Abstract
Abstract It is usually taken for granted that if a is better than b , and b is better than c , then a is better than c . In other words, betterness is normally thought to be a transitive relation. Transitivity is a crucial assumption in theories of value aggregation and measurement, and it appears essential for normative theories, as well. Arguably, any plausible moral theory puts some weight on promoting the good. If betterness is not always transitive, it may be that option a has a better outcome than option b , and b has a better outcome than option c , but c has a better outcome than a . In such a case, the requirement to promote the good provides no guide to action.
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