Is Jesus Physically Present in the Eucharist? Or How Not to Teach Berengarius

Reviewed by: Soundings in the History of Hope: New Studies on Thomas Aquinas by Richard Schenk T. Adam Van Wart Soundings in the History of Hope: New Studies on Thomas Aquinas by Richard Schenk, O.P., Faith and Reason: Studies in Catholic Theology and Philosophy series (Ave Maria, FL: Sapienta, 2016), x + 332 pp. Consisting largely of a series of essays and articles previously published elsewhere, Richard Schenk's Soundings in the History of Hope engages a variety of current theological conversations by making use of the resources presented by Saint Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries. The book unfolds in three parts, all variously attempting to point the way forward for Catholic theology through a discerning retrieval of the Church's rich theological past. Thematically uniting the whole, however, is Schenk's manifest desire to take up that past in a way that avoids any and all theological oversimplification, whether that be in repristinationist or progressivist directions. Schenk brings the past and present into conversation in such a way that the cherished ideas of both are challenged and made better for the exchange. The first part, coextensive with the book's opening chapter, is a case in point. Here Schenk suggests specific ways in which Catholic theology, in general, and both Thomism and the Dominican Order, in particular, might best utilize and stay true to the multi-faceted past communicated to them, and this precisely by bringing that past into an open two-way conversation with the present. What Schenk says with respect to Thomism there proves programmatic for the book and his vision of Catholic theology overall: "Thomism as a whole cannot live without a vibrant communication with what is outside it, nor will it flourish without a reflective diversity of methods within it. Genuine Thomism is necessarily collaborative" (25). The rest of the book is the concretization of just that conviction. The second part of the book, then, opens with a chapter that takes up anew the question of how faith's interiority—what is proper to the faith itself—should engage with those truths experienced as exterior to, or only "indirectly expressive" of, the faith. Beginning with Melchior Cano and moving to Saint Thomas's treatment of how all Christ's acts are variously instructive for us, Schenk proceeds to make the case that properly neither "interiority" nor "exteriority" should be pitted against one another, as has too frequently occurred in recent theology. Rather, "faith lives in its own way from a basic sense of exteriority (here the donum Dei) that makes a qualified interiority of human understanding and its openness to the other possible." (68) In the book's third chapter, Schenk explores what he takes to be the occasionally underplayed Platonic elements in Thomas's thought, especially [End Page 718] with respect to Thomas's alleged "realism" and the idea that "grace builds on nature." In so doing, he shows how Saint Thomas was able to bridge the divergent Proclean and Porphyrian streams of Platonic thought as they had been taken up in the West by Dionysius and Saint Augustine, respectively. Father Shenck opines that only by shedding light in this way on how Saint Thomas deployed and developed the Platonic tradition can one truly grasp "the programmatic nature of Thomas's own thought" (70). What is more, such retrievals have added theological benefit in terms of helpfully addressing present concerns, such as, for example, perhaps providing "an alternative to today's antithesis between demythologizing doctrine into our prior experience of humanity and remythologizing as the more genuine faith allegedly new experiences of the Trinity drawn from private revelations" (83). Continuing to seek new convergences where divergence has been presupposed, Father Shenck moves in chapter 4 to reexamine the question of whether or not human labor is chiefly to be seen as a perfecting participation in divine blessing or an ongoing degenerative, post-lapsarian curse. As before, Schenk enters into conversation with Saint Thomas and the broad historical tradition to problematize potential answers to that question which would minimize any aspect of work's theocentric, anthropocentric, or cosmocentric character, or slight its function as avenue for grace. Schenk's fifth chapter makes use of...

Faith, Metaphysics, and the Contemplation of Christ’s Corporeal Presence in the Eucharist: A Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Seventh Quodlibetal Dispute, Q. 4, A. 1 with an Introductory Essay Roger W. Nutt1* I. Introduction This translation and essay has two primary aims. First, and most importantly, a text of Thomas Aquinas on the thorny question of the presence of the “whole Christ” in the Eucharist is made available for the first time in English. This short article of a Quodlibetal question touches, in seed form, on nearly all the major points of St. Thomas’s profound doctrine of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. There is no sense in which this text should be sought as a replacement for Aquinas ’ contemplations in his more mature and nuanced works on this topic, especially the fourth book of the Summa Contra Gentiles and questions 75–77 of the tertia pars of the Summa theologiae. Nevertheless , this text may indeed prove to be a valuable primer or companion for students of sacramental theology who find themselves daunted by the philosophical rigor underlying the material on the Real Presence in either of the two Summae. The second aim of this introductory essay is deeply related to content of the translation: namely, the essay provides a basic introduction to the metaphysical concepts that are needed to understand the deepest contours of the revealed mystery of the Real Presence. Only what is absolutely necessary has been detailed below, and references 1 * To John Lawrence Nelson on the occasion of his First Holy Communion Antiphon 15.2 (2011): 151-171 152 Roger W. Nutt to primary and secondary sources have been provided so that the reader can pursue these topics more fully if he or she wishes. One may wonder what, beyond the historical intrigue of studying the metaphysics of substance that undergird the doctrine of the Real Presence, is the value of re-examining the speculative inner-workings of the Angelic Doctor’s thought on the Eucharist? One answer to this question is that it is not difficult to find Catholic theologians today who simply deny the claim that a metaphysical understanding of reality is needed in order to grasp the doctrine of the Real Presence.� The headlong consideration of the Real Presence from a metaphysical standpoint is thus offered here as an apologia to contemporary Catholic theologians; an apologia that seeks to underscore the rich and organic relationship between metaphysical contemplation and the vision of the world contained in Divine Revelation. It is our hope that this translation and the philosophical introduction, presented in conjunction with the objections and contributions of several recent authors, will contribute in some way to a confident renewal in the metaphysical aspects of Eucharistic theology, and, by default, to a confident renewal in the place that Aquinas and his commentators can have in teaching us about the Eucharist. II. Change, Substance, Quantity, and Location: A Brief Philosophical Introduction The teaching of the Catholic Church on Christ’s presence in the Sacrament of the Eucharist is clear and unambiguous: Jesus, in a substantial manner, is present “body, blood, soul, and divinity” in every particle of every consecrated host and in every drop of consecrated wine. The change that brings about this presence of the “whole Christ” is called by the Church “transubstantiation.” 1. Transubstantiation As the name indicates “transubstantiation” is a change whose term is in the order of substance. To understand, therefore, the presence that is brought about as a result of this change, it is necessary to understand the meaning of substance and how substance is really distinct from accidental realities such as quantity and location. Every change that takes place in the natural order of things, whether it be a substantial change (when one thing becomes another thing) or an accidental change (when a thing is modified without ceasing to be what it is), is governed by certain necessary principles without which the change cannot take place. One of Aristotle’s preferred examples of change, in this case an accidental change, is the movement of the non-musical man from being “non-musical” to being a “musical 153 Faith, Metaphysics, and the Contemplation of Christ’s Corporeal...

Reviewed by: God’s Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley by Kenneth M. Loyer Justus H. Hunter God’s Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley by Kenneth M. Loyer (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 295 pp. “DISTINCTIVE YET COMPLEMENTARY” is how Kenneth Loyer, in his learned study God’s Love Through the Spirit, characterizes the theologies of Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley. Distinctive, in so far as Wesley’s “practical theology” foregoes the gilding of scholastic Trinitarian theology. He does not consider the distinction between persons, processions, and relations, or essential, notional, and personal concepts, as does Aquinas. Yet, Loyer contends, Wesley’s soteriology complements Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology. God’s Love Through the Spirit is a work of Methodist theology. It is a retrieval of John and Charles Wesley’s doctrine of sanctification, enhanced by Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on the Holy Spirit. That is, it is a Methodist reception of St. Thomas. But it is also an offering of Methodism, and the Wesleys, to contemporary followers of the Angelic Doctor. As Loyer puts it, his Methodist soteriology “appropriates and amplifies” St. Thomas. The text has three phases. First, two chapters outline challenges internal to Methodist theology, centering around the Wesleyan doctrine of sanctification. Next, Loyer gives a detailed systematic analysis of Aquinas’s pneumatology focused around the concept of love. Finally, Loyer constructs a way forward for Methodist soteriology by appropriating Thomas’s teaching on the Spirit and love. The result is a rigorously constructed Wesleyan soteriology and pneumatology in dialogue with Thomas Aquinas that should garner interest from both Catholic and Methodist theologians. The provocation of God’s Love Through the Spirit is a deficiency in Methodist pneumatology. Loyer discerns a twofold problem descending from the lack of a developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Methodist theology. First, while Methodists have long emphasized their doctrine of grace, in particular sanctifying grace, they have failed to connect that doctrine to the Holy Spirit. As a result, Loyer contends, Methodist language of grace has become generic and Methodist theology “tends to end up reflecting the human spirit and its multifaceted quest for liberation more than it reflects the Spirit of God, who as the source of all life actually gives the human spirit its true freedom” (3). This dilemma he refers to as the “secularization” of sanctification, which is attended by a reduction of pneumatology to politics. [End Page 958] The question, of course, is what to do. The dilemma derives, in part, from a related problem in the reception of John Wesley. Wesley left the theological “foundation” of his teaching on sanctification implicit or undeveloped. Thus, the reception of his teaching has been prone to several misreadings, which Loyer calls variously “perfectionist,” “static,” “anthropocentric,” or “individualist.” Whatever misreadings exist, Loyer finds a single solution: to render explicit the implicit theological foundation of Wesley’s soteriology. That is, he seeks to connect Wesley’s teaching on sanctification to Trinitarian theology: “Viewing (sanctification) through the lens of trinitarian theology clarifies its appropriately theological content and orientation while illuminating Wesley’s emphasis on the immediate and ongoing work of the Holy Spirit sanctifying those in Christ so that the image of God is more fully restored in their lives” (18). Loyer ties this proposal to a broader concern in Wesley and Methodist studies for a recovery of Wesley’s teaching on holiness and perfection, most notably by William Abraham and Theodore Runyon. He therefore begins with a return to teaching of the Wesleys on sanctification and perfection. Weaving together the sermons of John and the hymns of Charles, in keeping with the best practices of Wesley studies, he shows an implicit trinitarianism. Loyer contends that making explicit, and augmenting, that Trinitarian theology promises to correct the misreadings he presents in chapter 2 and prevent the pneumatological deficiencies outlined in chapter 1. In order to express and augment the implicit trinitarianism of John and Charles Wesley, Loyer turns to Thomas Aquinas. Chapters 3 and 4 follow the sequence of articles in Summa theologiae I, question 37. Loyer first considers Aquinas’s position in article...

This dissertation is a comparative study of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Joseph Ratzinger’s (b.1927) theology of the way God reveals, or divine Revelation. The Dissertation’s Question and Outline Early in his theological formation Ratzinger was disenchanted by the Neo-Scholastic presentation he received of Thomas’s theology from his seminary professors in Freising. Upon discovering philosophical Personalism, he subsequently acquired an Augustinian, Bonaventurian, and even neo-Platonic tendency. Despite this, he claims never to have rejected Aquinas or his doctrine. With his early work in Fundamental Theology, laying important foundations for his theological career, and the contentions over interpreting Aquinas between the twentieth-century’s Ressourcement and Neo-Thomistic theologians, along with Ratzinger’s influence on Dei verbum’s composition, an opening arises for a comparative study of his Revelation theology with Aquinas’s. Thus the dissertation seeks to answer whether or not Ratzinger’s Revelation theology is congruent with Aquinas’s, and if so, does it advance from Aquinas’s principles (although definitely unintendedly). The study therefore presents and compares their understand of: (1) Revelation’s essential purpose; (2) its essential act; and (3) how it is received. Presenting the evidence substantiating these claims, the dissertation takes a threefold approach. It outlines important background details, and identifies its key question, its methodological approach and sets its objectives (Section 1.). It presents the evidence of Aquinas and Ratzinger’s positions (Sections 2. to 4.), and finally compares them (Section 5.). The Dissertation’s Contention and Summary of its Argument This dissertation contends that the foundation of their differences lies in Aquinas’s Aristotelian intellectualism as a university professor, and Ratzinger’s philosophical Personalism, which he employed for pastoral reasons. Regarding Revelation’s purpose, Aquinas understands it as ultimately given for our salvation (i.e., the attainment of the beatific vision); while Ratzinger understands it as bringing about the loving dialogical communion between persons, climaxing in Christ himself. From his intellectualism, Aquinas understands the essential revelatory act as consisting in the divine illumination of the Prophet’s judgment (and Christ’s beatific vision) within an Aristotelian lineal history; whereas Ratzinger understands it as consisting in a Christological dialogue, unfolding in a circular or spiral Christocentric history. Regarding their understanding of Revelation’s reception, Aquinas posits that it essentially consists in the intellectual acceptance of the revealed sacra doctrina through divine faith; whereas Ratzinger posits that it consists in a personal encounter and one’s entrance into what he terms, the ‘Christ-Event,’ by entering the life, worship and faith of the Church (and especially through her liturgy). The dissertation contends that Ratzinger’s Revelation theology is congruent with Aquinas’s principles, since they fundamentally agree that the revelatory act is a divine ‘speech-act.’ (Although Thomas does not employ this exact term I believe it can be argued that it adequately describes his understanding). It also contends that Ratzinger advances Aquinas’s understanding by positing that Revelation is not just a ‘speech-act’ stuck in the past but has a perennial connotation as it is an ongoing dialogical ‘speech-act’ unfolding throughout history. Ratzinger does this by essentially incorporating history into his theology, as derived from his study of Bonaventure. Ratzinger also advances beyond Thomas’s understanding by affirming that for Revelation to be had it must be received, and that the proper receiving subject is not the individual believer but the believing community of the whole Church (this is ‘Revelation’s proper dialogue partner’). Here they differ in their respective understanding of the Church’s role. Whereas Ratzinger incorporates the Church into Revelation’s essential act, Aquinas understands it more as a guarantor of Revelation’s message. Regarding Revelation’s reception through faith, Aquinas understands it as an intellectual assent to the realities revealed; whereas Ratzinger understands it as consisting in a personal encounter whereby the believer enters into the divine dialogue of love by entering the Church’s life, teaching, worship, and especially her faith, as manifest in and through her liturgy. The Contribution made by this Comparative Study Undertaking this study, I offer a contribution to the ‘reconciliatory dialogue’ currently occurring between ‘intellectual descendants’ of the twentieth-century’s Catholic Ressourcement Movement and Neo-Scholastic Thomism. I contribute to our understanding of Aquinas’s positions concerning the way God reveals, and further our understanding of Revelation theology. The dissertation is not a historical study of Ratzinger and Aquinas, but a constructive study in systematic theology.

In a 'Message … on Evolution' to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in 1996 Pope John Paul II speaks of both a physical continuity and an ontological discontinuity or leap regarding the origin of human persons.1 Alan Porter considers an ontological leap to be contrary to the 'gradualism' of evolution.2 In this paper we first present Pope John Paul II's views on evolution, the origin of human persons, and original sin more fully. Next we examine Porter's view more fully, as well as that of Denis Lamoureux who takes a gradualist approach to both human origins and human sin. We then summarize the proposals of Germain Grisez, Benedict Ashley and Earl Muller with regard to how an 'ontological leap' might be reconciled with evolution. They also consider how original sin might be reconciled with evolution. These various views and proposals, as well as a proposal that I put forward, are then assessed in terms of what seems to be most consistent with science, human experience, philosophy and Christian theology. Concerning human origins, it seems that a gradualism involving many steps pertaining to our biological and psychological dimensions could have taken place, along with an ontological leap pertaining to our moral and spiritual dimensions. In line with this we can also understand original sin. The church's magisterium is directly concerned with the question of evolution for it involves the conception of man: Revelation teaches us that he was created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gn. 1:27–29) . … [M]an is called to enter into a relationship of knowledge and love with God himself, a relationship which will find its complete fulfillment beyond time, in eternity . … It is by virtue of his spiritual soul that the whole person possesses such a dignity even in his body . … Consequently, theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the forces of living matter or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter are incompatible with the truth about man. Nor are they able to ground the dignity of the person. With man, then, we find ourselves in the presence of an ontological difference, an ontological leap, one could say. However, does not the posing of such ontological discontinuity run counter to that physical continuity which seems to be the main thread of research into evolution in the field of physics and chemistry? Consideration of the method used in the various branches of knowledge makes it possible to reconcile two points of view which would seem irreconcilable. The sciences of observation describe and measure the multiple manifestations of life with increasing precision and correlate them with the time line. The moment of transition to the spiritual is not the object of this kind of observation, which nevertheless can discover at the experimental level a series of very valuable signs indicating what is specific to the human being. But the experience of metaphysical knowledge, of self-reflection, of moral conscience, freedom, or again, of aesthetic and religious experience, falls within the competence of philosophical analysis and reflection, while theology brings out its ultimate meaning according to the Creator's plans.3 The account of the Fall in Genesis 3 uses figurative language, but affirms a primeval event, a deed that took place at the beginning of the history of man. … "Although set by God in a state of rectitude, man, enticed by the evil one, abused his freedom at the very start of history. He lifted himself up against God and sought to attain his goal apart from him" (GS 13, 1). By his sin Adam, as the first man, lost the original holiness and justice he had received from God, not only for himself but for all human beings. Adam and Eve transmitted to their descendants human nature wounded by their own first sin and hence deprived of original holiness and justice; this deprivation is called "original sin." As a result of original sin, human nature is weakened in its powers; subject to ignorance, suffering, and the domination of death; and inclined to sin. … "We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is transmitted with human nature, 'by propagation, not by imitation' and that it is … 'proper to each' " (Paul VI, CPG, n. 16). The victory that Christ won over sin has given us greater blessings than those which sin had taken from us: "where sin increased, grace abounded all the more" (Rom 5:20).4 It is especially in regard to original sin in this second meaning that modern culture raises such strong reservations. It cannot admit the idea of a hereditary sin connected with the decision of a progenitor and not with that of the person concerned. It holds that such a view runs counter to the personalistic vision of man and to the demands which derive from the full respect for his subjectivity. However, the Church's teaching on original sin can be extremely valuable also for modern man who having rejected the data of faith in this matter, can no longer understand the mysterious and distressing aspects of evil which he daily experiences and he ends up by wavering between a hasty and unjustified optimism and a radical pessimism bereft of hope.5 Moreover, man, who was created for freedom, bears within himself the wound of original sin, which constantly draws him towards evil and puts him in need of redemption. Not only is this doctrine an integral part of Christian revelation; it also has great hermeneutical value insofar as it helps one to understand human reality. Man tends towards good, but he is also capable of evil.6 The premise that evolution was gradual but ensoulment was discontinuous predicates the irrational conclusion that for one generation the parents were animals without souls and their children humans, made in the image of God, and with souls. Biological gradualism is incompatible with a sudden ensoulment dichotomy both in the evolutionary history of humans and for a maturing foetus, human or animal. At some point … there must have existed a strange family. The parents are hominid "animals" without souls, incapable of the knowledge of good and evil and of the experience of God after death and thus devoid of any of the theological interpretations of "imago Dei". John and Jenny their children by contrast, have been ensouled by an arbitrary gift of God and possess all the physical, cognitive, behavioural and spiritual attributes of a human. This implies a speciation event involving one generation only which is an evolutionary, anthropological and spiritual absurdity . …7 the Image of God and human sinfulness were gradually and mysteriously manifested through many generations of evolving ancestors. The origin of spiritual characteristics that define and distinguish humanity is not marked by a single punctiliar event in history. Rather, these metaphysical realities arose slowly and in a way that cannot be fully comprehended. Their manifestation during human evolution is similar to that in embryological development. Consequently, there never was an Adam/s or Eve/s. [Concerning the] … question of another conjectural opinion, namely polygenism, the children of the Church … cannot embrace that opinion which maintains that either after Adam there existed on this earth true men who did not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the first parent of all, or that Adam represents a certain number of first parents. Now it is in no way apparent how such an opinion can be reconciled with that which the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Teaching Authority of the Church propose with regard to original sin, which proceeds from a sin actually committed by an individual Adam and which, through generation, is passed on to all and is in everyone as his own.11 … [T]heology must assume that the spiritual capacity for free choice was given initially by a special divine intervention, which completed hominization, to a group of individuals small and cohesive enough to function socially as a single body. In this way, solidarity in sin by the whole of humankind was possible at the beginning. God may then have hominized additional groups which 'emerged into an already-given existential situation, and so shared prior to any personal act in the moral condition of humankind. In this sense, they shared "by propagation not by imitation" … even if not all humans were lineal descendants of a single couple . …' Therefore, 'there is no obstacle to thinking the original human community had a single leader whose action was decisive for its action as such.'13 Grisez's view would be an example of what Lamoureux calls punctiliar polygenism. [E]volutionary theory as a purely physical theory … is necessarily incomplete. In order to complete it as a theory which is … fully consistent with the principle of causality, it is necessary to refer to some superphysical creativity … [which is required] to explain the origin of human intelligence (or, better say, intelligent human beings), because … intelligent, creative thinking cannot be reduced totally to a function of the brain. Consequently, the evolutionary origin of human beings, while it must have been entirely consistent with the natural processes of biological evolution, also was a unique, creative event . … [Another possibility is that] … the origin of that final genetic trait responsible to produce a human brain capable of functioning at the human level depended on the mutation of one dominant gene that occurred in the germ-cells of a primate ancestor, which was not itself human but which then bred with another primate of its own kind to produce a male and female child who were genotypically the first human beings having fully human brains, and who by interbreeding became the ancestors of the entire human race. Either this or the former explanation is consistent with the interpretation of Genesis which is not concerned with the exact way in which the human species came into existence and began as a single interbreeding and intercommunicating species to have a history determined by a primordial act of human choice [i.e., original sin].14 [T]here is a single human race . … [T]he sin that disrupted human solidarity must have truly been sin. This in itself requires a spiritual dimension of human reality that simply transcends all other forms of life: monkeys … do not sin. … Furthermore, disrupted spiritual solidarity … and the universality of that condition require a disruption "in the beginning" – that is (as the Council of TRENT insisted), transmitted by propagation rather than merely by imitation . … But sin is a moral action, and this requires moral individuals.16 Christians have tended to prefer monogenetic evolutionary accounts. In point of fact, all that is strictly required by Christian faith is the universal solidarity in sin that is traced back "to the beginning". … There has been an implicit tendency to identify the human race (which is to say, rationally ensouled simians) with Homo sapiens and, accordingly, for many Christians to want to that Homo sapiens with a single There is no necessary theological to do ensoulment could have taken place prior to the of the final physical of the human or even after this had been would in interbreeding with the present solidarity of the human race had been In any event, the of the these of with any In the of evolution, it seems to that not only the of moral and spiritual life would have an ontological The first of psychological would also have a kind of or or an ontological animals the of psychological life seems to from who only experience a experiences such as how one experiences the or to more animals such as and who seem to experience many or a whole of psychological The and of that an individual experiences seems to be very to the of and present functioning of its as well as the of its body its and it seems that first to experience during As the individual into its or brain it to experience more and more it experiences to certain of its for to a or an to a for its in the individual will no longer be able to experience certain that it if the individual has a brain that it it then no longer experiences any the brain enough to it to do psychological experiences seem to be to the kind of brain and body an the psychological dimension of reality may have first with a genetic mutation capable of that kind of brain in a single that mutation was this capacity would then also be present in that genetic over time could have more and more brains, and capable of more and more psychological As as we we are the only living species on earth that has not only biological and psychological but also moral and spiritual dimensions. we can a kind of freedom that makes us responsible for our and and we can have a personal involving knowledge and with God, who is and who transcends the physical Pope Benedict of us human beings, created in the image of God, as free with souls and of we are persons, of us is only able to our moral and spiritual in this life we have that us to be the human child and all the human nature, with moral and spiritual at we can not these a certain of brain and psychological development. Nor can we if we have a brain that us the if the brain enough to and a certain level of psychological the person may be able to his or moral and spiritual the present to moral and spiritual in this seems to be to a certain level of present brain and psychological no or has been in the human As a I with and teaching that the human is a of a physical body and spiritual I have this view in another on philosophical and theological I will not all of I with Pope John Paul Grisez, Ashley and Muller that our moral and spiritual our capacity of or would have an ontological leap during evolution, which God a spiritual soul for human person. even a human is a living human an of the human species with a human nature, it seems that the most time that God created spiritual soul was body began to at and might the first human persons, with spiritual souls, have in the of proposals have some proposals, and the other views in this are assessed in the it seems that the of the first human person or during evolution may not have required a specific genetic the as an Christ was fully with a human body and he was also fully divine according to Christian faith and With in human history there within life in this a dimension or reality. This the of the or the second person of the who was fully with his human nature, body and the began with human that his human body began to this would not have biological but a by God, his was a and the the full of the divine and it required that there were in existence human beings with a true human It does not that the required any specific genetic Rather, it occurred at the time in human history by intelligence and which is greater than it seems that the moral and spiritual dimensions of human require brain and psychological to be in this God would have these were present in a hominid at in many individuals during part of their to the first human person or This may not have any specific genetic but God it at the most time according to It seems that the of the first human person would have as most with God their spiritual at their conception or that their body began to as was to faith original sin having one human and transmitted by human generation, it seems that there are possible one person who or two or more persons, the possibility of a who The one or more and their children the and so could then have with other of their biological These other of their species would have been very similar to them and The of the moral and spiritual would have the psychological experiences of the individuals who It would also have to certain in the This would have all of the human species were and by original sin, as is the original sin the first human person or would have been in the state of grace or with who in his body and was free from sin, beginning with his human who never committed sin, the first human person or did against God or sin original having who would not have been without sin, and their and so to us more than one human person was in the state of grace sin, it is that one of these and the other did which could have to some of the human race by original sin, and not It thus seems that most there was only one human person who or only a couple who the were the both human would have been in this original sin, with its for this is possible from a metaphysical and theological for it is also possible that there was only one human person the first human sin. God, who is free and could have initially created either a human soul for one human or he could have initially created souls for more than one human he or or they and had In either this proposal seems to be in line with the of original sin which is to all human 'by propagation, not by imitation' II By our personal we have all with this original sin. the of one to this was the of who was without sin, and never by a special or grace of God, to as the of our It seems that such a as in this is in line with the of doctrine on original sin, as well as what Pope John Paul II about both physical continuity and an ontological the origin of human occurred along these this would have a kind of from a within a from a biological this proposal is also in line with human evolution. In this I first a points Grisez, Muller and I then to Porter and conclusion that Pope John Paul II's views are in line with a of the and a metaphysical and theological of human Grisez's views are that free choice and the spiritual reality of either are present or However, his proposal that God hominized a whole group of humans all at and more groups all at after sin, would human ensoulment place at various of human from the to This proposal does not with the view that the most time God the spiritual both and was the body of the individual began to that at or a in the of an place the body to makes sense, the human person is a of physical body and spiritual In contrast, the proposal of is for all the individuals who would have been ensouled some time after their began to In the spirit of the [which are given in his that it is possible to a in with a by the of various … how a single mutation could have a sudden and during evolution on the of and us some into how it could have occurred at the genetic and In any two both a single which was the such mutation that one or two human capable of a fully human brain. This one or two from the would have been or to a spiritual soul or souls created by proposal is not it seems that a of his proposal is his an a spiritual soul so with his or genetic a single mutation could have to the first human then a mutation after this event, in a human that the capacity to such a human to human would not have received a spiritual soul from God, and would not be a This would be from the of and which are not the of human and are not human beings. a of proposal is that it would the view that all human beings are in dignity and human of the of their and This could be used to rather than in the image of the one God and with souls, all men have the nature and the by the of all are called to in the divine all therefore an … in personal … must be and as incompatible with and who is also a to teaching on the origin of human and original sin with biological evolution. view seems to be to both the proposals of and and these have been the are to to the by ensoulment could have taken place prior to the of the final physical of the human or even after this had been would in interbreeding with the present solidarity of the human race had been to evolutionary humans similar to us in between they began to and the of the their was from forms of modern humans and of about of the of of it is that as modern humans the they with these of the became Concerning this in of the of the that from and other humans may to for example in how the but most of these are to have no The human of modern humans, must have been to this it seems that ensoulment most occurred in modern humans some of them and with and In this way all humans or not they any from and the human nature with souls – having moral and spiritual – and are by original sin. The other proposal by in this paper is to the proposal by but does not the of the first human spiritual which in the first human to a specific genetic This the which from that certain could this and result in one or more of our species not having received a spiritual this were the they would not be in dignity with the of second proposal as we in this would also initially have of a biological and this is not required by the proposal in this It seems that one which some may against proposal is that if God began human spiritual souls in one or more individuals at a certain point in time, without a genetic that this may seem arbitrary on to this is that this is not any more arbitrary than the of Christ beginning at a certain point in time by As in there is no to that the was with a specific genetic mutation As we in Porter that biological gradualism is incompatible with a sudden ensoulment because in his view this would have irrational conclusion that for one generation the parents were animals without souls and their children humans, made in the image of God, and with This view that humans have souls and animals do but it does not the view of or that animals have souls, souls, humans have or spiritual souls, a kind of souls humans not only to the biological and psychological but also moral and spiritual to his of a sudden ensoulment dichotomy during evolution, Porter speaks of a strange the parents were of any of the theological interpretations of "imago children by … possess all the physical, cognitive, behavioural and spiritual attributes of a human. This implies a speciation event involving one generation only which is an evolutionary, anthropological and spiritual absurdity . As we have also the proposals of Pope John Paul Grisez, and the of this while biological gradualism in evolution, also an ontological leap regarding the of the spiritual of these proposals, second involves a species from a biological the first human child with a spiritual soul would have had a moral and spiritual and his or parents would in the of the proposal put in this they would have been very similar and proposals, the more fully human brain to a spiritual soul may have also some psychological but the child would have up in the culture of its we humans in that we have and psychological it may not have strange at all at the time, if the first human child had some as to other of his or As an we can consider how many great with their who some similar psychological to The first fully human child would have been more similar to his or than a and a This that an 'ontological leap' may not have been as strange as Porter the parents and child this could have as they to other better over the as the child of human origins is very in and various points of view and I with him that the origin of human beings in the image of God would have a which we cannot fully does not that we cannot understand or any that to the reality of the nature of the human as a of a physical body and a spiritual and sin, original sin. I the view that an ontological leap occurred during evolution (cf. Grisez, the proposal put in this and John Paul is required by a metaphysical of the human spiritual intelligence and The view that there was such an ontological leap is not necessarily to a and Rather, we can with human experience It is not possible to explain the moral and spiritual dimensions of human without that we have spiritual souls, which according to Christian are and other this is in line with a interpretation of those pertaining to an state of the person in some between death and nature, as we experience is not only one of us also has – to love God, and It is not possible to explain all of human evil only by biological and psychological and the we ourselves actually As Pope John Paul II II the doctrine of original sin is not only an integral part of Christian revelation; it also great hermeneutical value insofar as it helps one to understand human there was an ontological leap, with the first human person having received a spiritual soul created directly by God at conception (as to that his or body began to as is then, that first person would have enough to be able to his or moral and spiritual he or would have been capable of and against Therefore, sin in the human race would not have been but rather with a moral action, a sin, committed by an individual human person. if there was more than one person the first sin, no one of them would have the other in time, even if only Concerning both Pope John Paul II and Muller II and some very good points to original sin. These need not be In proposal I have also to to this In terms of of Genesis are not forms of modern or fully of the nature of these Pope John Paul II in his of the certain which they who we are in relationship to God and I with as well as Lamoureux himself that is part of and of God to an that was by In the of the it seems that Pope John Paul II's view regarding evolution involving both a physical continuity and an ontological leap is the of teaching on original sin is in line with good Christian and human experience and nature It can also be with evolution and human origins There is a of as he we have and are about evolution and human origins, from the of the natural can be as to the of Christian and a theology. In this paper we have a number of views with regard to evolution, the origin of human persons, and original sin. Porter and Lamoureux take a gradualist approach to both biological evolution and the origin of human Lamoureux also takes a gradualist approach to original sin. Pope John Paul Grisez, and the of this all a gradualist approach to biological evolution. of us that human nature not only a physical but also a spiritual which can only be by a by God in the of human person. a spiritual soul is to explain our moral and spiritual These the biological and psychological of animals and human a human soul for the first human person or would have an 'ontological to the of Pope John Paul an ontological leap can also us to understand original sin Grisez, and I have a proposals with regard to how an ontological leap may have occurred during the of biological evolution. This paper has not all views and proposals with regard to evolution, the origin of human persons, and original sin. proposal as well as of the views and proposals in this paper while to a to the of some very is not as a

Clooney’s lead article makes the case for a comparative theology that is Catholic and, consequently, for a Catholic theology that is deeply interreligious and yet still Catholic. It is fair enough to inquire into the depth of Catholicity undergirding a Catholic comparative theology even if, on the whole, comparative theology ought not to be held to a higher or stricter standard than the rest of Catholic theology. The article’s core argument is that the study of the texts of another religious tradition can and should be undertaken for the sake of Catholic theology, as a genuine form of Catholic theology. The thesis is illumined by four guiding points: discerning God’s presence in the content of non-Christian texts; discerning legitimate analogies across traditions’ boundaries, a discernment which requires theological instincts; moving from an extrinsic to an engaged form of scholarship; judging a Catholic comparative theology, like any other theology, by its fruits. On all four points, progress can be best made by the comparativist who is Catholic and thus too by a theologian genuinely engaged in the study of another religious tradition in the particular. The Catholic theologian who can learn most wisely from another religion is the Catholic who wisely studies the other tradition; and this theologian is a comparative theologian. Conversely, non- or pre-theological reading served up for subsequent theological study by others is unlikely to eventuate in a mature and integral Catholic theology. Separating theology and the study of religions does not serve the cause of theology, even if in the short run it seems to make things neater and safer. In his reply, Winkler, among other things, points to the importance of factors like the theologian’s subjective engagement and the necessity of theology of religions for doing comparative theology.

No trinitarian theology has exercised as much influence on Catholic theology as has that of St. Thomas Aquinas, yet no trinitarian theology has proven as difficult to comprehend either. In this chapter I begin with the ontological constitution of the Trinity in terms of processions, relations, and persons. I then go on to discuss the personal characteristics of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the logic of the immanent processions as the grammar of God's action in the world. I will end with a brief reflection on his relation to the patristic tradition, East and West, and on his challenges to our contemporary reconstructive tasks. My presentation is largely based on his Summa theologiae (The Summa of Theology) i, qq. 27–43, and Summa contra gentiles (known in English as On the Truth of the Catholic Faith) iv, 1–26.

So much attention has been concentrated on the doctrines on which Christians and Muslims differ that often it is not realized how closely their philosophical presuppositions agree on many matters. In the following pages, which form a brief comparison of Ash'arite theology as represented by al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153) in his Nihāyatu-l-Iqdām fī ‘ilmi’ l-kalām with Catholic theology as represented by St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) in his Summa contra Gentiles, an attempt is made to bring points of agreement into prominence.The Summa contra Gentiles possesses such enormous value in itself that the primary object of its composition has been lost sight of. Yet the connexion between it and Islam is indissoluble. It was written at the request of the Master-General of the Dominicans, Raymund of Pinnaforte, with the express purpose of convincing the Muslims of Spain of the rational basis of Christianity and the errors of their own religion. In the second chapter of the Summa (quae sit auctoris intentio) St. Thomas particularly singles out Muhammadans. Jews, he says, can be refuted from the Old Testament; heretics from the New Testament; but Machomestitae et Pagani can only be convinced by natural reason. And it is to natural reason that he proceeds to appeal.Though none was better equipped than St. Thomas to undertake an exposition of the Catholic Faith, it is, I think, clear that he felt himself at a disadvantage in writing against people whose books he could not read and of whom he knew only from the translations of others.

This article address the ways in which contemporary psychologists might usefully engage in a dialogue with Catholic philosophers and theologians influenced by the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. The specific point of common agreement and vision between these diverse approaches lies in the general notion that human action is directed toward an end which the individual judges to be good in some sense. Despite the considerable differences in foundational issues, both the clinical psychologist and Thomist are perhaps able to come to a constructive, common vision around the notion that all human action is directed toward the achievement of some good. The drama of human suffering and the desire to address such need through the efforts of clinical therapy mark a constant feature of contemporary life. Americans, Catholics included, are far more likely to turn to the rhetoric of psychology than theology for solutions to the problems of modern living. The church remains always at the service of humanity, yet it appears in many ways that humanity turns elsewhere, to its secular priests, the professional therapists, for guidance and advice on life’s most vexing problems. The accomplishments of the profession of psychology, especially within the counseling milieu, are in so many ways without question positive and compelling. There remains, nonetheless, the need to explore more fully how the profession might draw upon the theological wisdom of Catholicism and the moral tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is the aim of this paper to outline in a preliminary way some of the directions for a positive exchange between the contemporary aspects of clinical therapy and the moral tradition of Thomism. The task is as daunting as it is urgent for any exchange of ideas among Catholic philosophers or theologians and contemporary clinical psychologists will have to confront at the beginning a number of difficulties. Perhaps first among them is the difference in the meaning of terms.

In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Catholic theologians debated how to reconcile God’s predestination and grace with human free choice. The de auxiliis controversy had as its touchstones the works of the Dominican Domingo Báñez and the Jesuit Luis de Molina. Pope Paul V concluded the debates in Rome on these questions, the Congregatio de auxiliis (1597–1607), by prohibiting the accusation of heresy from either side in this quarrel. Dominicans, initially accused of Calvinism, and Jesuits, charged at first with semi-Pelagianism, generally claimed that their conclusions were at least consistent with Thomas Aquinas’ principles. But key notions in this controversy, such as physical predetermination, middle knowledge, and efficacious grace, are not found in Aquinas’ corpus, which encouraged theologians to account for the appearance of novelty. In the aftermath of these debates, Thomism was associated with these soteriological questions, and many Catholic theologians envisioned Thomas Aquinas as Augustine’s faithful disciple.

On the occasion of the 500th year of the commemoration of Christianity’s coming to the Philippines, the Filipino people profoundly remember how God bestowed abundant graces to them. Proofs to this remembrance are the external and internal manifestation of gratefulness among the Filipino people. The milestones reached by the Church in the Philippines are not an invitation to blow the horns of triumphalism but a call to profound introspection and humility. Thus, remembering how God has sustained us for half a millennium leads us back to people whom God used as conduits of His overflowing mercy. In this paper, I focus on Fr. Francisco Marin-Sola, O.P., who has contributed significantly to Catholic theology. Fr. Marin, as he is fondly called, had ties with the University of Santo Tomas in Manila. It was in this institution that he was able to hone his virtues and skills as a student, teacher, and writer. This Dominican’s natural talent blended well with St. Thomas Aquinas’ framework that led to the production of works reflecting the latter’s genius. Fr. Marin’s most notable work is titled, The Homogeneous Evolution of the Catholic Dogma, a compilation of articles published in La Ciencia Tomista during the early 1900s. In this work, he used the term “evolution” to investigate the Catholic doctrine’s homogeneous growth, which at that time, many viewed as provocative and a deviation from tradition. Criticized at first, his docility and vigilance earned him respect from his contemporaries. This paper also explored Fr. Marin’s significant contribution to Catholic theology counting him as one of the greatest Dominicans who graced UST with his meaningful presence.

Theological Indebtedness to Jacques and Raïssa Maritain:A Testimony to Their Contribution to My Theological Vocation Matthew L. Lamb Robert Cardinal Sarah's important The Power of Silence: Against the Dictatorship of Noise shows the fundamental significance of monastic contemplation and silence for a God-centered renewal of society and culture. Before I would teach at Catholic theological faculties, I realized that I should draw upon an intellectual and contemplative formation I had received previous to any teaching.1 Just before my fifteenth birthday, in May of 1952, I was graced with a vocation to enter the Trappist Abbey of Our Lady of the Holy Spirit in Conyers, Georgia. This gave me the advantage of being in a contemplative monastery where an intellectual asceticism was linked with quests for wisdom and worship. Steeped in the Biblical Word of God and the Divine Office, the intellectual, moral, and religious formation invited the monk to an in depth study of the philosophical and theological writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers, as well as the Medieval monastic and scholastic saints and scholars. I drew upon those fifteen years of study because they were foundational for a much needed renewal of Catholic theology in our times. A serious shortcoming in Catholic circles after Vatican II was a severing of a genuine ressourcement from aggiornomento. This rupture relegated the great intellectual achievements of the biblical, conciliar, patristic, medieval, and [End Page 617] Renaissance periods to historical museums. They were fine for visits, but had little or no relevance to modern issues and questions. As Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI warned, a hermeneutics of rupture made a hermeneutics of reform and renewal dead, leaving Catholics with nothing more than the swirling, ever-changing cultural fashions of the day. The writings of Jacques Maritain were studied and read in the Trappist monastery I had entered. The essay he wrote with Raïssa on "Liturgy and Contemplation" was published in the Carmelite journal Spiritual Life and was important in its relation of the Divine Office to the contemplative life. A most important aspect of Maritain's many writings is how, during the 1920s through the 1960s, he forged in philosophy the importance of recovering the great intellectual achievements of the past in order to provide adequate answers to contemporary questions. He saw clearly that major problems in modernity are due to the failure to keep alive the intellectual, moral, and religious traditions of Catholic Europe. He saw clearly the universal validity of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas as inviting the reader to discover the natural reason of humanity.2 It was common in the monastery to read Maritain's writings on an array of issues: natural law, the state and democracy, Christian existentialism, art and scholasticism, and the art of Rouault, as well as his contributions to the United Nations charter. His wonderful Reflections on America were read aloud during meals in the monastic refectory. Indeed, it was Jacques Maritain who illustrated in his philosophy how only by recovering human reason (ressourcement) through a thorough study of the ancients could one bring renewal and reform to modern times (aggiornomento). Thus the philosophical recovery of Aquinas by Maritain prepared the intellectual groundwork for a proper understanding of the biblical and patristic renewals, even though this had been unfortunately overlooked by some proponents of la nouvelle théologie.3 Decades before the 1960s, Maritain was recovering important theoretical writings of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and his commentators, especially John of St. Thomas. [End Page 618] Maritain realized the importance of this recovery not only to counteract the baneful consequences of nominalism and voluntarism on modern thought and life, but also to provide more adequate perspectives on major issues facing modernity. His philosophical ressourcement was decisive for his philosophical aggiornomento. When he saw the failures of many Catholic intellectuals after Vatican II to live up to the demands of the theoretical recoveries of the Fathers and Aquinas, he wrote the blunt positive and negative assessments of post-conciliar life and thought in The Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present Time. Nevertheless...

Reviewed by: Revelation, History, and Truth: A Hermeneutics of Dogma by Eduardo J. Echeverria Michael McClymond Revelation, History, and Truth: A Hermeneutics of Dogma by Eduardo J. Echeverria (New York: Peter Lang, 2018), xxi + 199 pp. Catholic fundamental theologians ought to attend to Eduardo Echeverria's wide-ranging new book, appearing when foundational theological issues stand in the foreground, as witnessed by debates over Amoris Laetitia, critiques from the Dubia Cardinals, controversies over the death penalty, and the 2019 Amazon Synod. The scope of argumentation in Echeverria's work is ambitious, encompassing essentialist-versus-historicist disputes over Vatican II (1–45), the nature of revelation, Scripture, and Tradition (47–92), questions of epistemic and theological foundationalism (93–152), and definitions of a Lérinian hermeneutics of tradition (153–74), as well as the development of dogma (175–95). While each theme might have filled out an entire volume, Echeverria in surveying each theme provides a compact yet comprehensive vision. The book is a contemporary manifesto for Catholic fundamental theology. Catholic readers will be struck by the many Protestant (and especially Protestant Evangelical) authors cited here, including such luminaries as G. C. Berkouwer, G. E. Ladd, Colin Gunton, Paul Helm, Kevin Vanhoozer, and Oliver Crisp. This engagement with non-Catholic authors reflects Echeverria's earlier, PhD-level training in Protestant dogmatics at the Free University of Amsterdam. Nonetheless, this work is not a mediation between Catholic and Evangelical reasoning, but rather a constitutively Catholic argument that selectively deploys ideas from Protestant as well as Catholic sources. Protestant insights here serve Catholic purposes. It is [End Page 1414] not just that non-Catholics have good things to say, but that Evangelical thinkers in their two-century-long battle against modernist Protestantism have accumulated their own rich repertoire of arguments that prove useful. For Echeverria, ecumenism involves co-belligerency: the enemy of my enemy may prove to be my friend. Among the Catholic thinkers whom Echeverria cites appreciatively are Thomas Aquinas, Yves Congar, Pope John XXIII, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Avery Dulles, Pope Benedict XVI, Aidan Nichols, Germain Grisez, Thomas Guarino, and (more surprisingly) Karl Rahner and David Tracy. Edward Schillebeeckx receives a mixed review in the book in light of his mid-career shift from realism to non-realism (24), as does Gavin D'Costa, since D'Costa rejects relativism but offers a position that Echeverria says is in need of a more robust metaphysical underpinning (27–29). Catholic historians and theologians who serve as a foil, against whom Echeverria reasons, include Giuseppe Alberigo, John O'Malley, Massimo Faggioli, Richard Gaillardetz, Lieven Boeve, and Christoph Theobold. Echeverria opens his book by stating that "I am centrally concerned with the matter of diversity and discontinuity in theological expressions and formulations within a fundamental unity of truth" (1). As collectively "the specter of relativism, antirealism, or fideism" (97), he opposes a cluster of interrelated ideas: that theological assertions make no objective claims regarding the world (non-realism), involve no intellectual or propositional content (non-cognitivism, non-propositionalism), and are always subject to revision or replacement by some new assertion (fallibilism). He writes that "the rejection of a realist notion of truth and language is behind why many find implausible the normative truth of dogmas, creeds, and confessions" (129). The author displays constructive as well as polemical intent in his book, seeking not only to refute false ideas but also to propose better, alternative formulations. Continuity and change in Catholic teaching, argues Echeverria, can be properly understood only if one distinguishes the universal and unchanging truths of the faith from their particular and time-bound forms of expression. What remain changeless are not specific words, nor even doctrinal concepts per se, but the underlying theological judgments and patterns of judgment (xvi). This core claim sets Echeverria at odds with John O'Malley, who uses the words "substantialism" or "essentialism" to typify those who in this way distinguish unchanging truths from their changing expressions (11). Echeverria argues that the truth–expression distinction is not only legitimate but necessary, and that it serves a central purpose in what he calls "the Lérianian legacy of Vatican II" (11). In defense of the truth–expression distinction, Echeverria...

Roman Catholic theologians of the late Middle Ages inherited a system of methods and sources with which to work out answers to philosophical and practical questions long held in controversy among Christian believers. Catholic interpreters of Scripture, usually university professors and higher-ranking clergy, used the Latin Vulgate version and made extensive use of patristic writings by renowned early scholars of the faith such as Augustine of Hippo (354–430). They also applied methods of pre-Christian philosophers, including Aristotle's system of categorising and applying knowledge. Other theological sources included canon law (containing conciliar decrees and patristic writings), the decretals (papal decrees since the mid-twelfth century) and multi-volume scriptural commentaries such as the Glossa Ordinaria and works by Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) and Peter Lombard ( c . 1100–60). Use of such canonical sources, a single translation of Scripture (that varied among manuscript copies), and philosophical methods of sorting through all possible conclusions and objections for one presumably correct answer to a question gave rise to the term ‘systematic’ for this type of theology. While chiefly maintaining status quo doctrines and practices, such theological work, the focus of the first section of this chapter, challenged powerful forces in society and called for reform. Catholic spiritual writings of the era also exhibit a systematic, Bible-centred approach to monastic and personal devotion. In the second section I treat controversial theology: writings by Catholics aimed at a Protestant audience or meant for the instruction of Catholics in how to refute Protestant doctrines and biblical interpretation. The final section examines Catholic theology collectively from 1600 to 1750, when a demand for Scripture-focused popular theology in northern Europe contrasted with traditional works maintaining an integrated use of sources. Systematic theology and spiritual writings before Trent The familiar Protestant accusation that the Bible played a small role in Catholic theology would have seemed very strange to the late medieval theologian. Intellectual life revolved around the study of the Bible, from the highest degrees at universities, to the basis of legal systems, to the cornerstone of lay spirituality. Still, the complexity of the scholastic method, the inaccessibility of dense biblical commentaries in Latin and the central authority exercised over the highest levels of scriptural interpretation left the Church vulnerable to allegations that the Pope and clergy were enemies of Scripture rather than the Christian Bible's custodians and inspired exegetes since late antiquity.

Original Sin according to John Duns Scotus Ernesto Dezza OFM (bio) This article is intended to offer a textual and evaluative presentation of the theory of original sin as elaborated by the Franciscan master John Duns Scotus († 1308), the “Subtle Doctor.” While there are many studies and articles about Scotus’ ethics, few are devoted to what is considered the root of evil human behavior, and hardly any analyze the text of the Subtle Doctor in any sufficient depth.1 Perhaps because this topic belongs more strictly to theology, it is seldom considered in depth by philosophers. On the other hand, since Catholic theology after Vatican II has virtually narrowed its treatment of medieval topics and figures to all but Thomas Aquinas, it is rare to find any theologians interested in other medieval theories of original sin. Yet, the way Duns Scotus presents the doctrine of original sin, namely, by showing the limitations of the Augustinian tradition, offers interesting contributions to the debate on this topic which is far from resolved in contemporary theology.2 Furthermore, philosophers interested in Scotus’ [End Page 111] thought would do well to analyze his theory on original sin, since the way he considers the human being is always predominantly theological. Studying anthropology or ethics in the Middle Ages without examining its theological scope is limited and one-sided. Before all considerations are examined, it is important to clarify the terms used in this topic. According to the Bible, our first parents participated in a sin of disobedience to God (see Gen. 3), which is called “the Fall” (casus) or “Adam’s sin” (peccatum Adae) by medieval theologians. When using the expression ‘original sin’ (peccatum originale), medieval theologians signified the consequences of Adam’s sin, that is, Adam’s sin in us.3 Catholic theology after the Council of Trent uses the expression peccatum originale originans to denote the sin of Adam, because it is the cause of the origin of our own sinful condition, and the expression peccatum originale originatum to denote the effect of that sin in us, thus showing a strong correlation between cause and effect. Nevertheless, I will follow the usage of medieval theologians and avoid the last two expressions. So, in the following paragraphs we will see, in a step-by-step manner, Scotus’ exposition on original sin as read in his first classroom teaching on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, the Lectura.4 1. Presentation of the Problem The topic is presented by Scotus in four questions throughout distinctions 30–32 of the second book of his commentary on the Sentences, which constitute a unique little treatise about original sin.5 In the first question, Scotus asks whether everyone who is naturally descended from Adam contracts original sin. There are five arguments [End Page 112] against this: two from Augustine, one from Julian of Eclanum, one from Aristotle, and the last one derived from reason.6 The core of these arguments is that sin presupposes a personal responsibility and that human nature cannot be considered guilty in itself because of an action performed by Adam. On the other hand, we know from Scripture that “through one person sin entered the world, and through sin, death, and thus death came to all, inasmuch as all sinned” (Romans 5:12). The second question is whether original sin is formally a lack of original justice.7 Four arguments8 arise against this explanation, because it does not seem that original sin and original justice must be considered as simply contrary to each other: e.g. an evil angel did not have original justice, yet he has not contracted original sin.9 Furthermore, while original sin seems related to some corporeal transmission in generation, justice belongs to the will, and the will is completely separable from the body (voluntas non est organica).10 In the argument to the contrary, however, it seems that original sin is nothing but a lack of original justice, because that sin is not an act of concupiscence (which belongs naturally to the sensitive power),11 yet is a mortal sin because it keeps us out of communion with God. It is not a type of ignorance, because babies are just...