Iran’s Proxy War Strategy

<p>Abstract – Proxy war have occurred since ancient times until now which is conducted by the major state powers by using state actors or non-state actors. The national interests of the big countries with objective of the struggle for power and the power of influence in affecting international relations. Proxy war has motives and hard power and soft power approaches to achieve their goals. Indonesia is safeguarding its national security in dealing with the proxy war strategy against disintegration attempts, thus it can be eliminated and the integration of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia will remains intact. To safeguard the integration of the nation, Indonesia must take a counter proxy measures. This article uses qualitative approach with data from reference sources and literature related to the proxy war. The validity and reliability of the data was tested by triangulation reference. The study shows that the counter proxy war conducted by maintaining Unity in Diversity which resemble the Opus Dei upon Indonesia, implementing policies and avoiding materialistic for the benefit of people (pro bono), and keeping the harmony of Indonesia.</p><p><br />Keywords: Proxy war, proxy war motives, national security, counter proxy war.</p>

Many inter-State and intra-State conflicts in Africa become more complex by being extended into 'proxy wars', i.e. secondary, often 'low intensity' armed conflicts, pursued in the context of a major power struggle, or outright wars between States carried out by subsidiary or co-opted insurgent movements, usually of an ethno-regional nature. In the Horn of Africa, the proxy war phenomenon is visible owing to alliances behind the scenes, the involvement of neighbouring countries, and frequent changes of allegiance. The proxy war strategy was pursued by both players in the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, not only in the enemy country but also in neighbouring States. Since the peace agreement of June 2000, the importance and impact of the proxy war factor has declined somewhat, but whether this decline will contribute to the building of a 'lasting peace' is not at all certain. The experience of tenuous negotiation during the past two years seems to indicate otherwise. The author argues that the threat of regional instability by proxy conflict remains, as long as the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes are unwilling to make real peace with each other. App. (list of insurgent movements), bibliogr., notes, ref. [ASC Leiden abstract]

This article examines the role of strategy in proxy wars, with the goal of identifying relevant findings to proxy wars. Comparatively analyzing Russia and the U.S.’s proxy strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War is useful to this end – four major findings emerge. First, a state’s proxy strategy is dependent on variables unique to that state, and those of the available proxy. Second, proxies – the actual individuals or groups – are not singular in their characteristics. A proxy’s uniqueness contributes to the range of options it provides its principal. Third, proxy strategies are not fixed. The range of proxy strategy options available to a state reflects the combined uniqueness of the principal and the proxy. Lastly, in proxy wars, concerns of conflict escalation might be a thing of the past. These points make an additive contribution to both strategic and proxy war scholarship by providing a useful examination of comparative proxy strategies.

While proxy wars have been around since time immemorial, the last decade of conflict has seen a rise in their strategic appeal. In the same way that sub-state violence captured the attention of policymakers and academics at the end of the Cold War, proxy wars are now a core feature of the contemporary and future strategic and security environment. Vladimir Rauta argues for a relocation of proxy wars by conceptualising them as strategic bargains waged on more complex grounds than risk avoidance, cost efficiency and deniability. He identifies two types of strategic goals sought through the employment of proxies: coercing and coping with an adversary, the differences of which are presented by contrasting the rationale for the US decision to support Syrian rebels against President Bashar Al-Assad with the Iranian strategy of proxy war in Syria.

Since 1979, Iran's strong Shiite identity has made its support for the Sunni Palestinian cause particularly remarkable. Despite over four decades of support of Iran to the Palestinian groups there are still some gaps in the literature required to be fulfilled. This study aims to uncover why and how Iran supports Palestinian resistance groups through the lens of proxy war conceptualization. In the literature, Iran's benefactor-proxy relationship with Hamas and Islamic Jihad is often discussed briefly and superficially under the broader context of Palestinian groups within Iran's proxy war strategy. Consequently, this study is distinguished by its focus on analyzing Iran’s support for Palestinian groups from the perspective of a proxy war, as opposed to the examination of their relationship. This approach sets it apart from other works in this field. In analyzing Iran’s proxy war strategy in Palestine, Andrew Mumford’s quadrilateral framework is employed, which encompasses the provision of manpower, the military assistance, financial support and non-military support. The study’s analytical clarity was ensured by using this framework.

The last decade has seen a growing trend towards the use of proxies in the Middle East and North Africa following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In this context, the issue of Turkey’s approach to proxy war in these regions has received considerable attention since 2016. Thereby, the purpose of this article is to investigate the essential characteristics of Turkish proxy war strategy in Syria and Libya. As such, this study intends to trace the development of Turkish proxy war strategy by making use of the conceptual frameworks proposed by Groh (2019), O’Brien (2012) and Art (1998). The most obvious finding to emerge from the analysis is that Turkey changed its indirect intervention strategy from donated assistance to proxy warfare in Syria and Libya when it saw a greater need to influence the result of the conflicts. In the case of Syria, this study has shown that the controlthrough-centralisation approach towards the Armed Syrian Opposition has enabled Turkey to carry out an effective proxy war strategy from 2016 onwards. In Libya, the results of this investigation have shown that theTurkish Army has pursued a proxy war strategy since Ankara and the Government of National Accord (GNA) signed an agreement on security and military cooperation in December 2019. The article concludes that Turkey has centralised many revolutionary groups under an Islamist-nationalistic vision and partnered them with its own military in order to expand its influence in the Middle East and North Africa.

Pakistan

This paper analyzes the Saudi-Iran deal brokered by China in March 2023, representing a breakthrough in the bilateral relations between Riyadh and Tehran after prolonged antagonism and proxy wars. It explores the potential of the historic deal by analyzing the strategic realignment of Riyadh and Tehran, focusing on the prospects for both sides. Furthermore, the paper raises concerns about the viability of the Saudi-Iran deal considering the underlying vulnerabilities. To ensure the smooth advancement of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, it is crucial to consider the vulnerabilities of the deal. This includes acknowledging the limitations of the agreement, addressing ongoing strategic issues, and considering external factors such as the delayed normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the United States’ (US) disruptive role in the Middle East affairs, particularly in the wake of war in Gaza. These factors have the potential to impede the development of Saudi-Iran relations and the long-term efficacy of the deal.

The article discusses the modern tools used in local conflicts and wars, which are largely based on war strategy, and tactics, military thought and art as well as experience accumulated in military-political and other related fields. These tools include support for revolutionary movements, the organization of coups, destabilization of the situation, waging coalition wars, proxy wars, hybrid and information wars, humanitarian interventions, cyberwars, no-fly zones. This set of tools is used selectively or is fully utilized, and tends to expand taking into account the technological innovations that have become firmly established in the life of mankind and allowing to qualitatively update the military arsenals of the world’s states. Today’s due to globalization local conflicts are rapidly gaining wide international resonance, leading to the involvement of third parties. The United States of America plays a special role in them. They are gradually losing ground in the world and do not want to put up with it. The article discusses the ways of conducting local wars and recent conflicts in relation to the countries of Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

The Middle East conflict is a complex and enduring series of wars, power struggles, and humanitarian crises driven by historical, political, ethnic, and religious factors, with ongoing repercussions for global security and international relations. Since 2023, the region has witnessed intensified warfare, notably the Gaza war that began with a surprise attack by Hamas on Israel and resulted in catastrophic loss of life, mass displacement, and severe humanitarian hardship. This conflict has drawn in regional actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen, contributing to further instability and international military responses. The roots of these conflicts trace back to a legacy of colonial influence, arbitrary borders, and persistent ethnic and religious divisions reinforced by external interventions. The emergence of non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, supported primarily by Iran, has shifted the nature of conflict from traditional interstate wars to complex battles involving militias and proxy warfare. Continued violence in the Middle East has resulted in significant civilian casualties, refugee crises, and disruption to global commerce, such as shipping routes through the Red Sea. Ceasefires have been intermittent and rarely lead to lasting peace, as underlying grievances and rivalry between major powers especially the United States and Iran fuel ongoing tensions. These events have had direct effects on international politics, humanitarian law, and security worldwide. Understanding the Middle East conflict requires a multidisciplinary approach focusing on history, geopolitics, religion, and foreign interventions. Its impact continues to shape the global landscape, demanding constant attention and critical analysis for any hope of resolving the region’s long-standing issues. The Middle East conflict is a multifaceted and enduring geopolitical issue with deep historical, religious, and political roots. Spanning over a century, it encompasses a range of disputes involving territorial claims, religious tensions, and international interventions. This essay provides an overview of the conflict’s origins, key events, major players, and ongoing challenges.

This research investigates how Iran employs proxy warfare in Syria and Yemen. Andrew Mumford’s quadrilateral framework is employed to analyze Iran’s use of proxy warfare in these cases, the focusing the provision of manpower, the provision military supplies, financial assistance, and non-military assistance. The study employed a method of multiple case analysis, enabling an examination of both the situations within and between cases. The objective of employing this approach was to identify the similarities, differences and underlying causes of these cases. The selection of these two cases for analysis was based on their distinctive environmental and socio-political factors, allowing for an evaluation of Iran’s proxy war strategy in the region. The time span of the study covers the decade following the beginning of the Arab Spring and ends with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. This study demonstrates that Iran utilises a flexible proxy war strategy, modifying its approach in accordance with evolving war dynamics and conflict points.

Proxy war strategy offers advantages along with inherent risks and limitations. This study analyzes the strategic benefits, challenges, and limitations of this approach. While proxies offer flexibility and plausible deniability, Iran faces challenges in controlling them, as seen in Hezbollah’s 2006 war and Hamas’s October 7 attack, which led to significant costs and strategic blowbacks. The inefficacy of Iran’s proxies in large scale operations in Syria and Iraq exposed their limits in conventional warfare. The challenges and limitations of the proxy war strategy underlined in this study raise questions about the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of the proxy war strategy.

The conflict in Papua has been going on for decades and shows the characteristics of asymmetrical warfare, where separatist groups use non-conventional strategies in dealing with state security forces. Indications of the involvement of external actors in this conflict are getting stronger, indicating the possibility of a proxy war that affects the dynamics of the resistance of the Free Papua Organization (OPM). This study aims to analyze how asymmetric warfare in Papua is influenced by the dynamics of proxy war and the strategies adopted by the OPM in the face of counter-insurgency operations by the Indonesian government. Using a qualitative method with a case study approach, data was collected through document analysis and literature study. The results show that the conflict in Papua does not only stem from internal factors such as socio-economic inequality and political dissatisfaction, but is also influenced by external interests that support the separatist movement through diplomatic channels, digital propaganda, and logistical assistance. Analysis of asymmetric warfare strategies shows that the OPM utilizes digital propaganda, international networks, and guerrilla attacks in the face of Indonesian military operations.

The multi-vector policy of the Serbian leadership makes it possible to maintain a delicate balance of relations with the West and the East — the European Union and Russia. Serbia, as a key country in the Balkan region, is experiencing tremendous pressure from Euro-American "well-wishers" to join the anti-Russian sanctions and sign the peace plan proposed by France and Germany to normalize the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. Serbia is successfully diversifying its relations with Russia and with other countries outside the Western bloc. At the same time, Belgrade in certain areas is forced to follow the policy of the collective West. This is done largely in connection with pragmatic goals — obtaining economic benefi ts from ties with EU countries and the West in general, adhering to such values and actively promoting them. At the same time, in order to speed up the process of subordinating Belgrade to the demands of Washington and Brussels, a hybrid war is already being waged against Serbia today with the threat of unleashing a proxy war and a color revolution. The eff orts of external and internal opponents of the current leadership of Serbia and its political line to preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country form the necessary and suffi cient conditions for the use of modern strategies and technologies of interstate confrontation. The proxy war strategy provides for the possibility of using the self-proclaimed “Republic of Kosovo” as a proxy agent for the US and NATO for a military attack on Belgrade. At the same time, preparations are underway for a coup d'état in the course of a color revolution in order to bring to power a government manipulated by the West. Practical recommendations are given for organizing a rebuff to hybrid aggression.

Perspectives on <i>The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War</i>