Abstract
The optimal constitution is one that protects people from politicians' thirst of power and preserves citizens' civic virtues. This paper presents a model that blends David Hume's (1741) consideration that in politics “every man ought to be supposed a knave,” with John Stuart Mill's (1861) conception of self-interested politicians. The optimal constitution is proved to be feasible. However, there are two possible equilibria, the Frey and Brennan-Buchanan equilibrium. It is shown that Bruno Frey's (1997) crowding-in and crowding-out analysis is a particular case of our model. In the Brennan-Buchanan equilibrium there is a long-run neutrality of enforcement on citizens' performance. In general, a trade-off is expected between the optimal number of laws and enforcement. The comparison between the equilibria shows that the Frey equilibrium is the best option to enhance the civic virtues of citizens, while the Brennan-Buchanan equilibrium is the best way to deter the ambitions of self-interested politicians.
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