Istraživanje savremenih trendova i mogućnosti za razvoj novih dekontaminacionih tehnologija

The New Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation and Prospects. Edited by Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998. Pp. xv, 604. Index. Fl 350, $189, £119. - Volume 94 Issue 1

International agreements prohibiting chemical weapons began in the 17th century, when the Germans and French agreed to prohibit poison bullets. New chemical toxins and new ways to deliver them have kept treaties to ban such weapons of mass destruction on the diplomatic and security agendas of large and small nations ever since. Although chemical weapons are among the most deadly military devices (the World War I battles in which they were used caused 8% of the deaths), never have they achieved eventual victory, and the Geneva Protocol of the 1920s sought to ban their use. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the latest and best attempt at ridding the world of chemical weapons by targeting both their possession and the means to produce them. Only if the major powers agree to participate and to enforce its provisions without hesitation will the CWC increase the national security of all states by reducing the threat from chemical warfare. An excellent overview of the main issues can be seen at the World Wide Web site of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ( ), along with a list of countries that have become signatory parties to the CWC. The CWC has now been signed by the leaders of 161 nations and will become effective on 29 April 1997. Under the Reagan and Bush administrations, the United States was instrumental in negotiating this agreement, and George Bush signed it in 1991. However, as of this writing, the U.S. Senate has still not ratified that signing. Unless that step is taken, the United States will find itself in the company of states that intend to ignore the convention, such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Nonparticipation has diplomatic, economic, and scientific consequences. Nonratification does not give us a seat at the table with our allies, almost all of whom have ratified, and provides an excuse to other nonmember countries to remain outside. Only ratifying nations may join the Executive Council (which will prepare for implementation of the provisions of the treaty) or the Technical Secretariat (which will, among other functions, provide inspectors for suspected stockpiles or production sites and monitor the destruction of existing stocks). Failure to ratify the CWC will constrain some aspects of chemical trade with international partners who are member states. The consequences of these restrictions will affect chemicals required in research throughout the scientific community, as well as major domestic industries in agriculture, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and transportation. The CWC will not alter U.S. policy on chemical weapons: The United States has already begun destroying its aging stockpile of chemical agents and expects to complete the process by 2004; no new chemical weapons are planned. Nevertheless, U.S. ratification has been stalled in the Senate for more than 2 years. Politics aside, the CWC has been opposed by groups who believe that compliance with its provisions will be unverifiable (small amounts of highly toxic chemicals or their precursors could be undetectable) and unenforceable (all penalties for violations would require approval by the Security Council of the United Nations). However, the need for improved means of remote sampling and for enhanced sensitivity in chemical identification and detection would surely benefit from U.S. expertise and instrumentation development in these fields. Opponents of the CWC also fear that any international inspection of chemical facilities could result in theft of proprietary processes that now give U.S. chemical manufacturers their edge. No group would have more to fear from this pillage than the U.S. chemical industry, yet the Chemical Manufacturers Association, along with the American Chemical Society, have been strong proponents of the CWC. In February 1997, the AAAS Board urged every member of the Senate to ratify the CWC. The Senate should consider stipulations that will make the CWC effective not only for U.S. security but for world security. Not only must the U.S. Senate vote for ratification without further delay, the United States must use its diplomatic influence to persuade other present nonsignatories—especially Russia, China, and Iran—to ratify the CWC as responsible members of the global community. Science urges its U.S. readers to make their feelings known to the Senate and asks its international readers to support the CWC locally.

The use of chemical or biological weapons, whether by a State or terrorists, continues to be a serious security concern. Both types of weapons are prohibited by multilateral treaties that have very broad membership, but both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are facing major challenges. In particular, the continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war by government forces risks eroding the norm against the use of such weapons. This paper briefly explore the recent history of efforts to constrain chemical and biological weapons and outlines challenges for the future.

Developments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential—the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions—is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. The strength of the ban of chemical and biological weapons also depends on scientists interacting with policy makers in evaluating risks and implementing measures to reduce them.

<p>This paper analyzes the failure of the Organization for Prohibited of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) in handling chemical weapon disarmament in Syria. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government against its own citizens poses a challenge for OPCW in its role to ban the use and development of chemical weapons worldwide. OPCW itself formed in 1997 is an implementation of Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) in 1993. The main problem of this study is OPCW failure factors to ban the use and development of chemical weapons in Syrian conflict. The study results show that the chemical weapon disarmament efforts in Syria by the OPCW by sending and destroying government-owned chemical weapons has failed. Although OPCW has claimed Syria has been freed from chemical weapons, it is still encountered the use of chemical weapons by ISIS terrorist groups and unofficial opposition groups. In conclusion, the role of the OPCW according to the concept of disarmament and the international organization is still not fully successful. OPCW is only able to detect the use of chemical weapons committed by the Syrian government. This organization has no authority in overcoming the problem of the misused chemical weapons committed by non-state actors.</p><p><span>Keywords: Chemical weapons, Syrian conflict, OPCW, Disarmament. </span><br /><span> </span></p>

Despite the declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868, Brussels Declaration of 1874, Hague Convention of 1899. Chemical weapons were used even in warfare which resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred thousand people and around one million people injured. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of biological weapons and chemical weapons, but does not prohibit the development, production, stockpiling or distribution, and does not regulate the handling mechanisms and procedures in the event of a violation. Then the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) was formed which regulates the use of chemical weapons in general, which means during times of peace or armed conflict. There are several forms of sanctions that can be imposed on parties to disputes in the internal Syrian conflict, namely non-military sanctions and military sanctions. In the context of international law, non-military sanctions are regulated in Article 41 of the UN Charter while military sanctions are regulated in Article 42 of the UN Charter which determines the authority of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions. The involvement of OPCW as an international organization in disarming chemical weapons by terrorist IS and opposition groups that are not recognized by the Syrian government has limited operations. Therefore, OPCW as an international organization based on CWC in world chemical disarmament requires greater authority and fluency in upholding its rules. According to article 13 letter b of the Rome Statute it has been stipulated that the UN Security Council based on its authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter has the right to submit to the Court through the Prosecutor for crimes that have not or have not ratified the Statute. Article 13 letter b of the ICC is a strong and legal juridical basis to legitimize the UN Security Council in making policies to hand over cases of gross human rights violations in the Syrian conflict to the ICC.

Why did the international community respond differently to sarin use in the Syrian Civil War than to every prior case of violation of the norm against chemical weapons? Looking at the mode of response and how it differed from the international reaction to other norm violations within the same conflict suggest that the “The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,” often abbreviated as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), served as the key factor prompting norm enforcement in this case. I argue, based upon how the CWC functioned to bring about norm enforcement in the Syrian case, that the CWC has proved more effective than past treaties banning chemical weapons for three main reasons: the backing of an actor possessing the relative power to credibly threaten enforcement of the norm, the choice of that actor to constrain itself, and the establishment of specific procedures for the norm’s enforcement including a verification regime and disarmament guidelines. The CWC’s scope, in banning chemical weapon possession in addition to use, arguably also aids the CWC’s ability to enforce the norm against use.

This chapter analyzes international legal regimes regulating the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. It begins with a brief description of chemical and biological weapons. It then discusses provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It argues that the biological and chemical weapons regulatory regimes, with the BWC and CWC as their cornerstones, have succeeded in establishing a comprehensive legal prohibition upon possession, development, proliferation, and use of biological and chemical weapons. This legal prohibition is supported by a pervasive and powerful ancient moral taboo particularly on the use of biological and chemical weapons.

This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of an international workshop that was organized jointly by IUPAC and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and held in Zagreb, Croatia, from 22 to 25 April 2007. It was held to assist with preparation for the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which will commence in April 2008. The CWC has been in force since 29 April 1997, and today 182 States have joined the Convention. The CWC aims at the total prohibition of all chemical weapons (CW) and the destruction of all CW stockpiles and production facilities by 2007. Extensions have been agreed upon and, for some CW stockpiles, the deadline is now 2012. This disarmament is subject to strict international verification by the OPCW. The CWC also prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and retention of CW and requires national implementation measures, including legislation, together with the international verification of chemical industry facilities. Furthermore, the CWC aims to strengthen States Parties' capacities in the field of protection against CW, and encourages international cooperation in the peaceful application of chemistry. The CWC requires that reviews of the operation of the Convention are carried out at five-year intervals and specifies that such reviews "shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments", so as to ensure the continued effectiveness of the treaty and of its verification and implementation systems. This report has been prepared to assist the parties of the CWC with that review.

Chemical weapons are banned under customary international law, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC today has achieved near universal adherence; a small number of states, however, remain outside its realm. Syria—until 2013 one of them—was long presumed to possess chemical weapons and in 2012 effectively admitted so. The Syrian civil war always carried the risk that one side or another would use these weapons. Reports to this end began to appear in 2012. In March 2013, following separate requests by Syria and several Western States, the UN Secretary-General began to investigate these allegations. Whilst the investigation team was in Damascus, a large-scale sarin attack was launched on Ghouta, killing hundreds of people. This incident and its subsequent confirmation by the UN team set in motion a series of unprecedented events leading to the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile under strict international control, supported by financial and in-kind assistance by more than 20 countries. But this multilateral effort did not end the use of toxic chemicals in Syria, and OPCW fact-finding missions have since confirmed several cases of chlorine attacks. Also, ISIS/Daesh reportedly has used chemical weapons including chlorine and mustard gas in Syria and Iraq. The paper concludes that it will be important to identify the perpetrators of these attacks and bring them to justice in order to protect the international norm against poison gas.

In 1987 the USSR announced it had stopped producing chemical weapons, and in 1989 it declared that its CW stockpile was 40 000 tonnes. Russia, the member of the Commonwealth of Independent States which assumed control of the Soviet CW stockpile, now faces the enormous task of destroying these stocks in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Responsibility for this and for all future planning rests with the Presidential Committee on Matters Pertaining to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, which was set up in April 1992.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is shortly characterised stressing its main principles, inter alia the General Purpose Criterion. Status of its implementation as of December 2004 shows the main data obligatory declared by already 167 States Parties and main achievements in destruction of Chemical Weapons (CW) stockpiles and destruction / conversion of CW production facilities and the verification efforts. The Organisation for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is briefly presented, results of the 1st Review Conference and future problems of the CWC are analysed. Special emphasis is laid on threats and benefits of the scientific and technological development and potential misuse of toxic chemicals for terrorist purposes. Role of the CWC especially of respective national implementation measures in combating chemical terrorism is analysed stressing the OPCWs expertise including its developed system of assistance and protection under the CWC and enforcement by all countries of the CWCs requirement to make the development, production, stockpiling, transfers and use illegal for anyone. (CWPF), CW destruction, CWPF destruction & conversion, CW non- production, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), First Review Conference, Chemical terrorism .

The first major use of chemical weapons in warfare was on April 22, 1915, when Germany attacked Allied forces along the Ypres Salient in Belgium in World War I. Since that historic attack a century ago, dozens of countries have researched, developed, tested, and deployed still more deadly chemical weapons. These inhumane and indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction were again used in 1924 by Spain against Morocco, by Italy against Libya and Ethiopia in the 1920s and 1930s, and by Japan against China in World War II (Robinson 1971). More recently they were deployed by Iraq against Iran and Iraq’s Kurdish population in the 1980s, and from 2012 to the present in the Syrian civil war. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2016 includes 192 countries, 98% of the world’s population, with only four countries—Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan—still missing. And of the 72,525 metric tons of chemical agents declared to date in eight possessor states, over 66,000 metric tons—92%—have been safely destroyed in the last 25 years. This is a historic achievement in global disarmament and peace-building and needs to continue until we rid the world of all chemical weapons, prevent their re-emergence, and promote peaceful uses of chemistry.

The provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) connected with possible contact of personnel are summarised. Any handling with chemical weapons (CW), both in bulk and in munitions as well as with toxic armaments waste, in implementing the CWC, including verifying its provisions, is associated with actual health and environmental risks. The most fundamental provisions of the CWC, which reflect its original purpose, are those dealing with destruction of CW, which present a high risk during the whole course of destruction operations, starting with loading the cargo containers, over transportation, filling of destruction equipment, etc. untill the disposal of nontoxic waste and scrap metal. The developed and operational destruction technologies are reviewed. The system of workplace safety and environmental protection of CW destruction / disposal operations including their verification as envisaged by the CWC is to be based on toxicological data of toxic agents to be destroyed, efficiency of technologies and toxic properties of end products. At present, with the exception of studies connected with the influence of sea-dumped CW on aquatic environment, there is a lack of data dealing with the impact of CW on other environmental components and ecosystems.

The use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war is a grave violation of international law, as it violates the prohibition on using chemical weapons under customary international law. The war has erupted since Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad responded violently to the peaceful opposition toward the regime. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has confirmed two occasions of using chemical weapons in Syria in 2015 and 2016. However, until recently, there were no necessary measures to protect civilians in Syria from using chemical weapons and prevent any future use of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons. The study aims to analyze the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war, the violation of the CWC in the Syrian civil war, and the legal protection of Syrian civilians. The study used a normative legal research methodology. The data sources in the study were secondary data obtained from the statutory, analytical, legal, conceptual, and fact approaches. The study's result showed that the Syrian government violated the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 (CWC) and should respond with the action, categorized as an infringement of the international legal norm.