Abstract
Iran’s attack on Israel on 13–14 April 2024 and Israel’s retaliatory strike on Isfahan on 19 April raised the possibility of all-out war between the two states. But there remain critical military and strategic constraints on the ability and motivation of both countries to escalate the conflict. Their armed forces are configured primarily to ensure survival rather than sustain major conflict. Casualty aversion and American hesitancy inhibit Israel, whose supremacy in air and ground warfare remains a substantial deterrent to Iran. In the nuclear realm, Iran cannot risk possessing a weapon, while Israel cannot risk using one. Both sides have reasons for perpetuating a sub-threshold war – Iran to maintain its prestige, Israel to fortify its deterrent against Hizbullah and other Iran proxies, as well as against Iran itself. Discreet agreements among combatants clarifying the parameters of conflict and how to avoid all-out war may be feasible.
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