Intuitionism in Moral Epistemology

Abstract

Attributions of moral knowledge are common in everyday life. While intuitionism was popular in the early twentieth century, it was subsequently dismissed as implausible. Recently, there has been renewed interest in intuitionism. Philosophers have defended updated versions of the theory and argued that the view has been misunderstood. This chapter considers the merits of intuitionism in moral epistemology. It examines different ways of being an intuitionist and indicates the relative strengths and weaknesses of various approaches within intuitionism. All moral intuitionists are united by their commitment to two claims: the descriptive claim that some moral beliefs are non-inferential, and the normative claim that some non-inferential moral beliefs have positive epistemic status. Response intuitionism is attractive because it does not over-intellectualize moral knowledge as other intuitionists arguably do. The focus on affective responses captures the dynamic and motivating force of moral judgements.