Issue Ownership and Strategic Policy Choice in Multiparty Africa

Abstract

While it is widely believed that democratic institutions are more responsive to citizens’ policy needs and interests, there has been little effort to examine how multiparty competition in consolidating democracies affects policy choices among competing economic interests. The questions of whether and how democracy influences such policy decisions tend to be ignored because many presume constituents in developing countries are only sensitive to relatively direct exchanges of favors for votes, such as distribution of clientelistic benefits or local/club goods. In this study, I examine some nationally important economic (sub)sectors whose policies favor some parts of the economy over others, targeting investment, taxes, and subsidies, trade protections, or regulation. Applying issue ownership theory to two cases—Ghana and Kenya—I find that partisan competition leads incumbent governments to pursue policies that help ensure economic gains to their electoral supporters at the expense of the opposition backers’ interests.Related ArticlesKostadinova, Tatiana, and Petia Kostadinova. 2016. “Party Promises, Voter Understanding, and Mandate Responsiveness in East European Politics.” Politics & Policy 44 (1): 5‐34. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12145Pelizzo, Riccardo, and Zim Nwokora. 2016. “Bridging the Divide: Measuring Party System Change and Classifying Party Systems.” Politics & Policy 44 (6): 1017‐1052. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12188Pelizzo, Riccardo, and Zim Nwokora. 2018. “Party System Change and the Quality of Democracy in East Africa.” Politics & Policy 46 (3): 505‐528. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12255