public against further, repeated, crime by convicts who have already been dealt with. But it seeks that end through several processes. Without taking space to amplify them in this attempt to meet Judge Perkins' particular criticism of one of them, they may be described as follows: 1. The Act recognizes the fact that segregation of a convicted criminal from society is not always and inevitably necessary for the protection of society against further crime on his part; that actual imprisonment may, on the other hand, conduce to character degradation and increased likelihood of repeated crime; and that, in consequence, as a matter of social safety, some individuals ought not to be actually confined in prison at all, others should be released after a comparatively brief period of confinement, and still others cannot safely be released for considerable periods. The Act therefore invests a Commission with power to determine when segregation is no longer necessary to the prevention of further crime and