Jaina Nayas: the Methods of Reliable Knowledge or the Forms of Refutation?

Abstract

Nayas (Sanskrit, “points of view”), are invariably included by historians of Indian philosophy in the number of methods of reliable knowledge. But in Jainism, they have the second aim also: they serve as the effective means of refutation of the opponents of Jīna Mahāvīra’s teachings. The article presents arguments in favor of mainly polemical aims of nayas because they aren’t as obvious as their cognitive function. The author of the article sees them as the means of polemics because they are mentioned already in the most ancient parts of the Jain Canon, which were composed much earlier than a theory of instruments of valid knowledge (pramāṇavāda) appeared, and also because, according to the instructions of Jain authors, nayas complemented the teaching of changeable reality (anekāntavāda) and they were used along with the sevenfold paralogism (saptabhaṅgī) for to demonstrate the false absoluteness of non-Jaina metaphysical positions. If we would consider the totality of these methods only as a means of obtaining reliable knowledge about the changing reality, this methodology looks like an unfit tool for two reasons at least: the variability of reality, relativizing any claims about it; and the uncertainty of the methods themselves, preventing the rapid acquisition of the required knowledge. This makes it possible to see the main purpose of using the method of points of view in proving Jain thesis that their opponents do not possess the absolute truth of any objects, which implies the insolvency of their claims to possess metaphysical truth, and it is an indirect justification of Jain metaphysics.