Is There Really Any “Merely Verbal” Ontological Dispute?

Epistemicism about the debate on material composition (Bennett 2009) has it that there are too little grounds to believe any of the competing theories—Nihilism, Universalism and intermediate positions. Although an epistemic critique of this debate deserves serious consideration, I wish to resist epistemicism by countering it with a form of epistemic relativism. I will argue that each party to the debate is justified relative to the ranking of theoretical features and virtues that is “internal” to each position. I will urge that this view is to be preferred to epistemicism on account of its greater charity towards the participants involved in the relevant ontological debate.

Rationality and the Genetic Challenge by Matti Häyry is a well-written and thoughtful book about important issues in the contemporary ethical discussion of genetics. The book is well structured around seven practical themes that the author takes to exemplify “the genetic challenge.” He also refers to them as “seven ways of making people better,” which the subtitle of the book already puts into question form: Making People Better? In the first chapter of the book, Häyry introduces these seven themes and he discusses each of them in Chapters 3–9. In the remaining two chapters, 2 and 10, he describes the main normative positions analyzed in the book and clarifies his own methodology and position. He chooses six authors, or three pairs of authors, whom he takes to “represent the three normative doctrines of Western Moral philosophy” (p. 27) in order to demonstrate six “divergent rationalities” or “methods of genethics.” In this way, Häyry both summarizes the main prescriptive positions in contemporary bioethical debate and contrasts them with his own “nonconfrontational notion of rationality,” which aims to show that there is a variety of divergent, not mutually exclusive normative views, the justification of which “depends ultimately on the choice of worldviews, attitudes, and ideas about the foundation of moral worth” (p. 47).

Current metaphysical debates (between, e.g., Hirsch, Sider, Hawthorne, and others) are historically centered in an earlier debate between Carnap and Quine. This was a debate over whether formal languages can function as replacements for natural language or whether instead they offer techniques that can be used to modify natural languages. This debate continues to be relevant to contemporary debates between Hirsch and his opponents. Hirsch presupposes the natural-language-centered Quinean position; many of his opponents take Ontologese to be a cogent alternative for metaphysical discourse. In addition, it’s shown that Hirsch’s attempts to demarcate substantial from purely verbal debates derail because of the technical failure to show that finitely specified sentence-to-sentence mappings between disputant claims are available. It’s shown further that quantifier-variant views make no sense of ontological debate. Participants in ontological debate need to share an existence concept if they are to argue successfully with one another.

Given the contemporary trend in favour of austerer ontological commitments, it would appear that Buddhism as a religion would have renewed relevance in the ontological debate concerning what exists. In what follows, I will argue that the ontological anti-realism of Madhyamaka Buddhism shares enough family resemblances with the lightweight realism of scientific naturalism to warrant a new look in, particularly in resolving ontological stalemates in the debate between the

Development studies and practice have recently undergone a transition that has yielded an unprecedented emphasis on local civil society (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). There is now a high level of agreement regarding the importance of popular participation for social change and empowerment. Behind the apparent consensus on the importance of local civil society in development, there are quite divergent views on the characteristics and functions of civil society. Two main strands of development thinking and intervention can be identified as particularly relevant in this regard. These can be described as revisionist neo-liberalism and post-Marxism. Revisionist neoliberalism sees institutions and actors in civil society as partners for enabling state institutions. Popular participation is seen as a means for making development interventions more cost-effective and efficient and also as a step towards privatisation of state services. PostMarxism, which may be seen as the. main counter-hegemonic position in contemporary development debates, sees civil society as a challenge to the hegemony of global economic liberalism and its associated political institutions. Social movements in civil society hold the potential for bringing about autocentric and socially relevant development in opposition to both the state and the market. Both agree that civil society has a crucial role to play as an alternative to exploitative, parasitic and inefficient states. This article seeks to address two main questions regarding the role of civil society: (1) What are the theoretical roots and main characteristics of these different views on civil society, and (2) What are the shortcomings of these perspectives? It will be argued that development theory has moved away from a polarised debate over

This paper presents a new interpretation of the objects of dianoia in Plato’s divided line, contending that they are mental images of the Forms hypothesized by the dianoetic reasoner. The paper is divided into two parts. A survey of the contemporary debate over the identity of the objects of dianoia yields three criteria a successful interpretation should meet. Then, it is argued that the mental images interpretation, in addition to proving consistent with key passages in the middle books of the Republic, better meets those criteria than do any of the three main positions.

One of the main positions in the contemporary debate on joint attention is John Campbell’s relationalist account. This account has been welcomed as extremely promising in some strands of philosophy and cognitive science, but it has recently been subject to renewed criticism. In this paper, I take a sympathetic approach toward Campbell’s relationalism and I provide support for it by means of a naturalistic theory of the individuation of joint-attentional states. I start from examining some recent objections raised against Campbell’s account. I suggest that, although these objections do not undermine the account, they point to questions that current relationalism leaves unanswered. Specifically, current relationalism does not provide an explanation of the psychological processes through which a joint-attentional experience is individuated, i.e., assembled and experienced, in such a way that it can constitute an immediate justification for a coordinated action. I propose that such an explanation can be found in a phenomenological-interactionist approach to shared intentionality.

The environmental economic response to mainstream neo-classical economics’ disconnect from the natural world was to value external environmental costs and include those into decisions about human welfare. The ecological economic response, heavily influenced by systems ecology, brought the concept of ecological scale or carrying capacity, as a limit to human choice. The divisions between these two theories are not merely cosmetic as illustrated by the highpolitical stakes in recent economic and environmental debates. This article concerns itself specifically with the question how Christian economists position themselves towards the unfolding ecological and economic crises. It is shown that the main positions taken in the policy debates on economy and ecology are closely mirrored in the broader Christian economic community, raising the question whether the Christian economic tradition does have anything particular to offer in response to the ecological and economic crises. We approach this question from two angles, first, reviewing the literature on an earlier debate by the Association of Christian Economists on what Christian economists should be doing and, second, reviewing the literature on the relationships between Christianity and environmental beliefs and behaviour. With reference to eco-theological literature on the varying theological views on the relationship between humanity and the rest of creation, and on different expectations of the eschaton, it is shown why such diverging positions are taken among Christian economists. Nevertheless, the objective reality of Jesus Christ demands a particular Christian ethics and behaviour, which in turn, kindles fertile questions for Christian economists in their practical engagement withthe economic and ecological sciences and with broader culture.

This essay examines ideas surrounding growth, based on experiential insights gained by the author while staying with indigenous leaders of the Kariri-Xoco in Northeastern Brazil as part of an artistic residency organised by Thydewa (NGO). This is not an ethnographic study, but a reflection into indigenous modes of learning through co-participation in the lifeworld, and how these learnings can help enrich a contemporary ontological debate on animism and indigeneity beyond identitary frameworks. The work also touches on a critique of developmentalism, through indigenous ideas concerning growth and change. Some insights into the performing arts practice developed with the Kariri-Xoco as part of the residency are also touched upon.

I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s concept of shared values as values of plural subjects created by joint commitment. I argue that Gilbert’s account of shared values is a cognitivist and extrinsic one: it neglects the specific role of values for the constitution of plural subjects and considers values neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social unity. I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological debate, phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow to account adequately for values and to understand values’ crucial role for social unity. I discuss Scheler’s dividing vs. sharing values thesis and mention Schapp’s collective values thesis. Finally I address the question of the collective feeling value.

Naïve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features. The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception has devoted little attention to assessing one of the main motivations to endorse Naïve Realism–namely, that it is the only view which articulates our ‘intuitive’ conception of perception. In this paper, I first clarify in which sense Naïve Realism is supposed to be ‘naïve’. In this respect, I argue that it is put forward as the only view which can take our introspective knowledge of perception at face value, and I identify the two (alleged) key features of such introspective knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that one of these features-namely, that it seems as one could not be in the same perceptual state unless the putative objects of perception existed and were perceived–is introspectively evident. Consequently, I argue that a view of perceptual experience–such as Intentionalism–which denies that this feature is true of perception can still take introspection at face value. This undermines the claim that Naïve Realism is the only account which accommodates our intuitions on the nature of perception.

The Buddhist theory of Apoha (exclusion) offers a distinct and non-essentialist approach to meaning and cognition by rejecting intrinsic universals and elucidating linguistic categorization through negation. Rooted in the epistemological and logical traditions of Indian Buddhism, Apoha was systematically formulated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as a counterargument to realist theories of meaning, which assert the existence of inherent essences corresponding to linguistic categories. Instead of postulating a positive universal, Apoha posits that words acquire meaning by excluding what they do not denote. For instance, the term "cow" does not signify an inherent cow-ness but instead differentiates cows from non-cows. This exclusion-based model of meaning challenges ontological realism and presents an alternative perspective in which meaning is derived through negation rather than intrinsic identity.This paper examines Apoha in relation to contemporary cognitive science, particularly in the contexts of category formation, prototype theory, and conceptual blending. Empirical research in cognitive science indicates that human categorization operates through flexible, context-sensitive processes rather than rigid universals, thereby aligning with the Buddhist view that meaning is constructed rather than inherent. Engaging with contemporary debates in the philosophy of language and cognitive semantics, this study positions Apoha in dialogue with alternative theoretical frameworks, including Aristotelian essentialism, Fregean reference theory, and Wittgensteinian perspectives on language. Through this comparative analysis, the paper explores how Apoha challenges foundational assumptions concerning meaning, reference, and conceptual representation.Furthermore, this study critically engages with objections to Apoha, particularly those advanced by the Nyāya School, which argues that exclusion alone is insufficient for a comprehensive account of linguistic meaning. Nyāya philosophers contend that Apoha leads to an infinite regress or circular reasoning, as negation presupposes some form of positive content. By reassessing these critiques within the framework of cognitive science, this paper demonstrates how Apoha can be reinterpreted as a viable model for understanding the construction and communication of meaning, particularly in light of contemporary non-essentialist approaches to language. By integrating Buddhist epistemology with modern linguistic and cognitive theories, this study highlights the enduring significance of Apoha in contemporary discussions on language and cognition. The exclusion-based model of meaning proposed by Apoha aligns with non-essentialist and usage-based linguistic frameworks, offering valuable insights into how meaning is generated through contrast, differentiation, and contextual dependence. In doing so, this research underscores Apoha not only as a pivotal contribution to Indian philosophy but also as a theoretically robust and philosophically compelling framework for modern cognitive and linguistic inquiry.

The purpose of the article is to study the historical and theoretical foundations of levying the tax on immovable property other than a land plot, to develop proposals for eliminating gaps in legislation and to expand the scientific basis for studying the above tax. Methodology. The study is based on the analysis of tax legislation in the field of levying tax on immovable property other than a land plot. The article outlines the historical stages of formation and development of taxation of immovable property other than a land plot. This paper analyses the current changes in legislation and establishes that the adjustments to legal regulation have affected the provisions of the list of objects and tax rates, the tax period, and the mechanism of forming a tax decision-notification. It is found that the formation of a scientific basis for the study of taxation other than land is relevant. Recent research in the field of real estate taxation is reviewed and analysed. The main doctrines and scientific positions are presented, and the analysis of domestic legislation is carried out. The imperfection of tax legislation is substantiated. The authors analyse the conceptual framework of the Tax Code of Ukraine. It is also determined that the term "tax collection" is an independent and highly specialised term, which means a set of actions of controlling authorities in the field of tax collection on real estate other than a land plot. A detailed analysis of real estate objects that are not subject to the tax under study was carried out. The research reveals abuses by taxpayers in determining the tax base for real estate objects for which the ownership is not registered. It is proposed to amend the list of taxable real estate owned by spouses in joint ownership. Positive changes in tax legislation under martial law are outlined. The difficulty of effective collection of tax on immovable property other than a land plot is substantiated. Results. In the course of the study of the theoretical foundations of taxation of immovable property other than a land plot, the authors concludes that the legislative framework for taxation has gone through its historical path and continues to evolve. Over the period of validity of the TC of Ukraine, Article 266 has undergone numerous changes, both positive and negative, however, this indicates that the legislator is looking for the best ways to ensure the quality of the tax under study. The article reveals discrepancies in the categorical apparatus of the Tax Code of Ukraine, the legislator uses the terms "administration" and "collection". This paper considers it appropriate to use the concept of levying tax on real property other than a land plot. The authors substantiate the imperfection of legal provisions regulating the collection of tax other than land, which contributes to the abuse of taxpayers. A positive novelty of the legislation is the inclusion of those objects that are not subject to taxation that are destroyed, damaged (requiring major repairs) and destroyed during the period of hostilities. Practical implications. The article provides proposals according to which amendments to the TC of Ukraine will facilitate more efficient collection of tax on immovable property other than land plots. Value/originality. The article provides proposals for amendments to the TC of Ukraine in terms of taxpayers' obligations, clarification of the preferential category of the tax base and jointly owned property.

This essay explores the possibility of constructing a structural realist interpretation of spacetime theories that can resolve the ontological debate between substantivalists and relationists. Drawing on various structuralist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as on the theoretical complexities of general relativity, our investigation will reveal that a structuralist approach can be beneficial to the spacetime theorist as a means of deflating some of the ontological disputes regarding similarly structured spacetimes.

Holism and supervenience