Introduction: Criminal Law

Abstract

It is hardly surprising that philosophers have long regarded the criminal law as fertile ground. As the most visible application of state power, the criminal law raises issues of the first importance to political philosophy: issues of liberty, justice, and the common good. In announcing and enforcing rules of behaviour the criminal law connects with the concerns of moral philosophers, who have paid particular attention to the justification of punishment and the moral basis of criminal responsibility. Lastly, since the criminal law is typically concerned with the actions of human beings, it raises issues in the philosophy of action. Philosophers have devoted much attention to such central criminal law concepts as voluntariness, intention, and causation.The essays collected here explore topics which fall into three broad groups: the interests protected by the criminal law, the relation of agents to outcomes, and defenses to otherwise criminal conduct. Criminal law protects certain types of interests against certain kinds of invasions. Not everything that sets back a person’s interests is subject to legal sanction. Among those interests that the law deems worthy of protection, only certain kinds of invasions merit criminalization. The papers by Marshall and Duff, Hampton, Lacey, and Brett all touch on issues of the moral basis of criminalization. Marshall and Duff focus on the general issue of criminalization, arguing that crimes merit a certain kind of public response because they are attacks on the public. Drawing out the implications of the familiar fact that the state is a party to a criminal proceeding, they argue that the criminal law appropriately addresses wrongs that are shared by the wider community. For Marshall and Duff, criminalization is about deciding that a wrong against one person is serious in a way that makes it a wrong against everyone in the community, and demands a collective response.