Issue Attention in Public Opinion Polls: Pollsters as Agenda Responders and Agenda Setters

ObjectiveWhile selective issue emphasis is a widely recognized strategy of party competition, we have little knowledge about how coalition parties interact with each other when deciding which policy issues to emphasize. Therefore we ask: Who leads and who follows the issue agenda in coalition governments?Methods. We create an issue attention data set using quantitative text analysis from over 40,000 press releases. We use this data set and time series cross‐section regression analysis to study the dynamics of coalition parties' issue attention.Results. We find that junior coalition parties are more responsive to their senior partners than senior partners to their junior partners. Hence, while coalition partners generally follow each other, senior partners enjoy a stronger leadership role in the cabinet.Conclusion. Coalition parties indeed coordinate their issue priorities as they respond to each other's issue agenda. However, due the asymmetric power distribution in coalition cabinets, it is not a negotiation process on equal footing.

Using aggregate time-series data, this study tests four research hypotheses. First, we examine the long-term trend in the issue agenda diversity of the public as measured by the Gallup Most Important Problem question from 1956 to 2004. Second, we test whether the agenda-setting effect between the media agenda and the public agenda has become weaker over that time. Finally, with multivariate autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) modeling, this study investigates the causal relationships among the longitudinal changes in public agenda diversity, the New York Time's content diversity, and the New York Times' agenda-setting effect on public opinion. While no significant trend in the agenda-setting effect was found, we found a significant quadratic trend in public agenda diversity and significant causal relationships among these three time-series measures. In short, increased public agenda diversity decreased the New York Times' public agenda-setting effect, and the issue agenda diversity of the New York Times has decreased over time, but the overall agenda-setting effect between the New York Times and the public has not become weaker over time.

ABSTRACTScholars characterize decision-making in the European Union (EU) as increasingly dispersed across different levels of political authority. This has implications for political representation. Yet, little is known about whether and how public opinion differs across levels of governance. In this article, we consider evaluations of issue priorities. Specifically, we use data from the Eurobarometer to evaluate the degree of correspondence between issues that citizens consider important to them personally, to their country and to the EU. We find generally weak relationships between these different levels, which suggests national issue priorities are distinct from both personal and EU priorities. The results indicate that more careful research is needed to understand how public priorities at different levels affect politics and policy in the EU.

The aim of the article is to examine how the population size of voluntary associations affects the process through which the public's issue priorities are translated into policy priorities. We conduct a time series analysis of political attention in executive and legislative agendas at the U.S. federal level in the period 1971–2001, covering all issues addressed by the U.S. government. We show that the number of voluntary associations in a policy area has a positive conditioning effect on the link between public priorities and attention for the president's State of the Union Address. However, our results do not find a positive effect for voluntary associations at later stages of the policy cycle, which experience a higher degree of institutional friction. The findings underline the importance of distinguishing between different stages of policymaking when considering the impact of voluntary associations on dynamic agenda responsiveness.

Using responses to 3,315 survey questions asked of national samples, we examine how policy preferences of Americans have changed over the last 45 years. The data indicate that there has been considerable stability in public opinion: responses to half the 613 repeated policy items show no significant change at all; approximately half the detectable changes were less than 10 percentage points; and rarely did preferences fluctuate significantly back and forth within a short time period. Foreign policy changes were no larger or more frequent than domestic, but they did tend to occur more abruptly. When opinion shifts occurred, they were not random or capricious; they were usually related to important changes in citizens' social and economic environments. Rapid shifts generally coincided with major events in international affairs or the economy.

The heart of agenda setting lies in defining public problems and setting governmental priorities. Veto threats represent conflict between Congress and the president over how to shape policy, yet we know little about the issues on which veto politics take place or longitudinal changes to these dynamics. When a president threatens to veto a bill, he raises its visibility and scope and thus helps shape the federal government's issue agenda. This article examines the issue dynamics of veto threats from 1985 to 2014. When presidents threaten to veto legislation they do so on public priorities and where their threats may be more credible, while divided government leads presidents to try to protect their own issue priorities on spending bills.

A comparison of front-page New Yor-k Times'content and national public opinion from 1954 to 1976 showed strong agenda-setting effects for the civil rights issue. For this issue, the optimal effect span was the fourto six-week period immediately prior to field work. These findings contradict previous findings and assertions about a cumulative media effect over a longer period of time. James P. Winter is an Adjunct Lecturer in the Newhouse School of Communications, Syracuse University. Chaim H. Eyal is on the faculty of the Communications Institute at Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 45:376-383 ? 1981 by The Trustees of Columbia University Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/81/0045-376/$2.50 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 05:32:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms AGENDA SETTING FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE 377 case in the literature. The question of the appropriate for analysis has received little systematic attention; in fact it has only recently been elaborated (Eyal et al., 1981; Eyal, 1980). One of the time frame components identified is the optimal effect span or peak association between media and public emphasis of an issue. Those studies that have to some degree broached the questions of time frame suggest that the optimal effect span between aggregate media attention and public priority is between two and five months, and that the impact is a cumulative one, with exposure over time leading to enhanced public salience (McCombs, et al., 1975). As McCombs and Masel-Walters (1976) indicated: It appears that the cumulative effects of from three to four months of day-to-day news play result in some issues rising high on the agenda and others disappearing from public view (p. 7). In a nonelection study of university students, Stone (1975) examined Time and Newsweek for six months before and three months after the dates of his fieldwork. Accumulating the media duration backward from the interviews, he found a monotonic increase in correlations between media and public agendas, especially up to two months prior to interviewing. Cumulative media content from a full seven months prior to the interviews provided the highest zero-order correlations with students' agendas, on several issues. Despite this indication, some researchers have found agenda-setting effects using as little as one week's media content from immediately prior to the interview period (Mullins, 1977; Becker and McCombs, 1977). Indeed, in a study comparing national television and Gallup Poll data over an eight-year period, Zucker (1978) found that the media emphasis in the month immediately prior to the interview period was a better predictor of public opinion than was earlier media content. However, Zucker's study was designed to focus on the causal order in agenda setting, and on types of issues and their duration of exposure in the media rather than the optimal effect span. A second important variable that has only recently been considered is the nature of the individual issues examined. McCombs (1981) described four approaches to agenda-setting research: using either aggregate or individual public agenda data, in conjunction with either a set of issues or a single issue. But perhaps the variable nature of issues precludes treating them in the aggregate, another problem that may explain inconsistent findings. With a few recent exceptions (Zucker, 1978; Stroman, 1978; Erbring et al., 1980; Winter et al., 1980) agenda-setting researchers have aggregated diverse issues, and expected wholesale transferral of issue saliences from media to public. The problems associated with treating issues in the aggregate have This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 05:32:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Elites forming a perception of what the public wants is an important way in which democratic representation comes about, the assumption holds. Yet very few are the studies that examine the effect of elite perceptions on politician action. This study sets out to revisit the matter, measuring actual public priorities, elite perceptions of public priorities and a wide range of representative actions with regard to a few hundred concrete issues. We find that elite perceptions matter for their representative behavior; elites are much more likely to take action on issues they believe citizens care about. The effect exists across the board; perceptions matter in three different political systems, for different types of political action, and for electorally safe and unsafe, trustee and delegate politicians alike. These results speak to the micro-level factors connecting public and policy agendas, and the conditions under which representatives are attentive to public issue priorities.

유권자들의 올바른 투표행위를 돕기 위해서 또는 정당이나 후보의 적절한 선거전략 수립을 위해서 여론조사를 통한 객관적이고 신뢰성 있는 정보의 확보는 매우 중요한 문제이다. 따라서 정당, 언론기관, 조사기관 등 여론조사 관련 기관에서는 여론조사의 결과 및 선거예측의 정확성 제고를 위해 지속적으로 노력해 왔다. 본 연구에서는 여론조사를 통한 선거예측의 과정에서 지지후보가 없다고 응답한 무응답층을 분류함으로써 득표율 예측의 정확도를 높이는 데 기여할 수 있는지를 살펴보았다. 실증 분석을 위해 2016년 20대 국회의원선거를 대상으로 전화면접조사를 통해 수집된 자료를 사용하였으며, 다양한 통계적 판별모형을 적용하여 분석을 시도하였다. 무응답 분류의 방법으로는 로지스틱 회귀(logistic regression), 판별함수(discriminant function), 성향점수(propensity method) 방법을 고려하였고, 각 방법에서 세부적인 사항에 따라 결과가 어떻게 달라지는지를 살펴보았다. 무응답 분류의 방법에 따라 다소의 차이는 있으나 어떤 방법을 사용하든 적어도 단순 보정의 결과보다는 더 좋은 예측 결과를 얻을 수 있었으며, 결과적으로 무응답층에 대하여 적절한 보정을 수행함으로써 득표율 예측을 위해 정확도를 상당히 높일 수 있음을 확인하였다.Obtaining the objective and reliable data through public opinion poll is of significant importance in order to help the electorate vote properly or establish a suitable election strategy of candidate or party. Hence, polling organizations such as political party, press, and research company have been dedicated to continuously improving the results of the public opinion poll and accuracy of election forecasting. This study looked into whether it can improve the accuracy of election forecasting by adjusting non-response, those who answered that they support no candidate, in the electoral process through public opinion poll. Logistic regression, discriminant function, and propensity method are applied for the classification of non-responses. For empirical research, we used the data that were collected by CATI(computer assisted telephone interviewing) for the 20th national assembly election in 2016 and attempted an analysis by applying varied statistical nonresponse adjusting model. Consequentially, our finding suggests that an appropriate adjustment for non-response can greatly increase accuracy in election forecasting.

\nEste artículo científico busca explicar cómo la agenda setting se aplicó en la cobertura y puesta en escena de los secuestros de un equipo periodístico de diario El Comercio y de una pareja de Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas; es decir, la prioridad de publicación y continuidad que tres medios de comunicación impresos El Comercio, El Universo y Expreso dieron para ambos hechos y si se cumplieron los códigos deontológicos. El período de análisis en el primer caso fue de 17 días, tiempo en que se desarrollaron los cinco momentos clave elegidos para la presente investigación (desde el secuestro hasta la confirmación de su muerte), mientras que los momentos del segundo se desarrollaron en el lapso de 80 días. En esta investigación también se utilizó el método empírico como la entrevista y los recursos descriptivo y documental. Como resultado se determinó que hubo un marcado seguimiento de cobertura en el caso del equipo periodístico, no así con la pareja de Santo Domingo, cuyo flujo de información oficial fue menor, debido a que hubo menos presión social dentro de la agenda mediática.\n
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Public Opinion Poll Question Databases: An Evaluation

Measuring party agendas is a central enterprise in agenda-setting studies, but there is no consensus on which empirical material to use to capture such agendas, and no study systematically compares different communication channels of individual parties. A crucial question arises: To what extent do political parties campaign on the same issues in different channels of campaign communication? Using quantitative content analysis to measure the agendas of Danish parties in six campaign channels during five national elections, the article empirically demonstrates that parties emphasise quite different issues in different channels, most likely due to strategic considerations. Potentially, this conclusion has profound implications for the research field: acknowledging the dissimilarity of the same party’s issue attention in different empirical material, scholars may not be able to directly compare agenda studies based on e.g. election manifestos and commercial ads. Thus, future agenda-setting studies should include multiple channels or begin a search for a standard source.

Agenda setting in the candidate–journalist relationship during the 2004 presidential election is explored by analysis of policy issues and campaign strategies contained both in candidate press releases and journalists’ coverage of the general election campaign. Candidate issue and strategy agendas were compiled from official George Bush (N=1280) and John Kerry (N=846) press releases throughout the general election campaign. The New York Times (N=1440), Los Angeles Times (N=853), and The Washington Post (N=1242) newspaper articles from the campaign's hot phase (Labor Day to Election Day) were used to construct the journalistic agenda. Significantly high cross-lag correlations for issue agendas throughout the campaign reveal convincing evidence of mutual influence on campaign agendas between Bush and Kerry. However, cross-lag comparisons of issue agendas during June reveal evidence of a one-time inter-candidate agenda-setting effect in Kerry's advantage over Bush. Attempts to influence journalists’ interpretation of political advertising and debate strategies dominate press releases from Labor Day to Election Day.

The aim of this research study was to trace the relationship between media presentations and public priorities. To trace the media and public relationship for media influence on the public through agenda-setting, four issues Pak-US relations, energy crises, and national reconciliation ordinance were studied on two leading news cable channels, The Express and The Geo News Randomly selected news shows and bulletins for a period of one year have been examined to gauge the media agenda while a survey to cable television viewers of two news channels has been conducted separately to check the audience’s agenda on these issues. 156 news bulletins and the same number of prime time talk shows were analyzed through agenda-setting and framing models to gauge media agenda. Results confirmed strong connections between media’s issues salience and the audience’s issue priorities on four understudied issues. Correlations were measured from r +0.66 to r +0.90 with a p-value of less than .001. H1 and H2 have confirmed the strong media influence on the public priorities in ranking the understudied issues.

256 SAISREVIEW foreign policy actions. For readers with a limited background in Cuban studies, Domínguez provides a detailed history of the major events since January 1959 and enough prior history to set the context. He draws on the actions of Castro and of other leaders of the Revolution to show the development of communism in Cuba, the role of Marxism-Leninism in their thought and politics, Cuba's role in the bipolar security regime with the United States and U.S.S.R, and the eventual role of the CEMA, the western market economies, and less developed countries in the Cuban economy. Overall, Domínguez makes a convincing argument for some degree of limited independence in the Soviet-Cuban relationship. At the same time, he seems to want it both ways: Cuba as willing servant and Cuba as disobedient child. He points to recent changes in the Soviet-Cuban relationship as merely incidental events in a generally continuous relationship characterized by different yet often convergent foreign policy goals. To Make a World Safe for Revolution is an excellent treatment of Cuban foreign policy and provides fine background material and historical perspective. It is justifiably lacking in projections for future developments, while seemingly suggesting that no changes are to be expected. While such a view is still widely held, recent events in other socialist countries portend changes in what many view as an immutable regime. Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe. By Richard C. Eichenberg. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. 293 pp. $29.95/Cloth. Reviewed by Bernard I. Finel, M.A. Candidate, SAIS Over the past decade and a half of major policy debates within NATO, proponents of every imaginable position have sought to bolster their arguments by citing European public opinion. Whether the issue was nuclear modernization, INF missile deployment, the neutron bomb, burden-sharing, or nuclear battle doctrines, advocates almost always quoted some European poll to support their position. With so many different political persuasions and interests claiming to speak in the name of the European mind, it is difficult to figure out what Europeans really feel. To the rescue comes Richard C. Eichenberg, presently at Tufts University. In this book published under the auspices of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Eichenberg presents a comprehensive and very readable compilation of European public opinion polls dealing with national security. The general issues Eichenberg examines are the perception of the relative military power ofNATO and the Warsaw Pact, the level ofconfidence in America's willingness to come to the aid of NATO, and the perceived threat of Soviet aggression. Other more specific issues include INF deployment, the necessity of an independent European nuclear deterrence, and public vs. military spending priorities. BOOK REVIEWS 257 In each case, Eichenberg presents the relevant data culled from extensive public opinion polls conducted over the past forty years. There are more than a few surprises: European and American perceptions are often very close, Europeans are by and large content with NATO, and Europeans do indeed trust (and maybe even like) Americans. Eichenberg also breaks down the available data into subgroups. For example, he compares views of younger and older generations of Europeans. Eichenberg is keenly interested with the problems posed by the so-called "successor generation." In many cases Eichenberg analyzes public opinion through voting patterns, noting for example that conservatives in most countries have perceived the Warsaw Pact as more powerful and hostile than their liberal counterparts. In addition, Eichenberg compares opinions of European elites to those held by the general population and concludes that elites are much more committed to the Western alliance and less susceptible to opinion swings in reaction to events. All this information may seem a bit overwhelming. However, this is not just a book of facts and numbers. Eichenberg relates the public opinion polls to historic events and decisions. In one sense, Eichenberg presents a history of the NATO alliance, with polls to highlight certain trends and movements. In another sense, Eichenberg uses the polling data to test numerous hypotheses about the way modern democratic societies deal with foreign policy challenges. Third, the polls represent a starting point for Eichenberg's own synthesis...