Abstract
Abstract This paper analyzes an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether to invest in research and development (R&D) that promotes clean technology. We consider the case in which the entrant could benefit from a technology spillover and analyze the conditions that facilitate the incumbent’s entry-deterrence behavior. We show that higher levels of the spillover make entry more attractive compared to a standard entry game. In addition, regulator and incumbent prefer entry when the spillover from clean technology is sufficiently high and the cost of investing in R&D is relatively low. However, preferences are misaligned when the spillover and cost of R&D are low.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
