Investment Treaties and the Legal Imagination

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Challenges and Options

PurposeThe dominant narrative in the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system is that it enables powerful corporations to encroach upon the regulatory power of developing countries aimed at pursuing compelling public interest objectives. The example of Phillip Morris, the tobacco giant, suing Uruguay’s public health measures is cited as the most significant example to prove this thesis. The other side of the story that States abuse their public power to undermine the protected rights of foreign investors does not get much attention.Design/methodology/approachThis paper reviews all the ISDS cases that India has lost to ascertain the reason why these claims were brought against India in the first place. The approach of the paper is to study these ISDS cases to find out whether these cases arose due to abuse of the State’s public power or affronted India’s regulatory autonomy.FindingsAgainst this global context, this paper studies the ISDS claims brought against India, one of the highest respondent-State in ISDS, to show that they arose due to India’s capricious behaviour. Analysis of these cases reveals that India acted in bad faith and abused its public power by either amending laws retroactively or by scrapping licences without following due process or going back on specific and written assurances that induced investors to invest. In none of these cases, the foreign investors challenged India’s regulatory measures aimed at advancing the genuine public interest. The absence of a “Phillip Morris moment” in India’s ISDS story is a stark reminder that one should give due weight to the equally compelling narrative that ISDS claims are also a result of abuse of public power by States.Originality/valueThe originality value of this paper arises from the fact that this is the first comprehensive study of ISDS cases brought against India and provides full documentation within the larger global context of rising ISDS cases. The paper contributes to the debate on international investment law by showing that in the case of India most of the ISDS cases brought were due to India abusing its public power and was not an affront on India’s regulatory autonomy.

This paper offers the first detailed English-language analysis of international investment arbitration law and practice in Thailand. Part 1 briefly introduces burgeoning foreign direct investment (FDI) and investment treaties in the Asian region, followed by more recent emergence of significant investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims. Part 2 sketches the expansion of inbound FDI into Thailand from the 1980s, and more recent outbound investment especially into neighbouring developing countries. This expansion prompted Thailand to enter into dozens of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), including ISDS-backed protections especially from the mid-1990s, and Free Trade Agreements including investment chapters from 2004.Part 3 outlines the first two treaty-based claims filed against Thailand, especially the 2009 arbitration award in favour of Walter Bau due to a lack of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ related to a Don Muang airport tollway concession project. However, Part 3 also examines cases where the Thai government has been subject to arbitration claims under concessions or other contracts with foreign investors. Thailand’s policy response has focused on restricting the capacity of public authorities to agree to arbitration clauses in concession contracts (in 2004) and other public contracts (in 2009, partly liberalised in 2015). Thailand also revised its Model BIT to somewhat reduce parallel treaty-based protections for foreign investors, but only from 2013.Nonetheless, Thailand joins other countries in the region (like Vietnam, Korea and Australia) that have weathered high-profile ISDS claims, but have decided not to let old investment treaties expire (as in Indonesia). Instead, they are negotiating future treaties with provisions recalibrating the rights of foreign investors and host states. However, Thailand has maintained the comparatively unusual extra response of maintaining restrictions on public authorities agreeing to arbitration in investment contracts.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism is under serious discussions of reform. Various reform measures have been proposed. This article tries to contribute to the on-going debate from governance perspective. This article frames the institutional structure of dispute settlement mechanism of investment-related disputes. First, this article categorizes the interdependent rights and interests related to an investment of a foreign investor into three types: private right dispute, regulatory dispute and political dispute. Based on the distinct social nature of investment-related dispute and the comparative advantages of available dispute settlement mechanism, namely main dispute settlement mechanisms, e.g. ISDS, G2G and local remedy, and subsidiary dispute settlement mechanism, e.g. joint interpretation ex post, this article descriptively summarizes the networked structure of current investment dispute settlement system which is largely ISDS centered and other dispute settlement mechanisms supplemented, and normatively, proposes a networked judicial governance in international investment regulation. Despite subject to alleged legitimacy crisis, current ISDS-centered dispute settlement system of investment-related disputes presents certain networked institutional characteristics, including formally autonomous actors in distinct dispute settlement mechanisms, two-way interacted and interdependent relationship thereof, evolving self-regulated norms and de facto public policy function of networked dispute settlement mechanisms, and the main reason for legitimacy crisis faced by ISDS is that related dispute settlement mechanisms are not well located and coordinated in the larger networked judicial governance system of international investment regulation. The normative networked judicial governance system of international investment regulations should be designed based on comparative advantages of various dispute settlements and the distinctly social nature of different type of investment-related rights and interests in terms of obervability, externality and legalization respectively. Roughly speaking, in typological sense, ISDS should govern private right disputes, G2G to political disputes, and local remedy to regulatory dispute respectively. However, settlements of investment-related disputes in gray zone of different types call for coordination and cooperation of different dispute settlement mechanisms and detailed discussion of rights protected in IIAs is necessary to design dispute settlement mechanism(s) for dispute concerning specific treaty-protected right. In order to avoid any unintended broadening of treaty protection, MFN clause should be cautiously worded and limited to prevent inter-treaty shopping and intra-treaty Clause shopping.

To achieve global climate change mitigation and adaptation goals under the Paris Agreement, international investment law should enable and expedite the transition away from high-emission investment toward low-emission investment. Existing international investment agreements (IIAs) providing for investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) fail to advance climate goals and can effectively hinder states’ climate action.\n\nIn this chapter, I discuss the implementation of two main policy options for climate-oriented reform of international investment law – termination of climate-unfriendly IIAs and negotiation of climate-friendly ones – at various governance levels, ranging from unilateral to multilateral action. Given the mounting risks and impacts of IIAs and ISDS, as well as the lack of evidence that they encourage foreign investment flows, terminating IIAs or withdrawing from them appears to be the most effective reform option. States seeking to conclude new climate-friendly treaties or to amend existing IIAs must ensure that the treaties legally distinguish between low-emission and high-emission investments. Climate-friendly IIAs must not hinder climate action (‘do no harm’), by denying treaty protections to high-emission investments, limiting their establishment and expansion, removing incentives such as fossil fuel subsidies, and requiring investments to be made responsibly.\n\nIn addition, IIAs should leverage the potential contribution of foreign investment to climate goals (‘do good’), by incentivising, promoting, facilitating, and protecting low-emission investments only, and by supporting a just transition to a low-emission world. In line with broader efforts to reform international investment law, climate-aligned IIAs should also exclude or circumscribe controversial provisions (fair and equitable treatment [FET], legitimate expectations, indirect expropriation, and most-favoured-nation [MFN], to name a few), prohibit treaty-based challenges to climate policy measures, and deny substantive rights and access to treaty-based dispute settlement mechanisms to high-emission investments. Climate-unfriendly investors would instead need to rely on substantive rights and procedural avenues based on domestic laws.

The current state of international investment law consists of thousands of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms that create safeguards in international investment law and provide foreign investors with the means to mitigate the political risks they face in host countries. However, the number of effective international investment treaties is generally decreasing, and new investment treaties also exclude investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. Based on past litigation, it is easy to see that the majority of investors who have successfully initiated litigation against host States have come from developed countries. Litigation against the host State by investors from the global South has been relatively few and far between, and has mostly been dismissed, and even when it has been successfully filed, it has not been successful. As a result, the dispute settlement mechanism is not inherently fair. It can be said that this mechanism is a symbol of protectionism in the post-colonial era, which is no longer suitable for the current time. This paper addresses these issues by providing a comprehensive analysis of the current state of development of international investment treaties and the current state of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms.

Investment treaties and ISDS serve not just to resolve disputes between states and foreign investors. Through interpreting foreign investor rights, they also help structure foreign investment relations. This chapter leaves the norm entrepreneurs of the late 1950s and 1960 aside to develop an analytical framework for examining how the rights of foreign investors can contribute to defining their role in and relations with states and local communities. It examines the type of rights that make foreign investment projects, their purpose, and different ways of looking at the interface between these rights, states’ right to regulate, and local communities. A transnational and socio-legal approach to property and contracts informs the analysis. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the importance of ISDS for foreign investor rights, examining the normative and distributive implications of this dispute resolution mechanism.

Human rights matters are increasingly becoming interwoven with Arbitration. The fact that, so far, international human rights norms are, as a matter of international law, not directly applicable on a horizontal level -- that is, in the relation between foreign investors and other private parties -- makes it not straightforward to bring claims based on the breach by the foreign investor of human rights obligations before a treaty-based arbitral tribunal. Instead, such obligations exist mainly on the domestic legal level. Also, traditionally, international investment treaties are silent on issues of human rights. Although states have recently effectively included references to human rights norms in their bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and other multilateral treaties (MITs), such as the recently negotiated Draft Pan-African Investment Code (PAIC), the vast majority of contemporary BITs do not mention human rights. There is a global increase in the use of International arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism especially in international investment disputes and the debates on: (I) obligations of foreign investors to respect human rights of host states, and (II) whether the state can sufficiently maintain policy space alongside Investment treaty obligations with International Investors and the feasibility of enforceability of an award arising from investor-state dispute. The overlap between arbitration and human right matters in Investment arbitration brings to fore the inseparability of these two seemingly distinct areas. The nagging question has been the impact of Investment treaties on the ability of the state to enforce policies which safeguard human rights and the extent of the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in Human right matters arising from International Investment agreements. This is essential because most international arbitration agreements are based on Bilateral or Multilateral investment treaties. The relationship between human rights and international investment law manifests itself in different contexts and directions. Two general and broad approaches concerning human rights law exist from the perspective of investment protection: human rights can be used to support or enlarge claims of investors or they can be used to strengthen the state’s defence of its actions which are taken to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Similarly, investment law can be viewed in two different ways from the perspective of human rights: it can be seen as creating restrictions on the state’s ability to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of occupants of the state; it may also be perceived as a breach of individual rights of investors under international investment law. This work will discuss the application of arbitration in International Investment disputes, in particular relation to emergence of Human right matters in arbitration of Investor-state disputes. It will consider the circumstances under which human rights concerns can be raised before an arbitral tribunal set up under a BIT, when and how this can be done, the limited jurisdiction of tribunals over human rights matters, and the challenge of finding a balance where there is an overlap between Human rights and arbitration.

The article analyses the international legal guarantees of the rights of foreign investors. International legal guarantees can be classified according to the volume of their rights as General and Special Warranty. General international legal guarantees are guarantees of human rights in the area of civil and political rights and economics, social and cultural rights. These guarantees are the universally recognized basic international legal guarantees to be followed by States. International guarantees of the rights of foreign investors can be called Special in respect of general international legal guarantees as they have a special subject of regulation - obligations of states receiving foreign investment to ensure protection of property rights of foreign investors. International legal guarantees of the rights of foreign investors, as the special guarantees, are contained in international multilateral and bilateral agreements and include guarantees of property rights of foreign investors, compensation, insurance, guarantees for the settlement of international investment disputes, but these guarantees are aimed at ensuring protection of property rights of foreign investors. It should be noted that international legal guarantees for foreign investors are the legal obligations of recipient states, enshrined in international multilateral and bilateral agreements, extending its action against foreign investors, through which foreign investors have an opportunity to exercise their rights and legitimate interests in the sphere of their ownership investments in recipient states.

International investment law (IIL) is an attractive subfield within international economic law (IEL). China and Chinese investors are important actors in international investment law and process. With the rise of China, its influence on international investment law and governance is also growing. Since its reform and opening-up, China has been one of the most popular destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI), and since 2008, China has gradually become one of the largest overseas direct investment (ODI) countries. China is an active participant in the international investment regime and has concluded more than one hundred international investment agreements (IIAs), including more than ten free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters. Chinese IIAs have experienced important shifts from the conservative IIAs providing limited investment protection, to the liberal IIAs providing high-level investment protection in the early 2000s, and then to the balanced IIAs protecting investment while safeguarding the regulatory rights of the host state. China has been respondent only in a few investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases. China has also been participating in the ISDS reform process through its IIA practice and at the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) forum. With the paradigm shift from the liberal IIAs to the balanced IIAs in IIL and the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has also been updating its old bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and participating in international investment governance reform. For example, China played the leadership role in the adoption of the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking in 2016, and, more recently, the negotiations on the agreement on investment facilitation among World Trade Organization (WTO) members. At the domestic level, China has been constantly improving its FDI and ODI laws and system. For example, China adopted the negative list model for foreign investment admission in 2013, and formulated the new and united Foreign Investment Law. In recent years, Chinese investors have been actively participating in international investment arbitration. In international investment law and practice, China has faced many unique or special legal issues nationally and internationally, such as national security screening, transnational investment subsidy, state-owned enterprises’ overseas investment, the applicability of Chinese BITs to Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR, restrictive arbitral jurisdiction provisions in old Chinese BITs, the role of labor provisions and sustainable development provisions in IIAs, the impact of the China-US trade war on IIL, compulsory technology transfer, the state capitalism debate, the BRI investment dispute settlement mechanism innovation, and the impact of the BRI and even the Chinese Model on the global economic legal order. China’s international investment law and practice and its role in the global economic order have attracted many legal scholars and practitioners both from China and from other countries. Since the 2010s, the study of the interaction between China and IIL has grown rapidly, and much academic literature on this subject has been produced.

After being hit recently by many ISDS claims under different BITs, including one by Australian investors challenging delays in its legal system, India adopted a new Model BIT 2016 to guide negotiations which ostensibly balances the rights of foreign investors with the host State’s right to regulate. This chapter will critically discuss the ISDS provisions in India’s new Model BIT to show that it tilts the balance in favour of the host State by making it very difficult for foreign investors to bring ISDS claims against a host State. The chapter will discuss key issues pertaining to provisions dealing with the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals, the requirement to exhaust local remedies by foreign investors for at least five years, transparency of the ISDS process, appointment of arbitrators, questions related to standard of review and governing law, and proposals for an appellate mechanism. The chapter will also contrast the ISDS provisions in India’s Model BIT with the ISDS provisions present in the ASEAN-India investment agreement, which was signed almost at the same time when India was still working towards its model BIT. The chapter argues that the ISDS provisions in the ASEAN-India investment agreement provide a much better balance between the rights of foreign investors and host State’s right to regulate. Given also that India is emerging as a major capital-exporting country, India could consider amending the ISDS provisions in the model BIT and use instead the ISDS provision in the ASEAN-India investment agreement as the template for negotiating future treaties and as it reviews its older ones.

This policy paper explores two near-term options that governments engaged in reform discussions can pursue, alongside longer-term work on substantive and procedural reform. These options are: (1) a joint instrument on withdrawal of consent to arbitrate; and/or (2) a joint instrument on termination. The paper examines how both options could be implemented, and makes the case for putting a pause on ISDS to ensure that investment treaties and their dispute settlement mechanisms achieve their desired ends, produce legitimate decisions, and do not undermine international economic cooperation and sustainable development more broadly.

Investment treaties aim to protect the rights of foreign investors and provide legal certainty, generally including an Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. The increase of criticism towards ISDS -which reached its highest point during the EU-US TTIP negotiations- brought up different concerns. As a result, the Investment Court System (ICS) was developed and incorporated for the first time in the CETA between Canada and the EU, and then in other Free-Trade Agreements (FTA) signed by the EU. However, in the EU-MERCOSUR FTA there is no regulation of a dispute settlement mechanism between investors and States parties.Currently, the United Kingdom (UK) is leaving the EU and negotiations of a new deal with the EU are being developed. In the next stages, the UK will most likely reach different agreements with sovereign states and others commercial blocks. In this sense, there is a possibility that a future EU-UK and UK-MERCOSUR agreement will need to consider whether the ISDS or the ICS will be adopted. Also, MERCOSUR will need to analyse which system it will be willing to adopt in the future in case a dispute settlement between investors and States is adopted, and could even explore a system that includes aspects of both the ISDS and the ICS.

This contribution examines the role of dispute prevention mechanisms (DPMs) in domesticating and broadening foreign investor privileges. Although conceived as a means of responding to the backlash against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), dispute prevention mechanisms are likely to produce legal enclaves whereby a privileged group of actors are afforded special treatment, and their interests are elevated into policy priorities. As currently conceived, DPMs are expected to operate as a regime embedded in domestic law, but replicating and amplifying investment law's emphasis on the exclusivity of foreign investor rights. Thus, the effect of DPMs is to anchor and extend foreign investor rights to a pre-dispute stage. By analyzing the premises and core features of the emerging DPMs, this contribution argues that, rather than addressing the systemic issues underpinning international investment law, the dispute prevention agenda will further expand and entrench foreign investor privileges.

In the context of ongoing debates concerning the reform of the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, this article critiques the widely-accepted approach that seeks to fit international human rights law (IHRL) into the existing structure of ISDS and argues that IHRL should at least be treated as ‘primus inter pares’ vis-à-vis international investment law. Testing ISDS on the touchstone of the human rights to equality, non-discrimination, and an effective remedy, the authors demonstrate that ISDS is incompatible with IHRL. Considering various structural and systemic problems, abolishing ISDS is perhaps the only normatively sound solution to address this incompatibility with IHRL. However, as this may not be politically feasible in the near future, this article articulates eight principles for a human-rights compatible international dispute settlement mechanism. We argue that these principles should inform the current efforts to reform the ISDS mechanism to avoid the risk of making only cosmetic changes.