Abstract
In his article, 'An objection to Smith's argument for internalism' (1996), Alexander Miller argues that Michael Smith fails to explain the 'striking fact' that a change in motivation follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral judgement. Miller does not challenge Smith's claim that the externalist cannot explain this striking fact; only that internalism is in no better shape than externalism in this respect. The sort of internalism Smith defends claims that the following is a conceptual truth:
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