John Rawls: A Theory of Justice

Abstract

It may be helpful to those who are not familiar with Rawls to plot his position against a better-known moral theory, namely utilitarianism. At any rate, on this side of the Atlantic, where no modern charter contains the compact under which we consent to be governed, the defence of truth and justice has most often in the last hundred years appeared to be in the hands of the utilitarians. This raises two immediate questions: first, is justice a department of morality? And second, do we by this mean to commit ourselves further to the position that the province of justice is not (whatever be the case for the rest of morality) governed by the principles of utility? After looking at these questions, we can go on to assess the particular solution proposed by Rawls. It is perfectly possible to be, broadly, an utilitarian and yet to give the principles of justice a special status. For instance, in The Concept of Law, Professor Hart carefully distinguishes fairness (which roughly covers justice) from morality in general.1 And Hart, I suppose, is a modern utilitarian. Why should the two ever have been confused? The explanation can be found by looking at Mill's chapter on the connection between justice and utility.2 Mill rightly saw the idea of justice as an obstacle to the simple test of utility in assessing right and wrong. People, that is, went on referring to this rather old fashioned notion, and seemed remarkably attached to it, despite being urged to look to expediency instead. But to Mill, this notion of justice had to be either irrational or the reflection of the operation of a perhaps concealed principle of utility.