Intergovernmental relations in German federalism: Cooperative federalism, party politics and territorial conflicts

Abstract

Since the late 1970s, but especially since Unification in 1990, the German federal system has come under considerable stress. On the one hand, party competition is increasingly played out through the Bundesrat, the body representing the Lander governments at the federal level, making intergovernmental coordination more difficult and leading to accusations of ‘Reformstau’ (reform log jam). On the other hand, Unification not only added five new Lander to the system, but also led to economic disparities between the Lander at a hitherto unknown level, and deepened territorial conflicts over Lander competencies and the allocation of finances. Both developments have led to demands for a reform of the federal structure aimed at disentangling joint policymaking structures to ensure greater autonomy for both the federal level and the Lander. However, as the article will argue, the developments have resulted in a triangular constellation of interests between the federal level, the richer and the poorer Lander that makes reforming the system almost impossible.