Ionics gets funding for Algerian desalination

Objectives/Scope In the current low oil price environment, oilfield Build Own Operate (BOO) and Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) projects deserve consideration. Although generally the objective of BOO and BOOT projects are to reduce upfront capital costs and transfer risk to the BOO contractor, BOO and BOOT projects also offer excellent opportunities to incentivize innovation and reduce project lead time to complete, lowering project life-cycle costs and accelerating project returns. If the BOO project is structured properly - safety, quality, and reliability are not sacrificed. Methods, Procedures, Process This paper compares and contrasts BOO and EPC projects to describe advantages and tradeoffs for successful application of BOO projects. The performance of the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) EPF-120 project in North Kuwait is reviewed, as a successful example of the application of BOO projects in the oilfield. The EPF-120 project is a BOO grass roots centralized Early Production Facility that processes 120,000 BPD of crude oil, 84,000 MMSCFD of gas and 80,000 BPD of produced water. The project has now been in service for the full term of its five years operations contract. Results, Observations, Conclusions The typical structure of BOO projects and EPC projects are described, and conventional EPC projects are compared to BOO projects. Incentives and disincentives for innovation are discussed. Typical project timeline for EPC projects will be compared to BOO project timelines. Mechanisms to achieve quality, safety, and reliability are provided. As an example of the opportunities that BOO projects offers, operations, maintenance, environmental, and safety performance of the EPF 120 project is reviewed, and examples of innovation implemented for the EPF 120 and for other BOO projects are provided. Additional costs of BOO projects - namely risk and financing are provided and compared to potential reduced life cycle cost and reduced project completion timeline. Operating challenges to execute a BOO project in an existing oilfield are presented. Trade-off between flexibility/innovation and specification/standardization are also discussed. Novel/Additive Information BOO is a solution in the oilfield to provide innovation and improved schedule without sacrificing quality, safety, and reliability. The skills required to successfully execute a BOO project will be detailed and include the following: process engineering and Front End Engineering Development (FEED) skills, capital and operating cost estimating capability, Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Management (EPCM)

Identifying greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials through large-scale photovoltaic-driven seawater desalination

Mitigating water imbalance between coastal and inland areas through seawater desalination within China

PurposeSeveral major infrastructure projects in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have been delivered by the build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) model since the 1960s. Although the benefits of using BOT have been reported abundantly in the contemporary literature, some BOT projects were less successful than the others. This paper aims to find out why this is so and to explore whether BOT is the best financing model to procure major infrastructure projects.Design/methodology/approachThe benefits of BOT will first be reviewed. Some completed BOT projects in Hong Kong will be examined to ascertain how far the perceived benefits of BOT have been materialized in these projects. A highly profiled project, the Hong Kong‐Zhuhai‐Macau Bridge, which has long been promoted by the governments of the People's Republic of China, Macau Special Administrative Region and the HKSAR that BOT is the preferred financing model, but suddenly reverted back to the traditional financing model to be funded primarily by the three governments with public money instead, will be studied to explore the true value of the BOT financial model.FindingsSix main reasons for this radical change are derived from the analysis: shorter take‐off time for the project; difference in legal systems causing difficulties in drafting BOT agreements; more government control on tolls; private sector uninterested due to unattractive economic package; avoid allegation of collusion between business and the governments; and a comfortable financial reserve possessed by the host governments.Originality/valueThe findings from this paper are believed to provide a better understanding to the real benefits of BOT and the governments' main decision criteria in delivering major infrastructure projects.

Exploring energy-saving potentials in seawater desalination engineering from the energy-water nexus perspective

Ashkelon seawater desalination project — off-taker’s self costs, supplied water costs, total costs and benefits

Analysis of regulation and policy of private toll roads in a build-operate-transfer scheme under demand uncertainty

Energy-water nexus in seawater desalination project: A typical water production system in China

Cloud and IoT based smart architecture for desalination water treatment

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme is being used increasingly by governments in their drive to privatize major public transportation projects. In a BOT scheme, the main objective for the private investors in determining the viability of a BOT project is profit, whereas the main objective for the government is whether the construction of the BOT project will give a positive social welfare to the society. These two objectives are often seen to conflict with each other. In this paper, modeling and analysis of highway pricing and capacity choice of a BOT scheme are provided to illustrate the tradeoff between the two objectives. Regulation is normally imposed by the government to ensure that the BOT project satisfies certain requirements. Five cases of the BOT network design problem are analyzed: (1) BOT without regulation; (2) BOT with positive performance measures; (3) BOT with a maximum toll charge level; (4) BOT with a minimum roadway capacity; and (5) BOT with a maximum toll charge and a minimum roadway capacity. Numerical results using a case study of the intercity expressway in the Pearl River Delta Region in China are provided to examine the various effects of regulation on a BOT project.

Analysis and evaluation of various energy technologies in seawater desalination

The need to meet the massive infrastructural gaps has led to the adoption of alternative procurement methods. Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) is one of the new ways used for procuring infrastructure. In developing countries, BOT projects are characterised by high-risk profile discouraging private investment. Therefore, it is imperative to identify the critical risk factors inherent in such arrangements with the view to attracting the desired level of private investment. This study employed Pareto Analysis to identify vital risk factors of BOT projects in Nigeria. Structured questionnaires were used to establish critical risk factors based on the perception of key stakeholders (government, concessionaire, lenders, and developers) in Abuja. Kaduna, Port Harcourt and Lagos. Descriptive statistics were used to obtain Standard Deviation of the risk factors indicating their impacts and severity. Based on the results, Pareto Analysis was carried out to separate the /'vital few' from the 'trivial many'. The results indicated nine risk factors as the vital few responsible for 80% contribution. The risk factors include; changes in government policies, hostile general business environment, project company default, time performance risk, cost performance risk, excessive development cost, instability in government, failure to raise finance for the project and lack of experience in handling the project. Therefore, for effective implementation of BOT projects, it is necessary for stakeholders to focus on the /'vital few' risk factors responsible for 80% of the risk impacts. The results of the study may not be generalised for use by clients and contractors operating in environments with different political and economic climate with Nigeria as the impact and likelihood of occurrence of risks may vary.
 Keywords: Build-operate-transfer, Nigeria, Pareto analysis, Risk factors.

Factors influencing the success of BOT power plant projects in China: A review

The largest SWRO plant in the world — Ashkelon 100 million m 3/y BOT project

PurposeThis paper explores the impact of both government subsidies and decision makers' loss-averse behavior on the determination of transportation build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession periods based on cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The prospect value of a transportation project under traffic risk can be formulated according to the value function for gains and losses and the decision weight for gains and losses. As an extra income for investors, government subsidy is designed for highly risky aspects of BOT transportation projects: uncertain initial traffic volumes and fluctuating growth rates.Design/methodology/approachA decision-making model determining the concession period of a transportation BOT project is proposed by using the Monte-Carlo simulation method based on CPT, and the effects of risky behaviors of private investors on concession period decision making are analyzed. A subsidy method related to the internal rate-of-return (IRR) corresponding to a specific initial traffic volume and growth rate is proposed. The case of an actual BOT highway project is examined to illustrate how the method proposed can be used to determine the concession period of a transportation BOT project considering decision makers' loss-averse behavior and government subsidy. Contingency analysis is discussed to cope with possible misestimating of key factors such as initial traffic volume and cost coefficients. Sensitivity analysis is employed to investigate the impact of CPT parameters on the concession period decisions. An actual BOT case which failed to attract private capital is introduced to show the practical application. The results are then interpreted to conclude this paper.FindingsBased on comparisons drawn between a concession period decision-making model considering the psychological behaviors of decision makers and a model not considering them, the authors conclude that the concession period based on CPT is distinctly different from that of the loss-neutral model. The concession period based on CPT is longer than the loss-neutral concession period. That is, loss-averse private investors tend to ask for long concession periods to make up for losses they will face in the future. Government subsidies serve as extra income for investors, allowing appointed profits to be secured sooner. For the benefit side of contingency variables, the normal state of initial traffic volume, average annual traffic growth rate and bias degree and the government subsidy need to be paid close attention during the project life span. For the cost side of contingency variables, the annual operating cost variable has a significant impact on the length of predicted concession period, while the large-scale cost variable has minor impact.Originality/valueWith an actual BOT highway project, the determination of transportation BOT concession periods based on the psychological behaviors of decision makers is analyzed in this paper. As the psychological behaviors of decision makers heavily impact the decision-making process, the authors analyze their impacts on concession period decision making. Government subsidy is specifically designed for various states of initial traffic volume and fluctuating growth rates to cope with corresponding high risks and mitigate private investors' loss-averse behaviors. Contingency analysis and sensitivity analysis are discussed as the estimated values of parameters may not be authentic in actual situations.