Jaśkowski’s Discovery and Various Ways to Master Contradictions

This article introduces, studies, and applies a new system of logic which is called ‘HYPE’. In HYPE, formulas are evaluated at states that may exhibit truth value gaps (partiality) and truth value gluts (overdeterminedness). Simple and natural semantic rules for negation and the conditional operator are formulated based on an incompatibility relation and a partial fusion operation on states. The semantics is worked out in formal and philosophical detail, and a sound and complete axiomatization is provided both for the propositional and the predicate logic of the system. The propositional logic of HYPE is shown to contain first-degree entailment, to have the Finite Model Property, to be decidable, to have the Disjunction Property, and to extend intuitionistic propositional logic conservatively when intuitionistic negation is defined appropriately by HYPE’s logical connectives. Furthermore, HYPE’s first-order logic is a conservative extension of intuitionistic logic with the Constant Domain Axiom, when intuitionistic negation is again defined appropriately. The system allows for simple model constructions and intuitive Euler-Venn-like diagrams, and its logical structure matches structures well-known from ordinary mathematics, such as from optimization theory, combinatorics, and graph theory. HYPE may also be used as a general logical framework in which different systems of logic can be studied, compared, and combined. In particular, HYPE is found to relate in interesting ways to classical logic and various systems of relevance and paraconsistent logic, many-valued logic, and truthmaker semantics. On the philosophical side, if used as a logic for theories of type-free truth, HYPE is shown to address semantic paradoxes such as the Liar Paradox by extending non-classical fixed-point interpretations of truth by a conditional as well-behaved as that of intuitionistic logic. Finally, HYPE may be used as a background system for modal operators that create hyperintensional contexts, though the details of this application need to be left to follow-up work.

A limited effort is made in this article to compare and contrast Durkheim and Spencer, with particular emphasis on their theories of societal evolution and their basic approaches to social science methodology. It is concluded that, while Durkheim's sociology was heavily inSluenced by the work of Spencer, it differs in certain basic respects. To the extent that subsequent generations of sociologists have embraced the 'paradigm' of Durkheim and rejected that of Spencer, the effect upon macro-level sociological theory has been highly constricting. Much can be gained from a study of the strengths and weaknesses of both theorists, and from a more balanced perspective. ' Who now reads Spencer? ' intoned Talcott Parsons (quoting Crane Brinton) in the opening line of his own now seldom-read work, The Structure of Social Action. 1 'Spencer is dead. ' Whether or not this declamation was a self-fulfilling prophesy, it is certainly true that Herbert Spencer-who had once been lionized as perhaps the greatest mind of the nineteenth century-went into eclipse and became a virtual non-person among many twentieth century social scientists.2 Emile Durkheim, by contrast, came to be widely hailed as a 'founding father' of sociology, despite the fact that he owed much to Spencer. (Consider, for instance, the index to The Divzsion of Labor in Society,3 Durkheim's preeminent and most frequently cited work. It contains forty-three references to Spencer. The next most frequently mentioned author, Auguste Comte, is cited c)nly eighteen times. ) Indeed, there is a cutious tendency among historians of sociology to pass Spencer by and skip directly from Comte to Durkheim, despite the fact that Comte died in 1857, six years after Spencer's landmark Social Statics appeared, while Durkheim was born in 1858 and did not publish his first major work until 1893, near the end of Spencer's prodigious (albeit controversial) career. TheBrsttsh Journal of Sociology Volume 33 Number3 September 1982 i) RK.P. 1982 0007 1315/82/3303-0359 $1.50

The launch into orbit of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, in 1957, represents a turning point in human history. From that moment on, Russia declared the competition with the United States open, and this particular period, now generally known as the “Space Race”, demonstrates how a new element like Outer Space, could make huge changes in the classic dynamics of state relations. The Space Race was truly the most spectacular aspect of the Cold War. Because of the great “spectacle” that followed the first satellites launches, the first experiences with living beings on board, until the human exploration of space, the race between the US and the USSR, is something relatively known. Less known, on the contrary, is the role of the third country in the world, after the US and USSR to launch its own satellite into orbit; Italy. The San Marco Project, planned by his founding father, Prof. Lieut. Luigi Broglio, marked the beginning and the earliest development of Italian space activities. The Paper deals with the first years of the San Marco Project history, from the birth of the idea,to the first tests, introducing the relevant role of the Italian physicist Edoardo Amaldi, and reconstructing the facts before the launch of the first Italian Satellite in 1964.

If one were to inquire from Americans the names of five founding fathers, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson will more often than not be mentioned amongst them. Apart from being among the founders of the republic, these two men presided over the republic as well. It is accurate to say both founding fathers were prolific writers who left behind a wealth of literature their progeny could look to when it came to the intricacies of politics and the nature of man. The aim of this thesis is to unveil the metamorphosis of a political order via the views and opinions of these two American icons. It is almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, yet many states still grapple with the concept of statecraft and nation-building. From the newly created states in the Balkans to the half-century independent states in Sub-Saharan Africa, statecraft and societal advancement have proven problematic. A core factor in the societal and developmental crises within these states arises from the lack of a proper theoretical understanding of the concept of the state and its limits within the human sphere. While it would be foolhardy for aspiring states to adopt the American mode of politics lock, stock, and barrel, one would have to admit the American political experiment has proven successful. For one, it is the world’s oldest republic as well as the most prosperous nation known in the history of mankind. While not all states will achieve world historic wealth and prosperity; life, liberty, and the realization of a prudent political order should be the bare minimum every state should aspire to. In this guise, Adams and Jefferson serve as timeless guides towards the realization of a prudent political order.

ThisPaperhas a fairly clear overall argument: that the relationship between State and Society in large-scale societies changed dramatically with the advent of industrial capitalism. Prior to that development, the State and the state bureaucracy played a substantially autonomous rolevis-à-visthe class structure of civil society. After that its autonomy has been negligible: indeed, for most analytic purposes the State can be reduced to class structure. Such an argument is by no means original. For example, its outlines were commonplace among eighteenth and nineteenth-century theorists. In this paper I draw somewhat on Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer. For one particular argument I am indebted to the contemporary sinologist Owen Lattimore. The idea of such a dramatic shift in the history of society is nowadays extremely unfashionable, however. Today theorists usually present essentially the same view of state-society relations throughout human history. Most Marxists reduce the state to being contingent upon the ‘determining’ categories of ‘mode of production’ and ‘class struggle’. Functionalists present a theory of structural differentiation which occurs so early in human evolution that in all recorded history the relationship between, and relative autonomy of, economy and polity are essentially unchanging. Weberians, in arguing for the autonomy of each element of ‘the structure of social action’, also give a picture of the mutual independence of state and economy throughout history. In all three cases, the caution and specificity of the theory of the ‘founding fathers’—Marx, Spencer and Weber—is thrown to the wind.

In this paper, we deal with the problem of putting together modal worlds that operate in different logic systems. When evaluating a modal sentence $\Box \varphi $, we argue that it is not sufficient to inspect the truth of $\varphi $ in accessed worlds (possibly in different logics). Instead, ways of transferring more subtle semantic information between logical systems must be established. Thus, we will introduce modal structures that accommodate communication between logic systems by fixing a common lattice $L$ that contains as sublattices the semantics operating in each world. The value of a formula $\Box \varphi $ in a world with lattice $L^{\prime}$ will be defined in terms of the values of $\varphi $ in accessible worlds relativized to $L^{\prime}$ using the common order of $L$. We will investigate natural instances where formulas $\varphi $ can be said to be necessary/possible even though all the accessible world falsify $\varphi $. Further, we will discuss frames that characterize dynamic relations between logic systems: classically increasing, classically decreasing and dialectic frames. Finally, we formalize the semantics of considering worlds operating in classical logic or logic of paradox, exemplifying the kind of issue one should face in this kind of formalization.

In intuitionistic logic system, constructive negation operator complies with the law of contradiction but not the law of excluded middle in intuitionistic logic system.In da Costa’s paraconsistent logic system , paraconsistent negation operator complies with the law of excluded middle but not the law of contradiction. Putting aside classical negation operator, both intuitionistic logic and da Costa’s paraconsistent logic establish logic systems by directly introducing new negation operators basing on the positive proposition logic. This paper attempts to make constructive negation operator and paraconsistent negation operator satisfying the conditions mentioned above in classical logical system.Oppositional logic is an extended system of classical propositional logic. It can be obtained from the classical propositional logic by adding an unary connective * and introducing the definitions of two unary connectives ∆ and ∇. In oppositional logic system, there are four kinds of negation: the classical negation ¬ complying with both law of contradiction and law of excluded middle, the constructive negation ∇ complying with law of contradiction but not law of excluded middle, the paraconsistent negation ∆ complying with law of excluded middle but not law of contradiction, as well as the dialectical negation * complying with neither law of contradiction nor law of excluded middle.This paper gives the proof of the soundness and completenesstheorem of oppositional logic. It also gives the following conclusions:[1] Oppositonal logic can be a kind of tools for paraconsistent theory and intuitionistic theory; the famous Duns Scotus law does not hold according to the paraconsistent negation and the dialectical negation;[2] In oppositonal logic, according to the unary connective ¬, * , ∇ and ∆, A is in contradictory opposition with ¬A; A is in subaltern opposition with *A; A is in contrary opposition with ∇ A; A is in subcontrary opposition with ∆ A. In this sense, we call the logical system mentioned above oppositional logic.Keywordsnegationoppositional logicparaconsistentintuitionism

The United States Constitution is the foundational document of the longest and most successful democratic experiment in modern human history. It not only serves as the legal bedrock for the world’s most powerful nation-state but also, more broadly, reflects that nation’s fundamental commitments as a society. Who then has the authority to interpret a blueprint of such extraordinary influence? Americans have come to treat the Constitution as somehow beyond the purview, even the competence, of the average American citizen. Only lawyers, judges, and academics are deemed fit to state what exactly the Constitution means. This elitist reliance on expert judgement is a radical and troublesome departure from the founding fathers’ intent. America’s Founding generation, in darling contrast, embraced a political ideology that celebrated the central role of the “the people” in supplying government with its energy and direction, an ideal that remained at all times in the forefront of their thinking-Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike. In this groundbreaking interpretation of America’s founding and of its entire system of judicial review, Larry Kramer reveals that the colonists fought for and birthed a very different system—and held a very different understanding of citizenship—than Americans believe to be the norm today. “Popular sovreignty” was no historical abstraction nor was the notion of “the people” invoked largely as a flip rhetorical convenience on the campaign trail. Important trials and the prospective passage of the influentional legislation such as the Alien Act—which granted a president the power to imprison or even deport immigrants—were met with vigorous public debate. The outcomes were greeted with celebratory feasts and bonfires, or riotous resistance. In short, Americans drew a clear parallel between the law and the lived reality of their daily existence. Theis self-sovreignty in law as much as politics was active not abstract. With this book, Larry Kramer vaults to the forefront of Constitutional interpretation. In the process, he rekindles the original spark of “we the people”, inviting every citizen to join him in enlivening the seemingly deadened sensibilities that mark the relationship between Americans and their constitutional past, present, and future.

Social media is awash with the latest discoveries about the human past. Headlines read: “DNA of ancient skeleton linked to modern indigenous peoples,” “Ancient DNA suggests the first Americans sidestepped the glaciers,” and “Ancient DNA reveals secrets of human history.” These headlines all come from respected outlets with a connection to the academic community (Smithsonian, Science, and Nature, respectively). However, news media outlets with a more popular audience have also become interested in the stories and histories being revealed about our ancestors through modern and ancient DNA, and new toolkits include a heavy bioinformatics component. As expected, these headlines are a bit more sensational: “Are you tall? Then thank your ancient cousins: Neanderthal DNA still helps dictate your HEIGHT and whether you suffer from lupus and schizophrenia” reads a Daily Mail headline about Neanderthal admixture. Another reads: “The ‘founding father’ of Europe: DNA reveals all Europeans are related to a group that lived around 35,000 years ago.” Yet another, seemingly contradictory, headline reads: “Europeans drawn from three ancient ‘tribes.’” Communications technology has evolved in lockstep with advances in DNA recovery and analysis over the last two decades, perhaps giving the impression that studies of past population movements are a recent development. However, interest in “ancient migrations” has a deep history in western science, beginning with analyses of the skull using what are now referred to as biological distance methods.

To understand what might be meant by democracy, and what its consequences might be, we must first understand the principles that underlie the design of political democracies. Our feelings and attitudes about within organizations that is to say, derive very much from our attitudes toward and experiences with the democratic political institutions that govern our country. The prestige of the label industrial democracy is determined very much by the value we attach to our democratic rights and privileges in our society as a whole. The United States has had a long history of experience with a democratic political and social system. Just a few years ago, we celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of our democratic institutions. Since those institutions have survived and prospered for such a long time, we may gain some valuable lessons from their history, and from the thinking of those who were responsible for their design and construction the Founding Fathers, men like Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and Washington. For them, was a very complex sort of institution. Now it is not necessary that the meaning of to the men who wrote the American Constitution be the same as the meaning of to us today. Human institutions change in response to human conditions and human experience. Perhaps human beings sometimes even learn from human history, although that is a more debatable proposition. It is certain that human institutions adjust as time goes on. In spite of the passage of time, and in the light of the 200 years of more or less successful experience of American political institutions, we would do well to take very seriously the practical judgment, the knowledge and experience, that went into their construction, and the political sophistication of the men who put those institutions together. What was the conception that the Founding Fathers held of democracy? It was woven out of at least four separable and distinguishable ideas: 1. The first is the idea of political the idea that those who hold the power of the state should be elected by the population, and should thereby be made accountable to them. Of course, in the beginning, general population did not mean all adults, or even all adult males, but

History Below Deck:An Interview with Marcus Rediker Jeffrey J. Williams (bio) and Marcus Rediker The factory, whether in the Midlands of England making cloth or the Midwest of the U.S. making steel, seems the quintessential institution of the rise of capitalism, and those toiling in it the archetypical worker. Marcus Rediker calls attention to a less visible realm of labor, the sea, telling about those who worked on ships, particularly sailors and pirates, during the age of sail on the Atlantic. Rediker first staked out this history in Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (1987), and expanded it in The Many Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, co-authored with Peter Linebaugh (2000). Alongside those, he also collaborated on Who Built America? Working People and the Nation's Economy, Politics, Culture, and Society, vol. 1 (1990), which shifted the focus from founding fathers in conventional histories to the movements of working people who shaped history. Rediker's investigation of the age of sail led to his pathbreaking account of the vehicle that made slavery possible, The Slave Ship: A Human History (2007), which describes the various people who staffed, invested in, and were human cargo on those seagoing "factories of capitalism," as he puts it. Complementing that book, in The Amistad Rebellion: An Atlantic Odyssey of Slavery and Freedom (2012), he unpacks one of the few successful resistances of those enslaved. Throughout, Rediker has foregrounded such moments of resistance. His Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (2004) and Outlaws of the Atlantic: Sailors, Pirates, and Motley Crews in the Age of Sail (2014) focus especially on pirates, and The Fearless Benjamin Lay: The Quaker Dwarf who Became the First Revolutionary Abolitionist (2017), shines light on an unlikely eighteenth-century pacifist hero. In addition, Rediker has co-edited two books on the Atlantic during the age of sail, and written a film, Ghosts Of Amistad: In The Footsteps Of The Rebels, with Tony Buba (2014). [End Page 547] Born in 1951, Rediker attended Vanderbilt University and Virginia Commonwealth University (BA, 1976), doing his graduate work at the University of Pennsylvania (PhD, 1982). He has taught at Georgetown and the University of Pittsburgh, where he is a Distinguished Professor of Atlantic History. This interview, conducted and edited by Jeffrey J. Williams, took place in Pittsburgh, PA, on June 6 and 12, 2019. Jeffrey J. Williams: How would you encapsulate the kind of history that you do? Marcus Rediker: I do "history from below." It focuses on the people who have been left out of the narratives of the past, especially those based on the nation-state. It's not just a matter of having sympathy for their lives but about how ordinary working people have made history and how their collective actions have frequently shaped history. A lot of the history I write has been hidden. I try to recapture lost voices and get close to the experience of unknown, frequently anonymous people. The great difficulty of doing this kind of history is that the people I study didn't usually create any documents of their own, so this work requires reading many different kinds of documents that were usually produced by the ruling classes and their allies, and reading them against the grain. Sometimes you're reading the archive of repression, but I'm especially interested in the active agency of unknown people in shaping both the archive and history. JJW: Your first book, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, gives an account of sailors and sets out your project. It's a history of the working class, but it's not about a factory as we usually think of them. One of your points is that we conceive of the sea as an empty space, but the sea was the prime conduit of capitalism as it developed in that era, and sailors were its chief workers. How were you drawn to study sailors instead of other workers? MR: Actually, when I went to graduate school in 1976, I intended to be a...

The founding fathers of the Indonesian Republic, Soekarno and Moh. Hatta, who became first President and Vice President respectively, designated the agricultural sector as the major factor contributing to Indonesia’s economic growth. Prof Anne Booth’s research findings during the Green Revolution in the mid-1970s also indicate the importance of the agricultural sector. Food self-sufficiency in the country was achieved in 1985, when Indonesia was close to its “take-off” stage. However, subsequent developments after the New Order period indicated a gradual shift of policy guide lines from People’s Welfare to Export-driven Growth and Increasing Foreign investment. Five Presidents since Sukarno have neglected the urgency of agrarian reform in Indonesia. Keywords: Agriculture, Food policy, Land use, Population

Mary Antin was not modest in her use of the possessive case inThe Promised Land— in her iterations ofMine, Mine, Mine. While still a schoolgirl, Antin asserted that everything she saw in the Boston Public Library, a “treasure house” of wisdom and art, was “Mine.” As the child of a newly naturalized American, she felt entitled to claim possession; the library and its treasured holdings were “Mine,” she said, “because I was a citizen; mine, though I was born an alien; mine … My palace —mine! … This is mine” (266, original emphasis). By the time Antin came to the soaring conclusion ofThe Promised Land, she had exchanged her natural (and naturalized) father for the country's Founding Father, and as the child of George Washington, she claimed as her “heritage” everything in human evolutionary history that had led to the creation of America and everything yet to be evolved. “I am the youngest of America's children,” she wrote, “and into my hands is given all her priceless heritage … Mine is the whole majestic past, and mine is the shining future” (286). In swooping hyperbole, Antin equated American citizenship with possession, and possession with inheritance, property, and rights: with a treasure house in which she “had a right to be … at home” (266).

Random Reflections of a Founding Witness

G. Priest and R. Routley. First historical introduction. A preliminary history of paraconsistent and dialethic approaches. Paraconsistent logic, Essays on the inconsistent, edited by Graham Priest, Richard Routley, and Jean Norman, Analytica, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, Hamden, and Vienna, 1989, pp. 3–75. - Ayda I. Arruda. Aspects of the historical development of paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistent logic, Essays on the inconsistent, edited