Intergenerational justice and the family

Abstract

Until quite recently, intergenerational justice has been a neglected topic. Yet the writings of recent moral philosophers devote considerably more attention to problems of intergenerational justice. This is prompted by the realization that we have the power to affect significantly the lives of future persons. In additio n, the aging of our society has turned attention in the opposite direction and prompted philosophers to consider the source and scope of obligations that younger persons owe to older generations. Although the problem of justice between extant generations is usually considered separate from the problem of justice between present and future generations, I will consider these problems in tandem, using the phrase "justice between generations" to refer to both issues. In this essay my concem will not be the practical one of specifying the content and scope of intergenerational obligations. Instead, I investigate the possible bases of intergenerational justice claims. I begin by examining the bases of justice in the more common case involving members within the same generation. I then turn to intergenerational justice and argue that the framework invoked for the more standard case cannot be carried over. I propose instead that a quite different set of premises support intergenerational justice. The broader question to be asked is whether rendering an account of justice consistent throughout requires altering the basis of justice more generally. I show that a range of altematives merits careful attention.