Introduction to the special issue: “Cho Seung-bog (1922-2012): at the Crossroads of Academia and Activism”

†‡ † Purpose: For the first time, a nationwide survey of the Patterns of Care Study (PCS) for the various radiotherapy treatments of esophageal cancer was carried out in Sout h Korea. In order to observe the different parameters, as well as offer a solid cooperative system, we compared the Korean results with those observed in the United States (US) and Japan. Materials and Methods: Two hundreds forty-six esophageal cancer patients from 21 institutions were enrolled in the South Korean study. The patients received radiation ther aphy (RT) from 1998 to 1999. In order to compare these results with those from the United States, a published study by Suntharalingam, which included 414 patients [treated by Radiotherapy (RT)] from 59 institutions between 1996 and 1999 was chosen. In order to compare the South Korean with the Japanese data, we choose two different studies. The results published by Gomi were selected as the surgery group, in which 220 esophageal cancer patients were analyzed from 76 facilities. The patients underwent surgery and received RT with or without chemotherapy between 1998 and 2001. The non-surgery group originated from a study by Murakami, in which 385 patients were treated either by RT alone or RT with chemotherapy, but no surgery, between 1999 and 2001. Results : The median age of enrolled patients was highest in the Japanese non-surgery group (71 years old). The gender ratio was approximately 9：1 (male：female) in both the Korean and Japanese studies, whereas females made up 23.1% of the study population in the US study. Adenocarcinoma outnumbered squamous cell carcinoma in the US study, whereas squamous cell carcinoma was more prevalent both the Korean and Japanese studies (Korea 96.3%, Japan 98%). An esophagogram, endoscopy, and chest CT scan were the main modalities of diagnostic evaluation used in all three countries. The US and Japan used the abdominal CT scan more frequently than the abdominal ultrasonography. Radiotherapy alone treatment was most rarely used in the US study (9.5%), compared to the Korean (23.2%) and Japanese (39%) studies. The combination of the three modalities (Surgery+RT+Chemotherapy) was performed least often in Korea (11.8%) compared to the Japanese (49.5%) and US (32.8%) studies. Chemotherapy (89%) and chemotherapy with concurrent chemoradiotherapy (97%) was most frequently used in the US study. Fluorouracil (5-FU) and Cisplatin were the most preferred drug treatments used in all three countries. The median radiation dose was 50.4 Gy in the US study, as compared to 55.8 Gy in the Korean study regardless of whether an operation was performed. However, in Japan, different median doses were delivered for the surgery (48 Gy) and non-surgery groups (60 Gy). Conclusion : Although some aspects of the evaluation of esophageal cancer and its various treatment modalities were heterogeneous among the three countries surveyed, we found no remarkable differences in the RT dose or technique, which includes the number of portals and energy beams.

Liberalists has declared that economic trade brings about political cooperation and peace between two countries through enhancing the economic benefits, promoting conversation, and removing misunderstanding. On the basis of this declaration, the policy on North Korea has been pushed ahead by the Korean government which tries to transform the relationship with North Korea from mistrust and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. It has been twenty three years since the economic trade between South and North Korea began in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo which was triggered by the Declaration of July 7 and the North-South Korean Economic Relation Measure of October in 1988. The total turnover between South and North Korea was about 15.9 billion USD during the period from the beginning of January, 1989 to the end of September, 2011, out of which 13.2 billion USD is for commercial trade and 2.6 billion USD is for economic aid. However, the controversy is being aroused in South Korea about the policy on North Korea because North Korea tends to keep hostility towards South Korea through nuclear experiment, blowing up the Cheonan ship, shooting a South Korean tourist in Keumkang Mountain, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. It seems to the realists that the economic trade between South and North Korea brings about reinforcing the North Korean military power and weakening the security in South Korea, which results in hindering the peace in Korean Peninsular. From the point of this issue, this paper aims to analyse the effect of trade and economic aid on easing conflicts between South and North Korea empirically. The result of this study can be summarized as follows. First of all, the increase of total turnover is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, which means that the increase of total turnover will decrease the conflict index. Secondly, the increase of commercial trade does not significantly affect the conflict index. Thirdly, the increase of non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, which means that the increase of non-commercial trade will bring about creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea. Finally, the multi-variable analysis shows that rate of change in non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, but rate of change in commercial trade is not. To sum up the results of the empirical analysis, the increase of total turnover and/or non-commercial trade is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, but not in the case of the increase of commercial trade. In other words, the economic trade between South and North Korea does not necessarily reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular. In fact, it has been happening in the real world since fifty years ago. Social welfare in North Korea should be enhanced to reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular through the economic support and trade from South Korea. The amount of social welfare increase in North Korea should be enough to offset the amount of social welfare decrease due to the cessation of the economic support and trade. Therefore, the economic trade between South and North Korea needs to be vitalized more and more so that North Korea be economically dependent upon South Korea. Limits of this paper, which are left to be studied in the future, are as follows. First of all, it needs to be analyzed how much social welfare has been enhanced in North Korea through the economic trade between South and North Korea for the past twenty three years. Secondly, it also needs to be studied what is the level of dependence of North Korea on South Korea, and whether the economic sanction toward the North Korea of the Lee Myung-bak administration is significantly effective or not.

Economists have expressed their opinion that the economic trade between countries brings about economic prosperity as well as peace. Their opinion is based upon that the trading countries do not want to face the situation of decline in their welfare and benefits due to not participating in economic trade. They argue that economic trades between countries give them the opportunities of conversation, decrease misunderstanding, and leads them to peaceful mind and behavioral attitude to adjust the political conflicts. On the basis of this kind of opinion and the reunification of Germany, the economic trade between South and North Korea has been suggested as the most efficient measure to maintain the peace in Korean Peninsula. It has been twenty four years since the economic trade between South and North Korea was triggered in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo’s Declaration of July 7 in spite of several crises. The total turnover between South and North Korea is about US$ 18.3 billion from 1989 to 2012, out of which US$ 9.2 billion is the export to the North and US$ 9.1 billion is the import from the North. Since the end of cold war, South Korea and China have established diplomatic relations on July 24, 1992, and they have become strategic cooperative partners. The total turnover between South Korea and China was US$ 6.4 billion in 1992, and it increased to US$ 215.2 billion in 2012. On the other hand, the total turnover between North Korea and China amounts to US$ 5.9 billion in 2012, which is around three times as much as that between South and North Korea. The results of theoretical analyses are summarized as follows. First of all, exports and imports between South and North Korea turned out to ease the conflicts between two countries. Therefore, ‘theory of peace through trade’ by the liberalists was supported here. Secondly, it turned out that the economic trade between North Korea and China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if South Korea and China are in friendly partnership. It implies that China induces North Korea to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. Thirdly, exports from South Korea to China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are friendly partners politically. Imports from China to South. Korea affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are in antagonistic relationship politically. Empirical analysis shows that the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea turned out to have a significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It implies that the increase of the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea is likely to ease the conflicts between two countries. On the other hand, the difference quotient in the imports turned out to have significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It tells that the increase of the imports is likely to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. While the expand of trade with China will ease the conflicts in Korean Peninsula from the theoretical viewpoint, empirical analyses present opposite results. It implies that the relationship between North Korea and China since the end of cold war is not the same as that before the end of cold war. It also tells that North Korea puts the higher political priority to developing the nuclear weapon and long-range missile. Inter-Korean policy has to keep consistency focusing economic cooperation apart from political issues. Long-term goal of inter-Korean policy should be unification, although short-term one is peace and stability in Korean Peninsula.

The image is very familiar to us: a scholar overcoming Cold War barriers to study a land where travel, let alone research, is impossible; their diligence paying off by locating materials that allow them to circumvent the obstacles and the propaganda created by the world’s “most isolated” regime; the resulting research offering a never-before-seen view into the inner truths of this nigh-impenetrable land.Or, at least, so we would have it.This is the image we North Korean researchers have often taken for ourselves.1 Playing off of old colonial images of the “hermit kingdom” now transferred to Pyongyang, our work has tended to capitalize on ideas of North Korea as a scholarly terra incognita, as though it was the last blank space on the map in an otherwise globalized world. This tendency, encouraged by the commercial instincts of publishers, has emphasized the solitary scholar working in a challenging environment while downplaying how this self-representation reinforces many of the shibboleths prominent in the media that our own research ostensibly seeks to dispel.In suggesting that this self-representation is, at best, a tad on the dramatic side and, at worst, self-serving, the seven articles in this special issue make one very simple point: the study of North Korea may not be so difficult after all. Ranging from investigations into science fiction literature to explorations of textual exchanges between the North and South, from the uses of quantitative data to ruminations on possible research agendas for anthropologists, and from treatments of Chinese soldier war memoirs to forays into international politics, this special issue shows that just because we cannot go to North Korea does not mean research is impossible. This special issue demonstrates that what might be called the “North Korean archive” is much broader and deeper than normally assumed. Indeed, arguably more sources exist for North Korea than for many other historical periods, including virtually any era leading up to the Chosŏn dynasty. As much as limits exist to these sources, the authors of this special issue ensure that the days of declaiming, “We can’t get there” or lamenting, “There are no sources” should be behind us.So, too, do they ask a wide array of research questions, based on the methodology of each author’s discipline. In so doing, they expand our understanding of what it is possible to ask when it comes to North Korea and cut through some of the Cold War conceptual categories that have boxed in our research. The result is a more varied and diverse understanding. Brought together as part of a workshop sponsored by the Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University and organized by Professor Gregg Brazinsky and Professor Jisoo Kim, these authors worked together through an online workshop and roundtable to consider the past, current, and future directions of research on North Korea. Everyone present agreed significant shifts were underway. True, there remain questions that cannot be answered, yet there are plenty of materials for new questions with lots of answers. The articles themselves simply get on with the work of doing research, showing that rich research possibilities exist by deploying different sources and asking novel questions.At the heart of this special issue is the question of opening up access, which, however infeasible geopolitically, is certainly possible for scholarship. Degree of access, of course, fluctuates depending on the nationality of the scholar, with many European scholars having more contact with North Korean scholars. Given relations between Seoul and Washington, American scholars have less access than almost all but their South Korean colleagues. Sonia Ryang begins her article with a question directed to colleagues in a field whose research is arguably the most disrupted by North Korea’s barriers to research regardless of their nationality: anthropology. “How could one carry out an anthropological study of North Korea,” she asks, “if one were not able to conduct long-term or even short-term ethnographic fieldwork on the ground?” Ryang’s question is relevant to other disciplines as well. Yet rather than be dissuaded, Ryang moves beyond the question itself, insisting on the possibility of research from a distance. Ryang argues that a text-based approach—“a reading of heterogeneous texts”—can offer a starting point to examine North Korea on its own terms and even, she goes on to argue, be turned back to question anthropological methodology itself.2 In arguing for critical treatment of North Korean texts, Ryang brings her anthropology closer to the methodology of the other social scientists and humanists in the special issue, all of whom confirm that there are, in fact, lots of materials for studying North Korea outside its boundaries.3There is, in short, a more expansive North Korean archive. Two of these types of sources (interviews and the archives of former socialist allies) are more familiar and another (Pyongyang published texts) less so. Each has its own idiosyncratic shortcomings and advantages, but when combined and engaged with critically, this expanded archive offers ways of diversifying possible research subjects and lines of inquiry.It is now an almost hackneyed usage among late twentieth-century scholars to call for an escape from Cold War–era approaches. Yet in the Korean peninsula, where the Cold War has yet to cease, where security problems still dominate the headlines, where in South Korea, National Security Laws still constrain research on North Korea, and where anti-communist rhetoric is still very much alive, the conceptual categories and narrative strategies of the Cold War, however much critiqued in other settings, remain powerful in shaping much writing about North Korea. The contributors represent a growing shift in scholarship that recognizes how studies on North Korea have been shaped by the Cold War at the same time as they have helped maintain the particular peninsular-specific structures of the Cold War—the division system. The significance of diversifying scholarly approaches is not just about North Korea but also about the division system itself.One of the longest-standing modes of research into North Korea has been interviewing people who left the country. From the 1950s to 1980s, these emigrants consisted largely of defectors, whose testimonies were dominated by South Korean intelligence services. With the changes in the Northeast political economy—in particular the rise of the Chinese juggernaut and the interlinked marketization in North Korea—as well as the food insecurity of the early 1990s, the irregular numbers of defectors became a virtual flood of migrants.4 Although defectors formerly consisted mainly of ex-officials and were almost always male, the new emigrants came with more assorted socioeconomic backgrounds. Women were predominant, they held more diverse motivations for leaving, and they originated primarily, though not exclusively, from locations close to the Chinese border.5 That this change in number and origin occurred at the same time as the fall of the Berlin Wall, together with a renewed attention to Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons, ensured that the flow of people out of the North attracted global media attention. A celebrity culture of a sort resulted, with key exiles gaining an international profile through such media as TED Talks. Publishers followed suit, often framing memoirs and biographies as the latest generation of that venerable Cold War genre, escape literature.6 Many NGOs took up the cause, framing the testimony of migrants in the language of liberal human rights—a vocabulary newly acquired and often fitting awkwardly in the speeches of those making tours of university campuses. The formation of the Committee on Human Rights in North Korea led to a flurry of English-language publications on human rights issues.7Academic research soon followed the arrival of North Koreans. Nothing in English rivals the quantity or quality of the long-term, consistent surveys and interviews conducted by various South Korean agencies and NGOs. Yet in English, too, refugee accounts emerged as a dominant mode for investigating not just the lives of North Koreans but also the nature of the regime. For the most part, these works have highlighted human rights issues or have conducted broad surveys framed by the traditional concerns of political science—namely, regime legitimacy and durability.8 Some work has rested exclusively on interviews while others have adopted interdisciplinary approaches, combining interviews with complementary written sources and often moving beyond a human rights or security framework.9 The result has been a mini-industry of interview-based studies, resulting in a boom that in both quantitative and qualitative terms produced much empirical data and analytical insights.These studies have not come without problems, however. Some English-language researchers have been blunt about the perils of interviews, questioning the representativeness of available interviewees who have skewed to the border regions, who, after all, were a self-selected group, and who for whatever personal reasons had left the country.10 In Korea, critiques have arisen concerning the negative side effects of the interview boom.11 Monetary payments to interview subjects who are often living precariously, critics have pointed out, have led some North Koreans to seek out interviews, leading to a cycle of repetition where different researchers often rely on the same subjects. Such repeat interviewees, together with word-of-mouth accounts of their experiences, have led some critics to question whether interviewees respond according to what they perceive to be the needs of researchers. Others have wondered whether stories appealing to human rights–style narratives become privileged in the telling, as interviewees “perform” the status of refugees to the organizations that support them. Such open discussions of methodology have been less thoroughly aired in English, where, as Jay Song points out in her contribution to this special issue, foreign researchers have tended to downplay the effect of their presence or, for many, the effect of the act of translation on the interviewing process.At stake here is how individual interviews are used to make larger claims about North Korean political culture. Lest we forget, for decades the Soviet field faced a similar dilemma. It, too, relied on studies based on information derived from exiles, much in the way we today turn to interviews. Today, scholars are well aware of how the negative assessments of defector testimony received an audience among journalists, intelligence services, and scholars who were primed by Cold War rivalries to see them as evidence testifying to the validity of their own preconceptions of totalitarianism—a type of circular confirmation bias that distorted understanding of the complexities of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras.12 With these challenges in mind, Jay Song’s article calls for more transparency in the interviewing field and for qualitative data derived from migrants to be combined with other types of information, in particular quantitative data now readily available through online databases. Similarly, Sonia Ryang argues for more rigorous and critical methodology while also asking for interviews “faithfully documenting how people live their lives in North Korea without veering into political judgement.”If refugees, exiles, and defectors are a long-standing source of information that have recently been revitalized and offer still greater potential, the same might be said of documents from ex-socialist states. Early studies depended on reports from North Korea’s allies, as did American intelligence services.13 Since the end of the Cold War, the opening of the archives of North Korea’s erstwhile allies has been a boon, especially for studies on political and international history. Reports by diplomats stationed in Pyongyang have been fruitfully used to extend our understanding of the origins of the Korean War, elite politics in the Korean Workers’ Party, and Kim Il Sung’s ascension to power, to name just a few.14 Many of these documents have been conveniently translated into English and Korean from languages as various as Albanian to Romanian in a collaborative project between the Woodrow Wilson Center and Kyungnam University. The former director of this project, James Person, points out in his contribution to the special issue that these translated items consist of only a small fraction of the original declassified documents and fall largely into the diplomatic, political, and military realms. This selection on what to translate reflects the dominant biases of the field and, not unsurprisingly, the security orientation of the agencies funding the translations. There is, in short, much work still to be done in these documents, and as Person shows, when combined with other sources, these archives have the potential to transform some of our foundational conceptions of even seemingly well-worn topics, such as the history of factionalism.Work in these multinational, multilanguage documents has special temptations and dilemmas, however. As many scholars inside and outside the Korean studies community are aware, some research emerging out of these archives has been subject to serious controversy.15 Among the lessons learned is that work in these archives will require scholars to meet demanding linguistic standards that abide no shortcuts and a willingness to collaborate openly and honestly with peers around the world. Wide-ranging discussions have followed, spilling over into such issues as the institutional hierarchies endemic to Korean studies, the hegemony of the English language and the United States on the international stage in a project like Korean studies, the (in)effectiveness of peer review, the stakes of academic publishers in downplaying scholarly transgressions, the ease of e-publishing to erase such transgressions, and the gatekeeping power of mainstream professional institutions such as this journal.In pointing out the possibilities and challenges of this underused assortment of documents, Person raises another dilemma. Until recently the flurry of activity in ex-Soviet sources has been conducted with an eye to extracting information to better examine known yet ill-understood events. Often the results have been more precise knowledge. Yet such searches for more data, however useful, nevertheless tend to use these documents transparently without examining the intellectual and cultural milieus in which the documents were produced. As historians have recently shown, the Soviet Union is best understood as a multinational empire, which ruled by privileging the center over peripheries and establishing hierarchies among the peoples that constituted it.16 Despite Soviet claims to pan-racial solidarity—claims often used in its Cold War rivalry with the United States over human rights and racism—these relations remained mired in chauvinism and structured by racial categories. This dynamic frequently contoured Moscow’s relationship with the Asian reaches of its empire. Other scholarship, especially in reference to East Germany, has shown how race consistently framed “comradely” relations within the socialist world.17 Given we know that deep affinities existed between the domestic, racialized politics of the United States and its diplomatic and cultural policies abroad (an issue that no good history of US-South Korean relations can ignore), it becomes imperative to ask the equivalent question for Soviet and East European politics: How did their racialized and cross-cultural assumptions extend to their treatment of North Korea?18 Or more specifically to our purpose, how did these biases shape the reports of Pyongyang-based diplomats that today are being used by researchers to reconstruct these histories? Race and privilege have all but been left out of consideration in these studies. As Person shows, diplomatic reports were full of dismissive and often smug remarks. Although he is unable to explore within the confines of this single article the extent of these biases or how these fit into broader cross-cultural relations, it is clear that a concern with the historical conditions for the production of these documents—in particular, the politics of racial representation—will be crucial for any future research based on them. As we all know by now, cross-cultural writing reflects not just on the subject but also on the writer—a dynamic to which self-proclaimed socialists, whatever their public claims to the contrary, were not exempt.Several of the articles in the special issue, however, are based on another source base that has been conventionally neglected and only recently taken up by a growing number of researchers. These are texts—newspapers, magazines, and monographs—printed in Pyongyang under the official of the Korean Workers’ and published by various of or These as well as publications of various make up the rich and varied reading culture of North Koreans in their In this special issue, authors these sources, from stories to quantitative data, magazines, and Many more could be to this sources are available to researchers not in archives but in that have been open to the In the United materials as part of a project to publications for intelligence are now at the of Many of its especially remain Moscow’s former now the as a type of for North Korean the including Korean of Soviet texts, and even Other in and the of also offer while the in former socialist in and are more have become available for of through the of in South Korea is more because of National Security Laws that to with North Korea, as Kim in the of her Seoul has more than many other some materials are available in such as the one at the National which more history. Many more sources in A history of how National Security Laws have shaped access to materials and how the Korean produced types of by scholars with special access to intelligence sources, especially in the early to be work like that done by Kim on the early funding in the of North Korean studies needs to be for even as this international field as sources, could into these to a rich array of in fact, than any single could in a These texts, however, have recently remained as more than propaganda without much research much about the dominant of the North Korea With a on and there was that such materials to offer who were more in about and Sonia Ryang called this the of North Korean The for the for the of and the of the of for or the of the name just a not much information relevant to the lines of publications such as the the or the might be into for the of examining the and of yet for the most part these remain This is now lines of become more these sources have shown their for these new the last scholars have more than any others these documents to an assortment of Ranging from the early work of which of changes in and institutions over to treatment of North Korean beyond of and this work has led the even in the of South Korea’s National Security In a of how much is in the by this Kim is a with from these largely Pyongyang-based sources that now numbers in the of as pointed out in her roundtable contribution to the the number of from the to today more than works on from to to of which is available to of the peninsula, a of scholars working in the United States such as Kim, and Kim an article in this special and in such as and have taken up this of a archive to shift from the elite politics and security on this scholarship, the articles in this special issue confirm a future more varied approaches to North Korea that arguably are no within a single that concerns with security and elite politics This is most rather than or see documents published in Pyongyang as the authors in this special issue them as a part of a more expansive North Korea archive. of them would no readily that these published with the of the are of propaganda and the of the regime. Yet their research on reading them and the as Kim it in her to the of Gregg Brazinsky on this point in his treatment of a different yet type of soldier source whose production has been by the official of a to its raises one of the of these sources, relationship between official and the of have tended to he points out, that that reflects the official narrative was written under and or only with official as truths or, as he inner or Brazinsky shows that a of such materials of their scholarly of the of in these texts, which like any other of documents their own idiosyncratic with they can to power of official in shaping the of the in ways more than the Cold War of while also showing the ways the as authors of this and used it to their own have similar in to archives in the In the study of it was these types of published sources that the early accounts of largely by and cultural historians decades and the opening of Soviet Yet do not have to so to such a of a still a time when documents published by the were as virtually no research for what up the was still called the of Korean history. the with which scholars the same documents that a generation is in As the articles in this special issue it is now the turn of sources published in Pyongyang to be taken for more than their propaganda is not to that these sources, like any historical do not have their own are after all by the are often sponsored by or are and by and written in a to have no space in such challenges such just one from just after the Korean with the of might be in the but it to get outside the categories in which the is might that what in their but remain as to the of those let alone their broader political is known about the politics behind these it can be that by the early individual publications the emerging of Kim Il for his others did reasons for this of these mean the early of the was not but by some Or could this be as to on the part of These can be but into the of Other issues by the regime as of new for or not of as to the of the in these As more research is done these sources, more will become clear about not just the possibilities but also the limits of their the those are more varied and than in work that published sources as that North Korean claims about the nature of or that the history and of to a single is also to point out that the articles in this special issue are with more than just sources, written or are also on their sources, both old and with novel questions, in the disciplines of each of the at the North Korea of a in Seoul will the with to for a North Korea Such have produced many yet they on a very that North Korea is best understood through its other a so that it a special methodology all of its Such an to research on an of North Korea’s own propaganda that it is any other in the in of a articles in this special issue work on a that the approaches of our disciplines are up to the of studying North Korea without to In other North Korea as a subject of scholarship no it or critical research, attention to the history of our conceptual the biases of the sources, and the historical of the twentieth-century peninsula, cannot to not always The between the and the particular, from an on North Korea’s to within which any be in this the study of North Korea to and approaches. True, there is no access to formerly of documents to the way it is in East Germany, where now the archive is can interviews be done inside the in the Chinese have been to better the possibilities of the 1950s Yet there is no time for to for North Korean archives to open or to be for

Last orders in Pyongyang

남북한이 상이한 사회적 규범체계 하에 분단국가로 장기화될수록, 건설기술에 대한 이론적 기술적 차이가 많이 발생하게 된다. 따라서 남북한이 화해의 국면에서 상호 교류시, 공동으로 사용하는 철근콘크리트 도로교의 성능수준도 명확히 차이가 발생한다. 이에 본 연구는 북한의 철근콘크리트 도로교 설계기준과 관련된 자료를 면밀히 비교 분석하고, 철근콘크리트 슬래브교에 대한 표준설계 제원과 사례를 토대로 구조해석을 수행했다. 특히 남북한의 설계트럭하중에 대하여 활하중 영향을 분석함으로써, 북한의 철근콘크리트 슬래브교에 대한 수준을 추정하였고, 이를통해 통행에 대한 안전성을 사전에 검토할 수 있도록 기초 연구를 수행하였다. 따라서 향후 남북한이 화해국면에 접어들어 교류가 활발히 진행되거나, 더 나아가 통일국가로 준비하는 단계에서, 공통의 철근콘크리트 도로교 설계기준을 작성하는데 기초자료로 활용될 것으로 기대한다. If North Korea continuously remains an isolated nation without social interaction with South Korea, the gaps in the theoretical and technological status in construction technology become greater between North and South Korea. Therefore if interactions between North and South Korea can be made, there will be significant improvement in infrastructure technological performance can be made(i.e., Reinforced Concrete bridges). This study was performed to compare and analyze data related to the design standards of North Korean RC bridges and to execute a structural analysis based on standard design specifications of RC slab bridges. Especially, basic study of analyzing the influences on design truck loads of North and South Korea was conducted for the purpose of predicting the performance of North Korean RC slab bridges and the safety levels of traveling vehicles in advance. It is expected that the results of this study can be used as fundamental data for the set-up of South-North RC bridge specification when South and North Korea enter a stage of cooperation and interaction between South and North Korea are actively pursued to prepare for reunification.

We analysed daily precipitation data at the rain gauge stations in North Korea over a period of 25 years from 1983 to 2007, and in South Korea over a period of 35 years from 1973 and 2007. We found a striking trend of decreasing summer precipitation across North Korea. By contrast, in South Korea, the trend is opposite: there is a major increase in summer precipitation. Also, the number of dry days in summer showed an increasing trend in North Korea and a decreasing trend in South Korea. For the number of days with heavy precipitation (i.e. days with above 50 mm/day daily precipitation) during summer, a decreasing trend was detected in North Korea, but no trend in South Korea. However, in South Korea, there was a significant increase of days with heavy precipitation over the whole year. These opposite trends in summer precipitation between North and South Korea were further confirmed using four global/regional satellite and rain gauge datasets of CPC Merged Analysis of Precipitation (CMAP), the Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP), Precipitation REConstruction over the Land (PREC/L), and the Asian Precipitation‐Highly Resolved Observation Data Integration Towards the Evaluation of Water Resources (APHRODITE). Copyright © 2011 Royal Meteorological Society

COVID-19 is an infectious respiratory disease that first appeared in December 2019 in Wuhan, China and first spread throughout the country and then worldwide. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, concerned about the rapid spread of COVID-19, officially declared a global pandemic on March 11, 2020. North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) barred foreign tourists from China on January 21, 2020, and then completely closed its border with China. In this article, I will explore the impact of COVID-19 on North Korean society and research the cooperation plan between South and North Korea. I will also briefly introduce in the post-COVID-19 period. To better understand the health care system and health conditions in North Korea, I will first analyse the infectious disease management system and, in the context of this, then try to investigate in detail how COVID-19 has affected North Korea. From an economic point of view, I will examine the changes in economic cooperation between North Korea and China, and then try to explain the social changes caused by restrictions on movement and lack of goods, and the political situation in North Korea during the COVID-19 crisis. Finally, I will try to research the situation facing North Korea and suggest a way for cooperation between South and North Korea in the future. The basic aim of this research is to find a useful alternative for joint cooperation in the field of health care and safety and to improve cooperation between South and North Korea in the post-COVID-19 era.

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

Degradation, urbanization, and restoration: A review of the challenges and future of conservation on the Korean Peninsula

It is generally believed that forest cover in North Korea has undergone a substantial decrease since 1980, while in South Korea, forest cover has remained relatively static during that same period of time. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Forest Resources Assessments--based on the reported forest inventories from North and South Korea--suggest a major forest cover decrease in North Korea, but only a slight decrease in South Korea during the last 30 years. In this study, we seek to check and validate those assessments by comparing them to independently derived forest cover maps compiled for three time intervals between 1990 and 2010, as well as to provide a spatially explicit view of forest cover change in the Korean Peninsula since the 1990s. We extracted tree cover data for the Korean Peninsula from existing global datasets derived from satellite imagery. Our estimates, while qualitatively supporting the FAO results, show that North Korea has lost a large number of densely forested areas, and thus in this sense has suffered heavier forest loss than the FAO assessment suggests. Given the limited time interval studied in our assessment, the overall forest loss from North Korea during the whole span of time since 1980 may have been even heavier than in our estimate. For South Korea, our results indicate that the forest cover has remained relatively stable at the national level, but that important variability in forest cover evolution exists at the regional level: While the northern and western provinces show an overall decrease in forested areas, large areas in the southeastern part of the country have increased their forest cover.

In 2010, with the implementation of the May 24th measures, inter-Korean economic cooperation was suspended in all areas except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Then, in 2016, with the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, all inter-Korean economic cooperation came to a halt. The joint venture enterprises in inter-Korean economic cooperation were mainly concentrated in the Pyongyang region. However, there was a case of inter-Korean economic cooperation in the form of a joint venture enterprise outside the Kaesong Industrial Complex that could be accessed using the entry and exit procedures of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. South-North Equity Joint Venture Enterprise in Kaesong can utilize the industrial, transportation, and transit facilities of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and has the advantage of active participation by North Korea, which holds shares. In the Equity Joint Venture Act, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for setting land usage fees, ease the all-out agreement system, and ensure education for workers. In addition, it is necessary to fairly define subsequent procedures in cases where consultation is impossible. Under the North-South Economic Cooperation Act, it is necessary to simplify the North's project approval process and stipulate that the North should manage its property in good faith, at least to a minimum extent, in special circumstances. The law on the development of inter-Korean relations needs to clearly define the special relationship between North and South Korea and elevate the legal status of the inter-Korean agreements to the level of general treaties. The law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should clearly stipulate in writing the procedures for obtaining North Korean visit approvals and for importing and exporting goods, and should minimize the time required for these processes. The agreement on investment protection between North and South Korea should specify in detail the abnormal issues that impede economic cooperation and provide for step-by-step investment protection accordingly. Regarding the agreement on the resolution of commercial disputes between North and South Korea, the follow-up procedures of the agreement should be promptly carried out, and the establishment of a governing law that applies to both North and South Korea is necessary. The inter-Korean agreement went through the legislative approval process outlined in Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, thereby establishing its legal validity. However, due to North Korea's non-compliance, it has become practically ineffective. However, as North Korea has not explicitly rejected the validity of the agreement, it is not advisable to disregard the agreement and its provisions in preparation for future inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea has been attempting to improve its external economy through scientific and technological exchanges, economic development zones, and other means since the 2010s. However, the situation has worsened due to North Korea's nuclear tests leading to U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19. Due to COVID-19, there have been zero exchanges of people between North and South Korea for a period of two years starting from 2021. In the current tense situation of strained inter-Korean relations, inter-Korean economic cooperation should be carried out flexibly and adaptively, taking into account the interests of both North and South Korea and contributing to their reunification, in accordance with the dynamics of inter-Korean and international relations.

190BOOK REVIEWS Two Koreas—One Future? A Report Preparedfor the American Friends Service Committee, edited by John Sullivan and Roberta Foss. Lanham, Maryland, and London: University Press of America, 1987. Pp. 167. Cloth, $22.50. Paper, $11.50. One can usually count on the American Friends Service Committee to offer fresh and at times controversial perspectives on current issues. This volume on Korea is no exception. Aside from a brief introduction and conclusion by the editors, the volume consists of six contributions on history, economics, politics, the military, major power perspectives, and a personal Korean view. Most of the contributors are scholars well known not only for their expertise in Korean studies but also for their independence of judgment. The first contribution is by Bruce Cumings and deals with the division of Korea in 1945. His "revisionist" view of the immediate postwar period is that it is the United States that should shoulder most of the blame for Korea's division. An American policy that saw a separate noncommunist state in South Korea— the position advanced successfully by "nationalists" as opposed to "internationalists " in the military government and the Department of State—prevailed during the period through the Korean War. I place the word revisionist in quotation marks because by now it is this view, taken from his longer work, The Origins of the Korean War, which has become the standard treatment of the period. This short piece essentially captures the main arguments he makes in that work. Jon Halliday next compares the North and South Korean economies. In an account that exhibits considerable sympathy for the economic policies of the DPRK, he notes that the highly industrial and largely self-sufficient (the Korean word chuch'e is used to describe this policy of autarky) nation suffers from a number of problems, most notably a difficult-to-calculate external debt. He gives a grudging nod to the economic success of the South, but also points out its external dependence on capital and markets. His chapter represents a counterweight to the highly hagiographie accounts of the South's economy and the often facile assumptions concerning that of the North. The debunking of conventional wisdom on Korea continues unabated in the third selection by Stephen Goose on the military situation on the peninsula. His argument is that the threat from the North is greatly exaggerated and that the South could quite easily defeat an attack because of its defensive posture, greater defense spending, superior weaponry, larger population, and more advanced industrial base. Following this logic, Goose proceeds to argue that the U.S. troop presence is superfluous and that the removal of U.S. troops would defuse antiAmerican feelings among South Korean students and foster the growth of democracy. In one of his last contributions to the Korean debate before his untimely demise, Gregory Henderson attributes much of the postwar political landscape to the Japanese colonial legacy that replaced Confucianism with military and anticommunist values. He then gives a brief political history of both North and BOOK REVIEWS191 South Korea, concluding with an adroit discussion of indoctrination efforts in the South. In the North there was less dissent, not because of superior policies, but rather because most of the dissenters had fled south before and during the Korean War. Predictably Henderson is critical, but he also suggests that the future for the South is bright, since at the time of his writing there was a trend toward liberalization. One suspects that recent events in South Korea would not substantially revise his overall assessment. Ilpyong Kim's chapter on the role of the major powers begins with the assumption, somewhat overdrawn, that it is the four major powers (China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union) which will largely determine the success or failure of inter-Korea dialogue. His contribution is a relatively straightforward account organized around the "Northern Triangle" (North Korea, China, and the USSR) and the "Southern Triangle" (South Korea, the U.S., and Japan). The only real "revisionism" comes in his conclusion that the U.S. hard-line policy toward North Korea must change before peace and stability can be assured on the peninsula. The final chapter by Kyungmo...

This paper raises the necessity and utility of environmental cooperation in the context of the climate change crisis caused by environmental pollution and the strained North-South relations influenced by the US-China rivalry. It presents a plan for the domestic legal revision needed to facilitate this. Particularly, in the case of North and South Korea, where land and sea are interconnected, a joint response to climate change is necessary, and such cooperation can be mutually beneficial. Additionally, environmental improvement projects in North Korea can enhance the quality of life of its residents, offering a humanitarian aspect and potentially not conflicting with international sanctions against North Korea. In this regard, efforts for environmental cooperation are necessary for both Koreas, and there is a considerable possibility that North Korea will respond to these efforts. According to reports submitted to the UN and others, environmental pollution in North Korea is at a serious level, and there is observed intent to seek international support for its resolution. This situation implies that the resolution of environmental issues between North and South Korea can at least be achieved within the framework of multilateral international cooperation. The South Korean government has proposed the “Green Detente” policy as part of its North Korea policy to address the problems arising from climate change in North and South Korea and East Asia. The Green Detente can be understood as a process that aims for unification through reconciliation and cooperation by enhancing mutual benefits through cooperation in the environmental sector, which is a non-political field. In a situation where political exchanges are difficult, environmental cooperation has the advantage of being less burdensome as it can be conducted through local governments, private sector, or so-called 1.5 track exchanges. However, when examining the current state of domestic legislation for promoting the Green Detente as part of this policy, several limitations and problems have been identified. Firstly, our laws do not anticipate the divided situation and are not formulated to be applicable to North Korean areas. Nor is there a special law for the promotion of Green Detente. Even if there were such a law, it would not be simple to pre-emptively legislate for various unpredictable situations. Therefore, the most useful approach currently available is to create a legislative environment for the implementation of the Green Detente policy by revising laws, particularly those governing North-South relations and laws addressing environmental pollution and disaster preparedness. A brief examination reveals that the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, which regulates all areas of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, needs revision due to unnecessary and complex regulatory elements concerning environmental exchange and cooperation. Individual environmental laws lack the foundation for research and study on North Korean areas and nearly lack provisions considering the possibility of cooperation with North Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to legislate including plans for cooperation, investigation, and research on North Korean areas in the provisions for establishing basic plans in individual environmental laws. Additionally, provisions related to international cooperation may be difficult to apply to bilateral cooperation issues between North and South Korea. The revision of domestic laws should be done in a way that respects the basic principles of unification under the constitution, does not harm North-South relations, prepares for unification, and complies with international standards on environmental issues.

본 연구는 남 · 북한 유아교육과정을 비교 분석하여 통일대비 유아교육과정의 방향성 정립과 통합을 위한 시사점을 제시하는데 그 목적이 있다. 남 · 북한 유아교육과정 비교는 4가지 비교준거, 즉 유아교육목표, 유아교육과정 영역 및 일과 운영, 교수 · 학습방법, 평가의 측면에서 이루어졌다. 연구결과 남 · 북한 교육이념의 차이로 인해 다양한 영역에서 유사점보다는 차이점을 보였으며, 통일대비 유아교육과정 정립을 위해 다음과 같은 시사점을 도출하였다. 첫째, 남 · 북한 유아교육과정에서의 통합을 이루기 위해서는 교육의 고유한 기능과 목적을 반영한 새로운 교육이념 정립이 필요하다. 둘째, 남 · 북한 유아교육과정 영역 및 일과운영 비교에서 가장 차이를 보인 영역은 정치사상교육으로, 통일 후 정치사상교육을 통해 공고히 형성된 북한의 정치사상의식을 극복할 방안이 마련되어야 할 것이다. 셋째, 통일대비 남 · 북한 유아교육과정의 통합을 위해서는 유아교육과정에명시된 유아교육관련 용어정리 및 표준화작업이 이루어져야 할 것이다. 결론적으로 통일대비 남 · 북한 유아교육과정 비교에서 유사점을 보이는 영역부터 점진적인 통합을 시도하는 것이 필요하며, 남 · 북한 간 상호교류를 통해 이질성 극복을 위한 노력이 지속적으로 이루어져야 할 것이다.This study was conducted to compare and analyze the curriculum of early childhood education in South Korea and North Korea in order to establish the direction of early childhood curriculum. Based on this, the purpose of the study is to propose educational alternatives for possible integration. The comparison of North and South Korean early childhood education curriculum was conducted in terms of educational goals, early childhood curriculum area and daily management, teaching and learning methods, and assesment. As a result of the study, there were more differences found than similarities in various areas due to differences in the educational philosophy between South and North Korea, and the following implications were drawn. First, in order to integrate North and South Korea’s early childhood curriculum, a new educational ideology that reflects the unique function and purpose of education should be established first, and specific curriculum and contents should be developed accordingly. Second, the most significant difference in the content and operation of North and South Korean early childhood education curriculum is political ideology education, which is the most important content of the North Korean early childhood education course. Third, in order to integrate the South and North Korea early childhood education curriculum in preparation for unification, it is necessary to organize and standardize the terms related to early childhood education in order to unify them. In order to do this, it is necessary to try to integrate them gradually starting from areas showing similarities, and to endeavor to overcome discrepancies through mutual exchange between South and North Korea.