Abstract
AbstractThis article explores the debiasing role of the mediator in the setting of international disputes. Starting from the rational choice theory, this article examines the choices that international disputants must weigh when deciding how to proceed with their conflict. International actors are assumed to be rational and negotiate settlements that are beneficial to them. Their alternatives to a negotiated settlement include both adjudication and continuation of the conflict. Puzzlingly, despite the advantages of negotiated settlements, many international disputes are not resolved in the form of a settlement. Instead, States seem to prolong conflicts or follow costlier routes of formal adjudication. Behavioral Law and Economics insights on the biases of disputants partly explain this phenomenon. The article contributes to the behavioral discussion by examining two separate categories of biases, i.e., biases when deciding to enter negotiation and biases during negotiation. Following that, it suggests that the specific characteristics of the process of mediation and of the mediator, in particular, can act as debiasing instruments. The article concludes with normative suggestions for wider incorporation of mediation within the international dispute settlement setting.
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