Japan’s 70 Years of International Cooperation: Diversification in ODA from the Late 1990s to the Present

THE TOPIC presents a major challenge; it is difficult to say something new and useful given the many reports on the subject and the excellent advice provided in two recent papers on directions for Canada.1 I have, therefore, attempted a slightly different approach, expanding on issues not often covered elsewhere, an effort in the spirit of John Holmes. I believe that the trends, constraints, and choices made as part of the larger themes have a more significant impact on the role in development cooperation than is normally acknowledged. An overly narrow frame does not allow for a full strategic overview of the most important issues and their interconnections. My article starts with the larger issues that provide the framework within which development cooperation policy must be developed and implemented. I argue first that development assistance and cooperation efforts are vital to self-interest and are not merely an expression of charity. I then touch on a few lessons from the past and some new emerging issues that will have to be considered in developing new policies and structures. Finally, I present a few directions for the future and some errors that should be avoided.CANADIAN INTERESTS AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION Development cooperation is generally viewed only through the lens of altruism; the picture is of Canada contributing to the welfare of other people, usually non-white and poor, the charitable orientation of the people translated on their behalf by the federal government. In this arrangement, CIDA has been the principal institutional mechanism through which over 80 percent of the money, goods, and services are transferred to the deserving poor. As ClDA describes it, development cooperation is a tangible measure and expression of Canadian values-humanitarianism, generosity, equality and social justice.2 I have no doubt that we all support the view that existing orders of inequality in the world are a disgrace and that contributions to reduce poverty, ill health, and other gross deprivations are a required expression of our ethical principles.But I also argue below that development cooperation serves important hard interests, including security, sovereignty, and prosperity. It is important to start with hard interests: the soft principles of altruism, good will, and charity of Canadians proved insufficient to prevent the decline of resources towards the less well-endowed during the decade of the 1990s. The decline followed the demise of the former Soviet Union in 1989, which marked the end of the Cold War and removed the perception of a hard interest in the form of a need to influence poor countries. Many commentators saw the end of the Cold War as providing a peace dividend. Both resources and attention would shift from defence to development. In Canada, the following decade saw the decline of all allocations to matters outside-defence, foreign affairs, and development cooperation.During the decade of the 1990s, while Canada's GDP grew from $570 billion in 1992s to $1200 billion in 2003,4 a growth of over 100 percent, the allocations for Canada's official development assistance (ODA) fell both as a ratio of ODA to GDP as well as in absolute amounts. This brought Canada down from the middle ranks of the 22 donor countries of the OECD to the bottom three or four in terms of the ratio of ODA to GDP. contributions plunged to 0.22 percent, very close to the US and far from our highest levels of almost 0.55 percent. It is far lower than our 35-year-old commitment to reach 0.7 percent. It is also far from the almost one percent provided by like-minded countries in northern Europe. If Canada had met its long-standing commitment by 2003, the resources currently available for ODA would have been $8.4 billion instead of around three billion.This reduction of resources happened in spite of the fact that 44 percent of Canadians believe that the country allocates inadequate resources to foreign aid and 57 percent of Canadians have said that they are in favour of an increased tax at the rate of one percent dedicated to international poverty removal programs. …

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to present policy directions that would enhance the effectiveness of Korea’s development cooperation projects in Africa. Design/methodology/approach - This study drew the limitations and implications of existing development cooperation policies through the review of Korea’s development cooperation policy flow, determinants and aid effectiveness in Africa. Findings - Due to cultural diversity among different countries, it is not possible to apply the same principles and strategies to all countries selected as priority partner countries for development cooperation. It was found that Korean development cooperation policy for African countries has promoted development cooperation projects focusing on political and economic interests from the perspective of the donor rather than focusing on the improvement of the quality of life for the people and to eradicate poverty in the recipient country. Research implications or Originality - When looking at some of development cooperation projects managed by KOICA, they seem to have had difficulties in terms of ensuring effectiveness due to a top-down approach and insufficient participation of local residents. Therefore, Korean international development cooperation needs to seek a policy shift based on new concepts of soft power, which is completely different from its existing policy.

In 2005, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) approved the aid effectiveness principles for improving the impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Donor countries such as Spain understood this agenda as an opportunity to promote gender equality in their development co-operation policy. However, gender equality almost disappeared as a priority in most of the bilateral agreements after 2005. This puzzling outcome leads me to ask how the implementation of the Paris principles made gender equality less of a priority, and how the feminist movement can ensure that gender equality and women’s rights are at the centre of this agenda. To answer these questions, I examine the negotiation process of the Peruvian–Spanish Strategic Framework 2013–2016. This case shows how exclusionary informal mechanisms may leave women’s rights organisations out of negotiation processes. I argue that connections of feminist and women’s movements with ‘femocrats’ and gender critical actors inside state machineries are crucial to defend gender equality as a priority sector. This is particularly relevant in the post-COVID-19 scenario and the global goal of ‘building back better’ with a gender lens. Without the participation of gender justice advocates in aid negotiation processes, it becomes more difficult to prioritise gender equality in bilateral co-operation agreements and, consequently, to allocate funds for women’s rights organisations.

Purpose: Using the new institutionalist approach (incentive analysis), this study examines the factors that encourage or impede private sector engagement (PSE) in development cooperation projects from the business perspective. Originality: Despite the quantitative and qualitative growth in official development assistance (ODA) in Korea over the past decade, PSE in development cooperation projects remains low compared to other advanced donor countries, and PSE are relatively small in scale. Therefore, a comprehensive and analytical understanding of the specific factors that either promote or hinder such participation is necessary to enhance PSE in Korea's development cooperation ecosystem. Methodology: This study surveys a sample of 42 employees at domestic companies, who either intend to participate in or have previously participated in international development cooperation projects, with the aim of examining their ‘motivations’, ‘demand’, and ‘evaluation’. The responses of these companies were collected and analyzed to provide insights into the factors that influence PSE in development cooperation. Result: Discrepancies were identified between the commonly held perceptions and the actual responses of companies towards the underlying reasons for the low PPP levels, in the areas of motivation, demand, and evaluation. Although Korean firms have shown increased awareness of ODA and corporate social responsibility, the gap between the awareness and actual participation was found. Among others, the lack of relevant information and institutional accessibility are considered negative factors for PSE. Conclusion and Implication: Based on the findings of this study, it is highlighted that mechanisms for matching and coordinating projects and companies are crucial to promote extensive and meaningful private sector participation in development cooperation

This chapter discusses the legal nature of EU development cooperation and how the competence of the EU and those of the Member States in the area relate to each other. It discusses first the distinct nature of the EU development cooperation competence, as an irregular shared or non-pre-emptive shared competence, and the effects that this has on the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. The second part of the chapter analyses how the principle of sincere cooperation, as formulated in Article 4(3) TEU, governs the management of the division of competences between the European Union and its Member States in the area of development cooperation. In particular, the obligations stemming from the principle of sincere cooperation policy are analysed in depth to answer how they govern the management of the vertical division of competences in development cooperation policy. In this respect, a distinct analysis is made of the positive duty to cooperate and the negative duty to abstain.

This article revisits the post–World War II evolution of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) over the past 75 years, with a particular focus on the period starting from the 1980s and subsequent changes in Japan’s international development cooperation policies. I address cornerstones such as human security and quality growth, while examining the role of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), shifts and continuities in regional visions and sectoral priorities, such as infrastructure development. I argue that the threefold mix of key drivers behind Japan’s development cooperation has remained consistent, involving developmentalism stemming from Japan’s own experience of successful modernisation from a non–Western background, neo–mercantilism, as well as strategic and geopolitical considerations. The relative weight and interplay of these factors, however, fluctuated in different periods.

(Analysis on Development Issues in Central Asia and Its Implications for Korea's Development Cooperation)

Introduction This chapter addresses the meaning and significance of the Development Cooperation Charter (DCC), endorsed by the second administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in February 2015, in the context of the US-Japanese relationship (MOFA 2015b). According to Marie Soderberg (Chapter 1, this volume), the DCC “opens up opportunities for more cooperation between security and development”, including funding for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). Furthermore, Bart Gaens argues (Chapter 9) that Japan has been making the best strategic use of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) under the guidance of the new National Security Council (NSC), which was established in December 2013. Both authors highlight the important issue of the securitization of Japan’s ODA or development assistance. Given the importance of this trend, this chapter analyses the security aspects of the DCC. It argues that the DCC was a major response to the US “pivot to Asia” and is indicative of Japan’s strategy of strengthening the division of labour between the United States and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. In effect, the DCC commits Japan to non-military peacebuilding roles, including economic assistance, while at the same time fending off excessive pressure from the USA for Japan to take on a greater military burden. Many scholars have analysed Japan’s ODA from various perspectives. Some have focused on domestic decision-making processes to understand how Japan’s ODA is formulated (Higuchi 1991; Koppel and Orr 1993; Orr 1990; Rix 1993). Many have been highly critical of Japan’s ODA (Murai and ODA Chōsa Kenkyūkai 1989; Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA Shuzaihan 1990; Soderberg 2010; Sumi 1989). One controversial issue is whether Japan’s ODA has any clear national philosophy. Japan’s ODA has been criticized as ad hoc and uncoordinated, and for precipitating confusion in recipient countries (Kawata 1977;Orr 1990; Rix 1980; Wright-Neville 1991). Meanwhile, others have praised Japan’s ODA (Hanabusa 1991; Kusano 1993), asserting that it has a clear guiding philosophy. This philosophy involves using ODA to gain economic benefits (Murai 1998; Tuman and Strand 2006), helping those who help themselves (Nishigaki, Shimomura and Tsuji 2004; Watanabe 1991 2005, p. 57), and achieving national economic security for Japan (Matsui 1983). It is important to understand the decision-making processes, value judgments, and philosophy behind Japan’s ODA. At the same time, ODA is an important diplomatic tool for Japan and, as Raymond Yamamoto discusses in Chapter 5, the securitization of ODA has been increasing. Hence, it is also necessary to analyse the relationship between Japan’s ODA and US policy – as the USA is Japan’s most important diplomatic and most senior security partner. Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr, Jr. (1993) argue that throughout the 1980s, Japanese officials made the most of US pressure on Japan to expand its ODA budget, as it provided Japan with an alternative to military burden-sharing in the US-Japan alliance. Koppel and Orr, however, insist that this does not explain the whole picture. Rather, they conclude that Japan’s ODA policy was the result not of US pressure, but of Japan’s substantial domestic economic, political, and cultural interests. Other scholars have claimed that external pressure has had no significant impact on the development of Japan’s ODA (Fujibayashi and Nagase 2002, p. 83; Murai 1998; Tuman and Strand 2006, p. 75). On the other hand, Motoki Takahashi and Masumi Owa (Chapter 2, this volume) suggest that the ambiguity of Japan’s ODA reflects the nature of a reactive state – a state that responds primarily to external pressure, especially that of the USA, but lacks an independent, proactive assistance policy. Soderberg (2010) also takes the effect of US pressure on Japan more seriously, claiming that the contribution of Japanese ODA to peacebuilding is just rhetoric and camouflage to resist US pressure to make a greater military contribution on the international stage. This chapter examines and expands upon Soderberg’s thesis by analysing the importance of the DCC in the context of US-Japanese security relations, in the light of which the Japanese contribution to peacebuilding may be seen as not just rhetoric, but a clever tactic to solidify the division of labour between the USA and Japan.

This paper is concerned with the terminology the European Union (EU) has created and used with regard to its development cooperation policy during its existence. The idea of fostering the development of less privileged countries by means of preferential trade agreements and financial aid was already incorporated in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, making development cooperation one of the Union's oldest policy areas. Both the concrete concepts and the respec- tive terms applied have been subject to continuous change, the more so as they were strongly influenced by the political and economic situation at the time. The purpose of the paper is to illustrate how tools and techniques developed in corpus linguistics can assist terminologists in compiling terminological information. It presents some of the results of a detailed diachronic study of the English terminology of the EU's development cooperation policy, aiming to describe the conceptual and terminological changes in this field over time. The analysis is based on a corpus of EU texts and supported by linguistic software, viz. WordSmith Tools. The generation of key words and word clusters is complemented by the establishment of terminological domains, which represents a helpful way of structuring the terms, thus facilitating the identification of the main topics of the underlying texts. The use of corpora in terminology opens up the possibility to gather both conceptual and linguistic as well as usage information about the terminological units. It also allows the analysis of concordances that can help to reveal ideological aspects of the terminology involved. The findings may contribute to the knowledge and understanding of European development cooperation among professionals in European and national bodies as well as scholars and teachers in the field of development cooperation.

Over the years, Official Development Assistance (ODA) transferred to Ukraine has evolved from supporting the state’s systemic transformation to assisting a war-torn country. After the unprovoked and illegal full-scale attack by Russia, launched on 24 February 2022, Ukraine became the most significant global ODA recipient. Despite the limited ODA contributions of the Visegrad Group (V4) countries, supporting Ukraine remains an essential part of their identity as donors and distinguishes them from others. This paper aims to trace the progress of the securitisation of four donors’ assistance to Ukraine in shifting conditions of aid delivery. Therefore, answering the question of how the security objectives have been incorporated into V4 donors’ ODA to Ukraine to serve their national security better is crucial. By applying the framework of aid securitisation, it is demonstrated that these states’ support to Ukraine intends to promote donors’ security interests. However, as the research shows, the ODA transfers to Ukraine exemplify the divergences in V4 countries’ development cooperation, and the securitisation of aid varies across donors. The differences result from the general assumptions of their foreign and security policies, mainly the state of bilateral relations with Ukraine, donors’ approach to Russia and anticipation of its threats.

This chapter investigates the extent to which the European Union (EU)1 has incorporated climate change into its development cooperation policy. It describes the EU’s development cooperation policy, its evolution and its main principles (see Section 6.2), and focuses on the process of delivering aid (see Section 6.2.5). Subsequently, this chapter explains how the policy areas of climate change and development cooperation have become linked over time (see Section 6.3), elaborates on how current EU policy incorporates climate change into development cooperation (see Section 6.3.2), and outlines the policy tools that are employed to incorporate environmental issues in general, and climate change in particular, into development cooperation programming (see Section 6.3.3). Finally, it assesses the current status of climate incorporation in EU development cooperation (see Section 6.4), and draws conclusions (see Section 6.5).

Despite the dominance of development economics in the study of foreign aid and development cooperation since the 1950s, particularly with the emergence of modernization theory, an examination of academic contributions to the larger debates in international relations (IR) reveals something not extensively documented in the scholarly literature. It is that the study of foreign aid and development cooperation is inherently intertwined with IR, constituting an integral component thereof. Understanding the evolution of foreign aid and development cooperation studies, as well as its interaction with IR theories, is essential for deciphering the contemporary theoretical, normative, methodological, ontological, and epistemological challenges faced by the field. Investigating the historical evolution of this field in relation to IR involves analyzing, in parallel, its development alongside shifts in the international order. The historical analysis highlights how foreign aid and development cooperation have been shaped by changing power structures, ideological shifts, and geopolitical events, underscoring its inseparable connection to broader IR dynamics and its theorization. The interconnected nature of these domains demonstrates how prevailing theoretical perspectives influence not only the methods employed but also the identification of underlying forces and the normative principles guiding research, as well as the design of foreign aid and development cooperation policies. Analyzing how epistemological approaches, such as rationalism and reflectivism, have influenced the investigation of narratives and practices within the realms of foreign aid and development cooperation reveals potential elements of theoretical complementation. Beyond mere theoretical differentiation, there are elements that contribute significantly to fostering notions of dialogue, pluralism, and interdisciplinarity within the field of foreign aid and development cooperation studies. The prevailing trend is a movement toward theoretical eclecticism, wherein researchers increasingly draw upon a variety of theoretical frameworks to better grasp the intricate dynamics of foreign aid and development cooperation. This transformation stems from the evolving nature of global challenges and the recognition that a singular theoretical approach may fall short in capturing the multifaceted dimensions of foreign aid and development cooperation. Moreover, it underscores the dynamic and evolving nature of the field, emphasizing the need for interdisciplinary approaches and theoretical flexibility to address the complex issues surrounding foreign aid and the discussion of the concept of development in times of global planetary crisis.

Jointly the EU Member States and the European Union provide more than half of all development assistance in the world. The European Union's development cooperation policy was first launched with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, but only in 1992 were specific provisions on EU development cooperation introduced at Treaty level. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, most of these provisions were carried over in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty has, however, introduced a number of both minor and major novelties, and certain parts of the provisions have been re-arranged. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty proposes to introduce a higher degree of consistency in the European Union's external relations - including also its actions in the field of development cooperation. This article sets out to provide a brief but systematic examination of the extent to which the substantive provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will affect the direction of the Union's development cooperation policy. To this end, it first provides an outline of how this policy has developed from the Union's inception until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It then goes on to identify the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty before finally providing an evaluation of the changes.

This book is the first legal treatment of tied aid and examines in detail the compatibility of tied aid with EU and WTO law. The workings of the aid projects and aid procurement systems of donor countries granting bilateral aid are fully examined through case studies from the UK, Italy, the EU and the US.

Although Japan’s official development assistance (ODA), a key foreign policy instrument, has been traditionally characterized by a heavy focus on infrastructure development through loan operations, the 1992 ODA Charter was revised in 2003 to incorporate human security as a core principle of Japanese ODA, establishing a nexus between development cooperation and security policy. However, the rise of China—particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative announced in 2013—and Japan’s severe economic and fiscal situation have ushered in a new era of securitization of ODA. In 2022, Japan adopted a new National Security Strategy that stipulates the strategic use of ODA. The subsequent revision of the Development Cooperation Charter in 2023 marked a significant shift in Japanese foreign aid policy, emphasizing national interests and security. This study argues that the securitization of ODA, including economic security, represents the most significant change in recent Japanese ODA policy.