Introduction: the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the re-making of the European security order

This paper discusses security and development issues in Europe's recent history and immediate future. The issue is how the security system affects the pattern of economic development and, conversely, the long-run effects of development on security. To understand this relationship a longer historical perspective is needed. Too much attention has been given to the EC `1992 project' compared to the more unplanned `integration' or political homogenization of greater Europe. Three distinct phases in terms of security orders are distinguished: the Hundred Years' Peace (1815-1914), the Cold War security system (1949-89) and an emerging system called the New European Security Order. We are at present entering a turbulent transition period in which several paths are open. A number of risk factors are identified and analysed. The way the security order is established and immediate security crises managed will influence the possibilities of developing a stable peace order, defined as a structure free from major contradictions and low conflict propensity. A European Peace Order, as distinct from a European Security Order, would presuppose a global peace order, the crucial feature of which will be regionalization on various levels of the world system in accordance with the model of `benign mercantilism', including Europe itself, where subregionalism may emerge as a new form of balance of power politics as an alternative to Pax Germanica.

This chapter asks if the European security order will crumble, definitively, as a result of the full-scale war of aggression that the Russian Federation unleashed against Ukraine in late February 2022. The analysis begins with the historical emergence of a European security order in the aftermath of the Second World War, with NATO and a nascent EU at its core. It proceeds with an account of how the Kremlin directly challenged European security arrangements in recent years, as well as of how the EU, NATO, and like-minded countries around the world responded to Russia’s aggression, first by introducing sweeping sanctions and subsequently by offering humanitarian, economic and military assistance to Ukraine. The chapter ends by predicting that the issue regarding the continent’s security order will be resolved on the battlefield and that future security arrangements may have to exclude Russia altogether.

List of Tables and Maps - Preface - Introduction - The New Europe - Strategic Options for East-Central Europe - Poland - Czechoslovakia and After - Hungary - East-Central Europe and the New European Security Order - Conclusion - Endnotes - Index

The article examines the sustainability and adaptability of European security institutions, structures and organizations in the context of the fundamental and qualitative change of the post-Helsinki European security order. Suggestions are presented for managing the Ukraine crisis by military and political restraint, the observance of the Helsinki Decalogue of principles and by upgrading executive mechanisms of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (osce). In a new European security order, the core political components would be constituted by the inviolability of frontiers and the incontestability of internal political order. In broader international change, the relative decrease of the role of old powers has to be accommodated with the growing clout of emerging powers. Since most of the conflicts take place within the States and not between them the risks and new threats have to be dealt with by transformed and upgraded security institutions adapted to the new security environment. At the same time, there is a manifested lack of interests by the great powers to rely on multilateral security institutions unless they are used as instruments in pursuing their own strategies. The new common security arrangement for the West and Russia has to reconcile the adversary national security interests within the Euro-Atlantic Security Forum.

The European peace and security order is facing an existential crisis. Its value anchors - democracy, collaboration and integration - are at stake and may seriously weaken due to increasing tendencies of fragmentation and re-nationalization. Such risks are high, because of the weakening of the European Union, an emerging new Cold War, and the erosion of the European arms control regime. However, the current crisis may also result in renewed awareness that more preserving and building of regimes are needed, as well as attainable if collaborative patterns prevail.

ABSTRACTThe article analyses the conflict between the EU and Russia over Ukraine and other countries in the common neighbourhood as a collision between two visions of European order: the liberal norms-based order, as perceived and represented by the EU, and Russia’s pursuit of a multipolar international order where major powers are entitled to a privileged role in their adjacent regions. It makes an analytical distinction between three dimensions of the conflict: first, the norms and values of political order; second, economic order, in other words the norms regulating economic activity; and third, European security order and, more broadly, the norms of international security. There are profound disagreements between the EU and Russia along each dimension. It is misleading to call the conflict ‘geopolitical’, if geopolitics is understood in the realist spirit as a zero-sum battle over who controls the region. What is at the core of the conflict is the norms and values of European order which define inter alia Ukraine’s place in Europe.

On 29 November 2009, the Kremlin published the draft of a legally binding European security treaty on its website. The initiative launched by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 for the rearrangement of Europe’s security order thus reached its preliminary and unexpected climax, or perhaps an inconclusive endpoint. At their core, Medvedev’s proposals aim at a codification of NATO’s current borders, a recovery of Russian influence in the so-called “near abroad,” and the establishment of legally binding “rules of the game” going forward in the realm of maintaining peace and stability in Europe. Two factors of the Russian initiative are particularly salient. On the one hand, it repeats established Russian claims from the 1990s, often word-for-word; on the other, this hasty presentation of a sloppily drawn-up treaty has forced the West into a dialogue that, for all its desirability, risks becoming rapidly exhausted. All this is happening against the background of the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and the offer made to Russia by the United States of a fresh start in their bilateral relations. The treaty’s strange lack of substance coupled with its political unfeasibility makes it particularly hard to know what to do with the Russian initiative. Does the Kremlin simply want to reissue existing Russian demands, or could Medvedev’s initiative be the starting point for a renewed dialogue about common security in Europe?

(1991). Perspectives for a new European security order after the end of the cold war. Journal of European Integration: Vol. 14, No. 2-3, pp. 103-124.

This article looks at ‘the permanent dialogue’ between ‘Realist’ and ‘Utopian’ thinking in the context of the major developments which are taking place in contemporary European security. The author argues that after the dominance of ‘Realism ‘ in both theory and practice during the Cold War, a resurgence of ‘Utopian’ thinking has taken place since the events of 1989, which has had a significant impact on the architecture of European security. The main thrust of the argument, however, is that despite the contradictions between the two approaches, both have a role to play in attempts to build a new European security order.

We investigate the impact of historically rooted domestic constructions of purpose and ambition on the patterns of discord and collaboration in the Franco-American relationship over the course of the postwar and post-cold war periods. We stress the importance and tenacity of domestic historical constructions for explaining and understanding the foreign policy strategies that would otherwise confound a power-based analysis. The Franco-American bilateral relationship, in particular, illustrates the persistence and tenacity of each nation's historically constructed foreign policy conception during the bipolar distribution of power during the cold war and the contested unipolarity of the post-cold war era. We conclude with an assessment of the salience and relevance of domestic elements of foreign policy role and purpose for explaining and understanding how their bilateral relationship has affected the European security order into the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Chapter 8, ‘Russia and the European Security Order: Impact and Implications of the Ukraine Crisis’, by John Berryman, provides an important lead in to the issue of the impact of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. He tracks in some detail 20 years of NATO’s encroachment eastward and the growing challenges that the West has generated to Russia’s sense of security, which he points out is the driving force in more recent Russian assertiveness.

The process which started with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has caused a deep stress in the European security order. Russia has not only threatened the European security architecture, but for the first time, Russia has openly challenged it through its actions. As such, the war in Ukraine was a turning point in both international relations and European security policy. Accordingly, the European Union (EU) has altered its foreign and security policy. Until then, the EU had acted within the framework of its responsibility to protect the security of its members through a normative structure and peaceful methods, representing a multilateral world order as a peace project. However, post-February 2022, it has adopted a power-oriented policy. Increased cooperation with NATO, the will to break all kinds of existing dependencies, strict sanctions ranging from economy to energy policy, and the increase in the use of military force have been indicators that Europe has entered a transformation. After 2022, its attempt to influence international relations and the international system with more solid means has demonstrated that the EU is an actor that does not completely abandon its liberal and constructivist identity but reacts realistically. This article analyzes how Russia’s attack on Ukraine entailed a change for Europe within the debate of the realism and constructivism The process which started with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has caused a deep stress in the European security order. Russia has not only threatened the European security architecture, but for the first time, Russia has openly challenged it through its actions. As such, the war in Ukraine was a turning point in both international relations and European security policy. Accordingly, the European Union (EU) has altered its foreign and security policy. Until then, the EU had acted within the framework of its responsibility to protect the security of its members through a normative structure and peaceful methods, representing a multilateral world order as a peace project. However, post-February 2022, it has adopted a power-oriented policy. Increased cooperation with NATO, the will to break all kinds of existing dependencies, strict sanctions ranging from economy to energy policy, and the increase in the use of military force have been indicators that Europe has entered a transformation. After 2022, its attempt to influence international relations and the international system with more solid means has demonstrated that the EU is an actor that does not completely abandon its liberal and constructivist identity but reacts realistically. This article analyzes how Russia’s attack on Ukraine entailed a change for Europe within the debate of the realism and constructivism frameworks. In this context, the authors attempt to reveal the transformation of the EU after 2022, which has now been accepted as a turning point, and how the process of building a common foreign and security policy has shaped the future of Europe.

This chapter describes the immediate cultural and societal context of discovery in the foreground of the publication of the first modern crime statistical report in France (1827). Drawing on De Graaf’s study on ‘European Security Order’, the chapter discusses the post-Napoleonic settlement not as period of stagnation, but rather as an era of innovation and optimism. Many of the key participants in the emergence of data-driven criminology saw a crime drop linked to the civilizing process. The century-long debate on the moral consequences of civilization forced the moment to its crisis, climaxing in Charles Dupin’s coropleth map (1826) and the first national crime statistic (1827). These innovations aimed at settling the morality–civilization debate with an empirical social science basis.

In this article, we identify the points of convergence, divergence and parallelism in the various security architectures on offer by the major powers; seek to place those architectures along the continuum of security system outcomes; and explore the issue of institutional choice in the contemporary European security order. We also address a set of questions derived from the institutional requirements of the European security order. Does the emerging European security order demonstrate the characteristics of regime congruence and interdependence? What lessons can be drawn from the institutional configurations within the economic and military-political components defining the security problematique in post-Cold War Europe? Must there be a parallel construction of the economic and military institutions of the European security order?

In this article, we identify the points of convergence, divergence and parallelism in the various security architectures on offer by the major powers; seek to place those architectures along the continuum of security system outcomes; and explore the issue of institutional choice in the contemporary European security order. We also address a set of questions derived from the institutional requirements of the European security order. Does the emerging European security order demonstrate the characteristics of regime congruence and interdependence? What lessons can be drawn from the institutional configurations within the economic and military-political components defining the security problematique in post-Cold War Europe? Must there be a parallel construction of the economic and military institutions of the European security order?