Ius soli under siege: a comparative analysis of France and the United States

One of the major campaign promises of the former US president Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign was to bar Muslims from entering the United States. Donald Trump kept his promise by issuing an executive order on assumption of office. The executive order banned Muslims from seven countries from entering the United States until a judge in Washington halted the executive order. The story received wide coverage in the media. This article will study the news coverage of the executive order in three leading international media organizations, AlJazeera English (AJE), the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. These three media organizations were selected because they provide different perspectives to news and have global audiences that consume the news on daily basis. Using critical discourse analysis (CDA), the article seeks to compare how the three media organizations pitched the story. CDA is interested in identifying the relationship between power, ideology and social inequality. The article explores the issues related to power, ideology and social inequality in relation to the Trump’s executive order as reported in the three news media organizations. What are the ethnic, political and cultural issues that dominated the discourse of Trump’s ban on Muslims in the three newspapers? The results from the study found ideological differences in the coverage, with AlJazeera and the New York Times being slightly more critical of Donald Trump and his policies in their approach, while the Wall Street Journal was supportive of the executive order. Nevertheless, all three news organizations were similar in promoting discourse, which promotes the interest of power elites. This approach in news discourse further contributes to creating a divided society that is unequal in nature. The article concludes by recommending the practice of a more contextual journalism that promotes a peaceful and harmonious society.

Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe. By Richard Alba and Nancy Foner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. Pp. 336. $35.00 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).

This Article explores the interpretation and construction of executive orders using as examples President Trump’s two executive orders captioned “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States” (the “Two Executive Orders”). President Trump issued the Two Executive Orders in the context of (among other things) Candidate Trump’s statements such as: “Islam hates us,” and “[W]e can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred.” President Trump subsequently provided further context including his tweet about the second of his Two Executive Orders: “People, the lawyers and the courts can call [the second of the Two Executive Orders] whatever they want, but I am calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!” Although President Trump replaced the first of the Two Executive Orders with the second one and although the Supreme Court by orders dated October 10, 2017 and October 24, 2017, vacated and remanded litigation involving the second order on grounds of mootness, the Two Executive Orders remain highly instructive for those who would understand the interpretation and construction of executive orders. This article therefore examines in detail the original speaker's (i.e., President Trump's) intended meaning and effect of the Two Executive Orders. It performs such examination using insights from the semiotic subfield of pragmatics, a semiotic subfield which explores how real-world people actually use, interpret, and construe language in various real-world contexts (including contexts where the issuer of the Two Executive Orders himself has claimed that “Islam hates us” and has tweeted “TRAVEL BAN!”). Using such insights of pragmatics, this Article also explores why reasonable judges thoroughly versed in legal theory, legal practice, and pragmatics should conclude that President Trump unlawfully targeted Muslims in the Two Executive Orders. This Article, among other things, also questions the sensibility of such notions as “facial legitimacy” to the extent such notions suggest text has meaning apart from context.

Previous articleNext article FreeReading Regents and the Political Significance of LawCristina M. RodríguezCristina M. Rodríguez Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreWhen the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, in June 2020, advocates celebrated. DACA—an acronym that no longer requires definition—lived to see another day.1 Newspaper headlines marked the decision as a decisive rebuff of the Trump administration’s efforts to end the Obama-era program that shielded so-called Dreamers from deportation while authorizing them to work in the United States.2 Initiated in 2012, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program had survived almost four years of a presidential administration overtly hostile to immigrants and immigration—a government bent on unraveling as much of the administrative and political legacy of its immediate predecessors as possible.3 The Supreme Court largely affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that efforts by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to rescind DACA were arbitrary and capricious and therefore invalid, sending DHS back to the drawing board to accomplish its objectives.4 With the 2020 presidential election less than five months away and the very real possibility of regime change in the air, the decision seemed decisive. The Supreme Court had saved DACA, at least for the time being.On the other side of the presidential election, we can now say that the Dreamers and their lawyers succeeded in using the courts to run out the clock on one of the more high-profile efforts of the Trump presidency. This success calls for an explanation. The original legal theory of DACA was predicated on its discretionary and therefore defeasible character. The government justified DACA as a series of individual acts of prosecutorial discretion, defined as the inherent discretion law enforcement officials possess to forbear from enforcement, at their convenience, in order to prioritize enforcement resources. DACA’s founding document—a memorandum issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security—included the disclaimer standard in Executive orders and agency guidance documents: “this memorandum confers no substantive right.”5 DACA’s promise, then, lasted as long as the Executive wanted it to. The promise was durable as long as President Obama remained in office but unenforceable should the Executive branch fall into the hands of officials hostile to the program.Given the apparently weak anchor DACA provided, why was it so difficult for a new administration, whose enforcement priorities did not include categorical forbearance for Dreamers, to reorient the enforcement system in its preferred direction? A conventional answer, repeated as a description of many of the Trump administration’s stumbles across regulatory arenas, was that officials were incompetent, sloppy, and disingenuous. The myriad court opinions in the DACA rescission litigation of the Trump years, from across the country and up and down the judicial hierarchy, reflected a version of this thesis. No court concluded that DACA was required by law. All parties, including the Supreme Court, seemed to agree that an administration could end the program.6 But despite efforts to respond to the demands and criticisms of the lower courts, the Trump administration could not find its way to its desired conclusion.But if the Court has implicitly acknowledged that DACA is not legally required and expressly stated that the government has the authority to wind it down, in what sense was Regents a major victory? In this essay, I argue that Regents is not a triumph in immigration law or even a decision of immigration law; far from it, the opinion contains a roadmap to DACA’s demise. The decision’s salutary outcome for immigrants also distracts us from a more ominous turn in the Roberts Court toward a reading of the immigration laws that empowers both Congress and the President to do as they please—a reading exemplified by one of the Term’s other decisions, Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, in which the Court rejects a Suspension Clause challenge to expedited removal proceedings.7Regents does reflect a kind of political triumph, however, not just because DACA was saved but because the Court calls attention to the profound interests its recipients have in remaining in the United States and thus to their new social status, separate and apart from their legal status. And yet, within the Regents decision itself, as well as in the legal claims made against the Trump administration, are the very tools with which courts might again stymie political change designed to advance immigrants’ rights, relying on the exacting procedural regularity championed in Regents by Chief Justice Roberts.I. The Trump Administration’s Failed RescissionChief Justice Roberts opened his opinion in 2012, at the moment of DACA’s inception. But to understand what DACA sought to achieve as a matter of administration, it is important to understand what it replaced. As most every court to have heard a DACA-related dispute has recognized, implicit in the operation of an immigration enforcement regime is the authority of Executive officials to set priorities for law enforcement agents. Those priorities can encourage agents to forbear from arresting or deporting otherwise removable non-citizens as part of a larger systemic interest in channeling resources toward removals in the government’s highest interests. Beginning in 2010, Obama-era DHS officials articulated a set of priorities in guidance documents (known as the Morton Memos) in an effort to encourage line-level officials to consider non-enforcement against certain types of individuals, including those who met the criteria that would eventually define DACA – the hundreds of thousands of non-citizens lacking immigration status who had been brought to the United States as youth.8 After two years of trying to steer the enforcement system with these exhortations, DHS officials determined that few obvious or publicly visible changes to enforcement practices had occurred. The Department’s political leadership, in conjunction with the White House, thus devised DACA to protect Dreamers from deportation. The program, adopted by what came to be known as the Napolitano memorandum, invited applications for forbearance from those who satisfied carefully drawn eligibility criteria, virtually ensuring, though not guaranteeing, protection and work authorization for Dreamers.9By the time President Donald Trump took office, more than 750,000 Dreamers had been granted DACA status,10 which provided them actual and psychological relief from removal and enabled them to enter the workforce and live as if their immigration status were immaterial. As a candidate, Donald Trump vowed to rescind DACA immediately, but in his initial months in office, President Trump himself expressed ambivalence and even reservations.11 In September 2017, however, Attorney General Jefferson Sessions sent a one-page, four-paragraph letter to Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke to “advise” that DHS should rescind the Napolitano memorandum initiating DACA on the ground that DACA was “an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws” and “an unconstitutional exercise of the authority of the Executive Branch.”12 The next day, in what had to have been a coordinated decision within the administration, Secretary Duke released her own memorandum terminating DACA,13 citing the Attorney General’s letter and the litigation that had called into question the legal authority for a second but now moribund Obama-era deferred action policy (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)).14 The timing and content of each of these two administrative documents became central to the Supreme Court’s resolution of the legal question before it—whether the Trump administration’s efforts to rescind DACA had been lawful.The court case began in three different circuits, where an array of plaintiffs raised numerous substantive claims, two of which ended up before the Supreme Court: that the rescission of DACA was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the rescission violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. In its culminating opinion, the Supreme Court first concluded that DACA did not fall into the class of non-enforcement decisions long held to be unreviewable by courts on the authority of Heckler v. Chaney.15 DACA amounted, instead, to a full-blown program for granting immigration relief and attendant benefits, justifying judicial review—review that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) also did not preclude. The Court then proceeded to hold that the rescission of DACA in its entirety was indeed inconsistent with the requirements of the APA but that none of the plaintiffs’ allegations established a “plausible” claim of racial animus under the Equal Protection Clause.But DACA was a discretionary program that the administration should have been able to undo easily, not a program that should have survived more than three years of a concerted rescission effort (assuming Trump officials’ hearts were in it). Why did a clearly permissible outcome evade the Trump administration? Though incompetence has been charged repeatedly in public commentary, the explanations offered by Chief Justice Roberts underscore that the federal courts’ conceptualization of the administration’s fault changed throughout the litigation.In his letter to Secretary Duke, Attorney General Sessions justified the rescission as legally required, in part citing the litigation risk that maintaining the program posed, given that the Fifth Circuit had invalidated President Obama’s similarly structured DAPA initiative.16 At the time, Adam Cox and I argued that the administration was hiding behind flimsy legal arguments to duck political responsibility and accountability for ending a widely popular and successful program.17 The lower courts quickly put a stop to this evasion by demanding that the Trump administration provide reasons for the rescission beyond what the courts viewed to be erroneous legal claims.18 Judge John Bates in the District for the District of Columbia actually gave the administration an opportunity to remedy the APA violation by providing the court with a more extended rationale for the rescission.19 The administration obliged with a memorandum from a new DHS Secretary, Kirstjen Nielsen, in which she purported not to disturb the Duke memorandum and its legal conclusions but added multiple policy reasons to justify the rescission.20 By elaborating on its legal reasoning and offering a policy rationale for ending DACA that could justify the rescission if the court continued to find the legal reasoning wanting—just the sort of rationale courts typically do not second-guess—the path to rescission seemed to have been cleared.And yet, at the Supreme Court, the sufficiency of the Nielsen memo went untested. In its opinion, the Court dismisses the memo’s relevance because it had been framed as an elaboration of the Duke memo and yet bore “little relationship” to the original purported basis for the agency action.21 Under hornbook administrative law, then, the Nielsen memo constituted an irrelevant post hoc rationalization. In support of this conclusion, the Court lists the familiar case law, for which the standard citation is SEC v. Chenery Corp.22, and the reasons for rejecting an elaborated justification and insisting that the agency start a new policy process or issue a new decision to invoke new reasons: that such requirements promote accountability, ensure the parties and public can respond to the agency’s authority, preserve the orderly process of review, and constrain the agency from making its reasons and therefore its policy a moving target.23Thus focused on the Duke memo, the Supreme Court offers a two-part reason for finding the rescission procedurally flawed, each part of which I consider in more detail in Part II. The first is a legal rationale not yet hit upon by the federal courts but offered by the respondents from the District of Columbia: according to the Court, the Sessions letter had concluded that DACA was unlawful because it contained the same legal defects the Fifth Circuit had found in DAPA. Because the Fifth Circuit focused its analysis on the benefits DAPA conferred (primarily eligibility for work authorization), the Secretary failed to appreciate that the Sessions letter left her with discretion to decouple the two parts of DACA and consider whether its forbearance policy standing alone, without benefits, passed legal muster.24 The second of the Court’s rationales also sounds in basic administrative law—that when it changes a policy, an agency must consider the reliance interests engendered by that policy, not because those interests are necessarily legally dispositive, but because they are always substantively relevant.25 Leaving aside the puzzlement expressed by Justice Thomas in his partial dissent—why should these reliance interests matter if some or all of the program itself was without legal foundation?—the Court gave the administration two clear assignments on remand if it hoped to continue the rescission effort.With this move, Chief Justice Roberts found a political sweet spot for someone hoping not to take sides on the merits. He did not allow the rescission to proceed, but he also avoided concluding that DACA was lawful. He thus did not close the door to an eventual gutting of DACA through elimination of the path to work authorization that made it so valuable. But whether Regents amounts to a “win” depends both on whose perspective we take and the timeframe we adopt. In the months after the decision, DACA recipients had clearly triumphed. The story’s denouement unfolded in a courtroom in the Eastern District of New York. After Regents, the government did indeed return to the drawing board. Attorney General William Barr rescinded all DOJ authorities relevant to the case, including a 2014 memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel elaborating why the much larger DAPA program was consistent with the INA and within the Secretary’s authority.26 At DHS, Acting Secretary Chad Wolf rescinded the Nielsen and Duke memoranda and styled his own memo as beginning the process of considering DACA anew. He pledged that, while DHS conducted its fresh process, the agency would honor existing DACA grants but would no longer adjudicate new or pending applications. In his memorandum explaining these steps, Acting Secretary Wolf acknowledged the reliance interests of existing DACA holders by repeating back the Supreme Court’s articulation of those interests. But he then offered: “[w]hatever the merits of these asserted reliance interests on the maintenance of the DACA policy, they are significantly lessened, if not entirely lacking” for those who had never received deferred action in the first place.27Litigants immediately challenged this new quasi-rescission. But rather than determine if DHS had properly adhered to the procedural path cleared by the Supreme Court, Judge Nicholas Garaufis found Wolf’s appointment to have been unlawful, thus invalidating his actions as lacking authorization—a conclusion reached by numerous courts reviewing various DHS actions in the waning days of the Trump administration.28 Whether DHS could correct this structural defect and try yet again to rescind DACA became moot with the election of Joseph R. Biden to the presidency in November 2020. Biden pledged during the campaign to shore up DACA. Not long after his inauguration, he followed through by declaring his intention to “fortify” the program.29But even though the election brought the rescission saga to an end, a deeper, more speculative strain of Regents is now in play. Despite being a procedural decision on its surface and in its holdings, Chief Justice Roberts’s novel reasoning forecasts still more legal wrangling over both DACA’s validity and, more generally, the capacity of a new president to chart a different path on immigration policy.II. Immigration and the Roberts CourtRegents ensured that DACA would survive into a new administration determined to preserve it. But the decision itself is neither a victory for immigrants’ rights in a jurisprudential sense nor a particularly probative data point in a more holistic account of immigration law in the Roberts era. Most immediately, the opinion provides a roadmap to DACA’s demise by inviting litigants and judges to separate its two pillars—categorical forbearance from removal on the one hand and eligibility for work authorization and benefits tied to deferred action status on the other—and to invalidate the latter. Beyond DACA, the prospects for a jurisprudence that restrains the coercive power of the government against non-citizens grew even dimmer this Term, despite Regents. In the unrelated decision, the Roberts Court yet another challenge to the of a enforcement and removal power expressly by what to be the Court’s from its of of the INA with a for basic process This opinion much less interest from the and public than the of DACA, but it is of far to the of immigration law first to DACA through the courts is its which the Regents Court to do As DACA was an exercise of the Secretary’s enforcement of typically from judicial The so-called benefits of DACA from the decision to forbear from removal in of and administrative back that those benefits to a of deferred it that the Obama administration deferred action as the through which to provide Dreamers some relief because of these legal discretion to an established regulatory with a and process by which recipients of forbearance could for authorization documents in various of the litigation over both DACA and the Supreme Court and the lower courts have the government’s across that the are unreviewable of enforcement In Regents, the Court to Heckler v. and its holding that the decision to to the law is not to judicial because it is to agency discretion, that is not a non-enforcement By an process to who met criteria, the administration a for immigration not a non-enforcement By DACA as a program with each to legal review, the Court thus the for the government by the of what the administration to accomplish in a way that more procedural and the of judicial despite finding DACA to be the Court does not to the of its parts on the merits. the Court fault with the Secretary’s own to decouple DACA’s two and then the and of a In finding this legally to the Secretary, Roberts is the Sessions letter to Secretary Duke, as the Chief Justice himself the Secretary’s in not clearly the Roberts and legal on DACA as a But Roberts on the that DACA policy has the same legal defects that the courts as to to chart his through the In the litigation over the Fifth in v. United had determined the relevant legal question to be whether the Secretary had authority to DAPA recipients for benefits, not whether he had authority to forbear from the class of who into the In other even under letter and the of litigation risk raised by the Fifth the Secretary could have a version of DACA. And under administrative v. agency to rescind a policy must consider in its whether the of the existing might be Because forbearance was at the very of DACA, DHS to have a policy of without and the Sessions letter did not that Regents opinion thus gave the Trump administration a a to DACA and for The agency could return to the drawing find the benefits to be legally while maintaining a policy, which it then could have out if it had articulated policy reasons for this of enforcement that took into account reliance interests on which And as in what out to be the waning months of the Trump administration, Chad Wolf the rescission process to a that the Court’s before Judge Garaufis found his authority the Court’s roadmap is no longer of to the administration But it does steer litigants of for to challenge DACA’s very down a clear path that the Court Despite not DACA’s the and reasoning of the Court’s opinion are both forbearance the of work authorization and other benefits is in This in part from the on by the Chief Justice of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in v. United which after a lower court decision an immigration relief program not actually at issue in Regents and that did not in a Supreme Court decision on the merits. be Attorney General Sessions put the Fifth Circuit opinion at issue by to on it in his DACA letter to the But not does Chief Justice Roberts v. United States and the of DAPA into his of the of the DACA he in an extended of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis when Secretary that she had no legal discretion to continue DACA. In his of the decision, Chief Justice Roberts up making a case for the of the And by that the Secretary consider this he is at the very least that it well be legally if not legally put if the Chief Justice it that a forbearance policy the legal it would have been for to the matter back to the agency for of an to the litigation over DAPA its not to raised the categorical forbearance it same legal Justice Thomas in his Regents opinion from the APA in which he Congress has not categorical to the removal But by the time the DAPA case had reached the Fifth that court seemed to have forbearance as a of the authority to prioritize removal for a court to the forbearance of DACA would be a of a very basic enforcement As Adam Cox and I have DACA is no less enforcement discretion for the of discretion to the Secretary and away from individual even as individual agents continue to that we have a presidential administration that to rather than wind down DACA, the central of in the Regents opinion into the courts the Biden administration to continue eligibility for work authorization other to recipients of deferred action under the DACA DACA’s to its on the to this Though a promise of forbearance the and psychological with the of eligibility for work authorization is what has made DACA for hundreds of thousands of non-citizens without legal status who are Chief Justice Roberts does not on the merits whether DHS has the authority to eligibility for work But he also does not take the of of the lower courts, which the Trump administration’s conclusion that DACA was He offers as an for the agency a that work authorization for being Sessions had but on with if the administration had through with such an and it had reached the Supreme Court a second time, Roberts and his upon would have in that of work authorization was After the making deferred action recipients to for back to the The administration would then have had to rescind or those after through and and why it was so – that, as even Justice recognized, would be no But would the Chief Justice have sent the Trump administration back for more memoranda he them to and for all up with articulated policy reasons for all of DACA, the for the Court to the of DACA on the the Court was to a decision on the the 2020 election have its the Biden administration has its intention to DACA through and This to more procedural to the program in the of it through what be a legal by the of and some of its in the District of where the who invalidated DAPA now on the and when DACA to the Court under this new no one should be if forbearance at the end, it to Congress to provide a anchor of for the The way the Chief Justice in Regents the work authorization question as for legal and the expressed by some of the at in the DAPA case back in justify the litigation risk with DACA as the Court does indeed to on a version of DACA, its decision Regents as an of the Court’s of administrative and an that Executive be by clear and even In so the Court would the of the Executive branch to and into its of a deportation regime that Congress thus far has been or to This of the Executive in the of accountability and the of would in turn another of immigration law that the Supreme Court but has been in years, including during the a of decisions over the years, the Court has the of its opinion in Regents, finding that DHS has power to to the immigration laws in of In at least two the Court rejects the of and on the political in that from And in other the Court provisions with to that would be of immigrants’ including in that in basic In other the real of the Roberts Court’s immigration jurisprudence has been to the political in with waning interest in the Executive the power Congress has to

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Germany has been taking controversial policy measures that had been quite unimaginable, even in the 1980s. On the one hand, regulations for asylum seekers and ethnic Germans have gradually become restrictive in nature. On the other hand, changes to the Citizenship and Nationality Law of 1913 (Reichs und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz) and the Alien Act of 1965 (Auslandergesetz) have dramatically altered the naturalization process. Before the passage of the new German citizenship law in 1999, the acquisition of citizenship in Germany was solely based on the principle of descent (jus sanguinis). This paper attempts to explain why German government altered its citizenship policy and introduced birthright citizenship. It reviews the post-war contextual factors that have shaped the debate on citizenship and asks whether it is external or internal factors, that is international-level norms and institutions or domestic politics, that led to the change. If domestic politics can fully explain the adoption of the new citizenship law, what domestic forces played an important role? Was state action taken in the name of protecting “the national interest” or was it party politics? What role did societal forces play in the making of new citizenship policy? Did the act seek to mitigate anti-foreigner sentiment growing in Germany since the 1990s? Using archival and documentary research and secondary data on socio-economic and demographic trends in Germany, this paper concludes that domestic politics explain the changes in the citizenship law. I argue that granting and withholding national citizenship, including birthright citizenship, is exclusively in the hands of a nation state. Considering a purely ethnocultural understanding of nation-hood now includes legal and territorial components, the new German citizenship law is a major reform at the both theoretical and conceptual level. However, the practical consequences of the new naturalization process remain to be seen. The main question for the future research agenda is whether the new naturalization and citizenship laws will bring full integration of foreigners living in German society.

The present investigation is an endeavor to examine discourse from the CDA perspective. The following inquiries are the focus of the investigation: The extent to which the language employed in Trump's speech influenced individuals. Is the discourse beneficial or detrimental to the Egyptian populace? Additionally, which discursive strategies are implemented during their discourse? The study posits that speakers employ a variety of strategies, argumentation, and historical contexts to communicate their ideologies to their audience in order to secure their support. This will address the aforementioned inquiries. Additionally, it is postulated that the manner in which English and Arabic speakers employ these resources differs. The data selected has been analyzed using Wodak's (1999) historical discourse approach (DHA). Consequently, the data for this study is derived from the speech of "the former president of the United States of America", Donald Trump, on October 23, 2020, regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The historic approach's components, such as the topos, the context, the historical framework, and the strategies, will be the primary focus. These components are employed to analyze each discourse. The research investigates how politicians wield social power and engage in through their speeches. The analysis highlights that many of the techniques employed are related to meaning and argumentation. Critical discourse analysis is a type of discourse analysis that is dedicated to the exploration of the discursive manifestations of ideology and authority. The study aims to investigate the manner in which politicians and exercise social authority in their addresses. The research indicates that the majority of the methodologies employed in critical discourse analysis are pertinent to political speeches. This research employs the lens of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to dissect the language, rhetoric, and underlying ideologies within media coverage.

Political issues on International media play significant roles in shaping world opinion. The world today is influence by the superpower of United State, so that the political campaign of United Stated president candidates broadcasted all over the world. The political battle between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton is unnerved watched by people all over the universe. The world famous medias such as CNN, New Yorks Time and others were fully covered their campaign process. Indonesian newspaper such as Analisa, Medan, North Sumatera also covered the campaign of the United State president’s candidate.Analisa is a newspapers that has huge readers in Sumatera. The readers come from wide range of different religion, culture, class and economic background. The political news that published by Analisa considered positive and able to develop a pluralism nation such as Indonesia. This research conducted at Analisa used Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method. The research carried out during October 2016. The news that researcher analyzed were world news in page two on daily basis. The specific news was about the campaign of the United State president candidate for 2017-2022. Most of the issues that mentioned by the candidates are about racism, religion, gender and the miss used of West Superpower, America-Europa and East, Russia-China Middle East. America seem is reluctant the China and Russia to be future super power states.

The emergence of Donald Trump as an anti-Muslim-Islam presidential candidate and victory over Hillary Clinton is an issue of debate and division in the United States’ political sphere. Many commentators and political pundits criticize Trump for his disparaging rhetoric on Twitter and present him as an example of how Twitter can be an effective tool for the construction and extension of political polarization. The current study analyzes the selected tweets by Donald Trump posted on Twitter to unmask how he uses language to construct Islamophobic discourse structures and attempts to form his ideological structures along with. The researchers hypothesize that Islamophobia is a marked feature of Trump’s political career realized by specific rhetorical and discursive devices. Therefore, the study purposively takes 40 most controversial tweets of Donald Trump against Islam and Muslims and carried out a critical discourse analysis with the help of macro-strategies of the discourse given by Wodak and Meyer and van Dijk’s referential strategies of political discourse. The findings reveal that Trump uses language rhetorically to exclude people of different ethnic identities, especially Muslims, through demagogic language to create a difference of “us” vs. “them” and making in this way “America Great Again”.

Geographic Variation in the Availability of Deceased Donor Kidneys per Wait-Listed Candidate in the United States

In the attention given to Trump's Muslim ban, overlooked by many critics was the fact that two of Trump's executive orders creating the ban invoked the idea of killings. The term killings appeared in the Purpose section and the Transparency and Data Collection section of the first executive order. It also appears in the Transparency and Data Collection section of the second executive order, a section that has not been superseded by subsequent executive actions. In this article I examine the role of killings in these executive orders, in litigation against the Muslim ban, and in judicial responses to the ban. I also sketch a genealogy of how killings became a problem for U.S. governance, through the efforts of Ayaan Hirsi Ali's AHA Foundation and the linking of Muslim immigrants with terrorism, gender subordination and threat to sexual liberty made visible in Trump's presidential campaign speeches. In Trump's executive orders, rhetoric and data work together to create the vision of killings as a problem in the United States. The use of the phrase killings in the executive orders can be understood as evincing a professed concern for violence against women, while actually functioning to reinforce a perception of Muslim barbarity and inferiority. The invocation of killings thus functions as the kind of coded signal called a dog whistle. This cynical deployment of feminist concerns as a proxy for xenophobic exclusion is troubling enough. But what may be even more disturbing is that the notion that killings are a problem in the United States has been constructed through false and misleading claims about data. As explained in the article, the idea that there are 23 - 27 honor killings occurring annually in the United States was circulated by former Attorney General Jeff Sessions when he was a Senator, and is expressed in the report produced by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security in response to the current Transparency and Data Collection mandate of the second executive order. This number is invented and invalid. This submerged story about the contribution of killings to the Muslim ban has been largely missed. But the part played by very specific ideas about gender in creating anti-Muslim animus deserves a central place in our scrutiny. The specter of violence against women has played an important role in the Trump administration's executive orders seeking to bar Muslims from entry, and continues to rationalize the notion that the nation must be protected through their exclusion.

Birthright citizenship refers to the legal status of citizenship when acquired through birth to a citizen parent (ius sanguinis) or birth in the territory of a state (ius soli). This is how most people acquire citizenship, often unconditionally and automatically at birth. A minority across the globe acquire citizenship through naturalization. Historically ius soli predominated from the Early Modern period, when those born in the sovereign’s territory automatically became their subjects. Ius sanguinis arose following the French Revolution, reflecting the free citizen father’s right to pass citizenship on to his child. Both forms spread globally through imitation and colonization. All states now award citizenship by birth; most have a combination of the two forms. But the strength of provisions varies. All states have substantial ius sanguinis provision; fewer have strong ius soli. In both, acquisition may depend on certain restrictive conditions related to parental birthplace or residence, marital status, gender, religion, ethnicity, or race. Until recently citizenship has been studied more by lawyers than political scientists, and birthright citizenship has received less attention than naturalization. Studies have tended to focus on the citizenship laws and policies of a limited number of states, mainly in the Global North. Only recently have studies covering a greater number and diversity of countries begun to emerge. Comparative scholars have sought to identify and explain different patterns of birthright citizenship provision related to the strength of ius soli and ius sanguinis. These have been interpreted variously as alternative models reflecting different national conceptions of citizenship, as determined by civil or common law traditions, or as dependent on histories of emigration, immigration, and colonization. Contemporary changes have been understood as a function of domestic electoral politics, developments in international law, norm diffusion among states, or a range of contingent contextual factors. Scholars dispute whether diversity of citizenship regimes has been succeeded by convergence. More complex typologies and indices, including birthright citizenship, have emerged, along with increasing availability of data on citizenship around the world. The justification of birthright citizenship has been much debated. Birthright citizenship has been seen as an appropriate way of allocating democratic membership, providing intergenerational continuity of citizenry, reducing the incidence of statelessness, and integrating immigrants. But ius sanguinis has often been criticized as exclusive and illiberal. It is debated whether ius soli is better justified, or if all forms of birthright citizenship should be seen as conveying arbitrary privilege and contributing to global inequality.

Statelessness exists in the United States, a fact that should be of concern to advocates of strict immigration control as well as those who favor a more welcoming policy. The predominant reasons for statelessness include the presence of individuals who are unable to prove their nationality as well as the failure of their countries of origin to recognize them as citizens. Migrants with unclear nationality, already a problem for the United States, obstruct efforts to control immigration by the deportation of unauthorized aliens. These existing problems of national identity will increase exponentially if birthright citizenship in the United States is amended to exclude the children of undocumented aliens. Contrary to common assumptions, proposed changes to U.S. citizenship law would exacerbate statelessness into the next generation when no fall-back nationality is available. Effective statelessness throughout the Western Hemisphere (documented in this paper) is currently an issue for the United States because of existing migration patterns. This paper also explains how the citizenship laws of other nations could produce statelessness at birth in the United States, if the US practice of territorial birthright citizenship is changed.

The health effects of restrictive immigration and refugee policies targeting individuals from Muslim-majority countries are largely unknown. To analyze whether President Trump's 2017 executive order 13769, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" (known as the "Muslim ban" executive order) was associated with changes in health care utilization by people born in targeted nations living in the US. This retrospective cohort study included adult patients treated at Minneapolis-St. Paul HealthPartners primary care clinics or emergency departments (EDs) between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2017. Patients were categorized as (1) born in Muslim ban-targeted nations, (2) born in Muslim-majority nations not listed in the executive order, or (3) non-Latinx and born in the US. Data were analyzed from October 1, 2019, to May 12, 2021. Executive order 13769, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States." Primary outcomes included the number of (1) primary care clinic visits, (2) missed primary care appointments, (3) primary care stress-responsive diagnoses, (4) ED visits, and (5) ED stress-responsive diagnoses. Visit trends were evaluated before and after the Muslim ban issuance using linear regression, and differences between the study groups after the executive order issuance were evaluated using difference-in-difference analyses. A total of 252 594 patients were included in the analysis: 5667 in group 1 (3367 women [59.4%]; 5233 Black individuals [92.3%]), 1254 in group 2 (627 women [50%]; 391 White individuals [31.2%]), and 245 673 in group 3 (133 882 women [54.5%]; 203 342 White individuals [82.8%]). Group 1 was predominantly born in Somalia (5231 of 5667 [92.3%]) and insured by Medicare or Medicaid (4428 [78.1%]). Before the Muslim ban, primary care visits and stress-responsive diagnoses were increasing for individuals from Muslim-majority nations (groups 1 and 2). In the year after the ban, there were approximately 101 additional missed primary care appointments among people from Muslim-majority countries not named in the ban (point estimate [SE], 6.73 [2.90]; P = .02) and approximately 232 additional ED visits by individuals from Muslim ban-targeted nations (point estimate [SE], 3.41 [1.53]; P = .03). Results of this cohort study suggest that after issuance of the Muslim ban executive order, missed primary care appointments and ED visits increased among people from Muslim-majority countries living in Minneapolis-St. Paul.

Political speech is often being a topic of research in linguistic. Some of interdisciplinary studies appeared while the role of the language has developed. They are pragmatics, critical discourse analysis, phsycholingustics, neurolinguistics and sociolinguistics. This research focused on the transitivity system and ideology in Donald Trump Speech Campaign. Transitivity System that stated by Halliday become a tool to analyze the linguistic data which this theory has been used by Fairchlough in his critical discourse analysis. Based on the aims of this research that described transitivity system and ideology of Donald Trump speech campaign, therefore this research called descriptive research. Method of collecting data is method of seeing and noted technique. Technique purposive sampling is used in this research. The result showed that there are six types of process is used by Donald Trump to represent his experience, those are material process, relational process, mental process, verbal process, behavioral process, existential process. Material process is mostly used by Donald Trump followed by relational process and then mental process. To show his ideas, Donald Trump used material process mostly and showed his principal that better do action than only talk. To draw attention of US society and influenced their thought, Donald Trump is often used rasism issue in his speech campaign such as limit the access of immigrant in working and list the muslims US in separated database. Beside that, some of his statements showed that he is a narsistic. He showed his love and proud of himself mostly and he has protectionism in economy.

As an interdicipline that studies the relation of language, power and ideology, critical discourse analysis has attracted more and more linguists’ attention, which can be applied to analyze language features under certain social and cultural background. Critical discourse analysis is based on Halliday’s systemic functional grammar that is a practical method to analyze discourse. Political discourse as a kind of typical discourse which involves the speaker’s ideology and intention, can also be analyzed by critical discourse analysis. Therefore, this paper analyzes Donald Trump’s inaugural speech mainly from the perspectives of transitivity, modality, personal pronoun and coherence in order to reveal the speaker’s political intention, and help readers understand the meaning of discourse, cultivate their critical consciousness and analytical ability. The paper concludes that Trump uses different language forms to transmit, change and maintain audiences’ ideology subtly. At the same time, it has a positive effect on the development of the critical discourse analysis.