Institutionalizing Redundancy: Establishing a Saudi Arabian Military Reserve Component

: This monograph examines the current organizational structure and employment of the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Reserve Force, to research the possibility of increasing force readiness through command reorganization and implementation of a reserve employment strategy. The historical significance of the Reserve Component illustrates the changes in the reserve force imposed by a changing strategic environment. Important to this study was the role the Reserve Component has played the throughout history and its ability to adapt to world wars and peacetime environments. The end of the Cold War created a change in the strategic environment that required the military to adapt to full spectrum operations around the globe. The Department of Defense initiated the Total Force Policy as a method to integrate all resources, Active, Reserve, and National Guard, and meet increasing objectives with a smaller force. This monograph examines the current reserve force structure and employment of the Army and Navy to illustrate the service commitment to the Total Force Policy. The Army and Navy organize their Reserve Components to assume a more active role and reduce the operational tempo of the active force. The U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) organizes and employs reserve forces in the same manner as the active SF Groups. The SF methodology for organization and employment offers possible changes for NSW to implement. The current NSW organizational structure and employment strategy illustrate the underutilized reserve resource and the possibility of applying the lessons learned from the SF. This monograph concludes that NSW can enhance force readiness through the reorganization and employment if its reserve force. The total NSW force active and reserve components, can provide better support to theater CINCs.

This research uses a qualitative approach with a case study method to explore lessons that can be drawn from Russia's experience in building an effective military reserve component. The article discusses the importance of establishing a robust and effective reserve force in Indonesia, drawing lessons from Russia's experiences and strategies employed by other nations. It emphasizes the need for a well-structured organization, clear command structures, efficient hierarchies, and regular training programs. The integration of technology and information systems, as well as the provision of welfare and incentives, is also highlighted as essential components for enhancing the effectiveness and readiness of Indonesia's reserve forces. The document also emphasizes the necessity of clear regulations and policies to provide a strong legal framework, ensuring the operational effectiveness and integrity of Indonesia's reserve forces. Additionally, it underscores the importance of integrating reserve components with regular forces through joint exercises, standardized doctrines, and operational procedures. The document concludes by emphasizing the opportunity for Indonesia to design a resilient reserve force by learning from Russia's challenges and strategies employed by other nations, ensuring the creation of a large, effective, well-trained, and deployable reserve force to balance and strengthen the overall national defense system.

: Five years into our nation's first protracted conflict since the advent of the all volunteer force, we must reaffirm our investment in the current and projected Reserve force role. To do this, we must take a look at a few key Reserve Component (RC) policies and practices that have emerged since the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Three, in particular, which warrant examination are: the method by which combatant commander requirements are generated and access to mobilize Reserve forces is granted, the effort to rebalance the force in order to reduce the strain on Reserve forces, and the judicious and prudent use of Reserve force policy. These policies must be considered to determine if they, along with the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF's) method of providing metered access to Reserve force units and service members to meet Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements, support long term best practices when it pertains to joint operational warfare.

The main purpose of this article is to analyze domestic cases where reserve forces were mobilized during national crises and to propose strategies for enhancing reserve force operational capabilities. Specifically, this study examines mobilization cases in counter-infiltration operations and disaster response. Based on this analysis, it proposes measures to strengthen reserve forces' capabilities in the legal, personnel management, and training domains. In shut, from a legal perspective, the article suggested integrating crisis management legislation to enable timely mobilization of reserve forces. Regarding personnel management, the research proposes that the part-time reserve forces system, which has contributed significantly to combat readiness, should be further developed so that reserve personnel can perform roles at the active duty level during crises. In terms of training and education, it is vital to evolve into a mission-specific, tailored training system, establishing scientific training methods and facilities to enhance combat capabilities effectively.

Abstract: Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) costing model suggests Active and Reserve forces cost about the same. Thus, many of the assumptions about the cost-effectiveness of Reserve Components may need a closer look. Budget Cycles we close the book on one of America's longest military engagements, the battle for shrinking resources is growing more intense. But what risk can we realistically assume before we place US security interests in jeopardy? Many solutions call for the Army to move more of its capabilities to the Reserve Component. However, the cost savings may not be as great as we might think. This article explores some of those costs through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) costing model. Cost-Effective Reserve Components National Guard Bureau 2013 Posture Statement: Security America Can Afford states The National Guard is the DOD's most cost effective component. One of the reasons listed is that 11% of the Army Budget, the Army National Guard provides 32% of the Army's total personnel and 40% of its operating forces. (1) United States Army Reserve 2013 Posture Statement makes a similar claim: As the Army's only Federal Operational Reserve Force, the Army Reserve provides a cost-effective way to mitigate risk to national security. For only 6 percent of the Army budget, the Army Reserve provides almost 20 percent of the Total Force. (2) Clearly, the percentage of total force provided by each reserve component is correct. However, statements about percent of the Army budget need to be qualified. They hold true when viewing the Army budget purely from an appropriations-sponsor perspective, but the Army pays for several National Guard and Army Reserve expenses through active Army appropriations. Here are a few examples: * Other Procurement of Army (OPA) appropriation is used to purchase new equipment for all three components. Army may buy 50 new trucks and allocate ten to the ARNG and ten to the USAR. cost of new equipment is not included in reserve component appropriations. * Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation pays the overhead costs of operating ten rotations per year at the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). National Guard uses one rotation per year at each center and pays its own military personnel costs and a portion of the OM (2) establish common Army costing baselines to compare Active and Reserve Component costs; and (3) gain leadership agreement (AC, ARNG, and USAR) so those leaders could accurately engage the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other agencies outside the department. …

This study focuses on the size of reserve forces and the factors affecting their size. As a result of analyzing theory and prior research, we identified the relations between standing and reserve forces. To minimize the problem of relations, we used a two-stage least squares estimate with simultaneous equations as the analytical method used. We utilized the 2022 cross-sectional data points and analyzed the sample by dividing it into 69 countries and 38 countries with reserve forces. In 38 countries, the reserve force size derived from regression analysis was 2.2 million people, and the standing force size was 470,000 people. The empirical analysis shows that 2.2 million reserve forces solved the single-equation estimation problem caused by the two-way causal relationship between reserve force size and standing force size through simultaneous equations, which further improved the consistency of the estimated coefficients. In terms of size, it was smaller than the 2.75 million presented in Defense Reform 2.0, which seems to be due to the analysis of countries with relatively capital-intensive military structures compared with Korea. Various factors are expected to further increase the size of future reserve forces: the rapid decline in the nation’s birth population; the proportion of defense spending to the government’s budget; the reserve forces, which have been further expanded by Defense Reform 2.0; and the prospect of a reduction in standing forces expected by Defense Innovation 4.0. Therefore, the size of future appropriate reserve forces will increase further than the current appropriate level, making it necessary to determine policies related to reserve forces and develop appropriate measures for procurement.

: The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to the Reserve components and provides independent and timely advice and recommendations on the challenges they face. The Secretary has asked the board to support transformation, rebalance and strengthen the Reserve components, and assist the Reserve in reconnecting with America. The board usually meets quarterly and reports annual to Congress. It consists of 24 members including the Chairman, the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of each military department, and flag and general officers from active and Reserve forces and the Coast Guard. The regular officers are designated by their respective service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff names the military executive, and the Secretary of Defense designates the Reserve officers. Congress has repeatedly stated its duties that the board act independently in its advisory and reporting roles--a position steadfastly maintained and more important than ever due to increased reliance on Reserve forces and mobilizations in support of the war on terrorism.

The trends discussed above are likely to continue. The American active-duty armed forces are unlikely to grow larger and are probably going to get smaller. They are likely to be more professionalized and career oriented and hence older and with higher numbers of married personnel. There will be continued pressures on the defense budget, and budget allocations are likely to go to hardware acquisition and to deferred maintenance rather than to personnel (including family) programs. Noncash benefits to families are declining as is retired pay. The job security that used to be a strong incentive for career personnel is threatened. The smaller force is likely to continue to be called upon to perform a large number of out-of- area missions, including peacekeeping and fighting terrorism, contributing to frequent family separation as a characteristic of military service. Where possible, reserve forces will increasingly be used to supplement the active forces on these missions, thus making separation a more common characteristic of service in the reserve components as well. At the same time, the armed forces, which have in past years assumed more responsibility for the well-being of the families of their personnel than have most employers, are increasingly likely to regard military families as apart from, rather than a part of, the military community, as increasing numbers of military spouses pursue their own careers and increasing numbers of military families live off-post and receive their basic services, from education and health to recreation and entertainment, from outside the military.

Mental Health Issues of Women Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan

This chapter presents a forward-looking assessment of the Middle East through 2029 using scenario planning methodology. Building on three key axes of uncertainty—US engagement, internal state stability, and regional security dynamics—the analysis generates eight possible futures, synthesized into four overarching archetypes. Each archetype is explored in detail, highlighting strategic implications for major actors including the United States, Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), Jordan and Egypt, fragile and transitional states (Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq), and non-Arab regional powers (Iran and Turkey). Rather than offering predictions, the scenarios are designed to challenge assumptions, illuminate emerging risks, and inform adaptive policy responses. This chapter underscores that durable regional stability is more likely to emerge from pragmatic cooperation and political moderation than ideological rigidity or external dominance. It concludes with strategic signposts to guide ongoing monitoring and decision-making in an increasingly fragmented and unpredictable Middle Eastern landscape.

Since 1949 military expenditures in the Middle East have grown at a rapid rate and are now large in dollar volume. For instance, from 1949-1969, military expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 14 percent for the Middle Eastern Nations (UAR, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon) as compared to a rate of 7 percent for the United States, 4.6 percent for France, 4.1 percent for the Soviet Union and 1.6 percent for the United Kingdom. And in 1970, the dollar value of these expenditures (in millions of 1960 United States dollars) were: Israel (1268), UAR (1043.9), Iran (619.5), Saudi Arabia (387), Iraq (202.4), Syria (157.8), Jordan (76.4), Kuwait (70), Lebanon (45.1), Yemen (14), or a total of $3884.1 million for all of these countries combined.' In more recent years, leading up to the recent war, these military expenditures have again grown rapidly and for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran, the growth rate has been even more phenomenal.2

: Since the early 1990s the frequency and extent of reserve component utilization has increased significantly. The United States no longer goes to war without its reserve components. The Army Reserves has changed from a strategic reserve force, only called up in the event of a World War III scenario, to an operational reserve force utilized anytime active forces are employed across the spectrum of military operations. Changes to the reserve component retirement benefits are warranted in light of the change in use of the reserves. This paper examines several of the proposed changes to the reserve components retirement benefits. First, I will review the reserve component military retirement system origin and purpose, and then I will examine what purpose the reserve retirement system serves now. Then I will briefly discuss the proposed changes and examine which system, either the existing system or one of those proposed, is best to meet the current purpose of the reserve component retirement system. For comparison sake reference to active duty benefits and specifically retirement benefits are included to frame the discussion concerning reserve retirement benefits.

: Before Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S), the last major mobilization of reservists occurred almost 50 years ago during the Korean conflict. Thus, reservists serving in the Selected Reserve Components before 1990 had largely no experience with a large-scale reserve mobilization. In fact, the likelihood of a reserve mobilization was probably viewed as so remote that it played almost no role in decisions to join or remain in the reserve forces. The ODS/S mobilization, and the subsequent involvement of reservists in various other operations, ranging from the Army Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Initiative to the current effort in Bosnia, have changed this perception in important ways. It is clear that the Reserve Components are expected to play an important role in responding to regional crises, as well as in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations. For instance, since 1991, Reserve Component members were activated or volunteered to support Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti), Provide Promise and Deny Flight (Bosnia), Restore Hope (Somalia), Southern Watch (Southern Iraq), and Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq). Mobilizations are likely to be more frequent in the future and are likely to have important effects on reservists' attitudes and the degree of support they receive from their families and civilian employers.

Objectives: Atrial fibrillation (AF) is the most common cardiac arrhythmia, and accounts for one-third of hospitalizations for cardiac disturbances. The majority of data on management of AF patients are from western countries, with limited information available from the Middle East region. The objective of this study was to characterize treatment patterns and health resource utilization among AF patients in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE). METHODS: A retrospective chart review was undertaken at three hospitals in UAE and three in KSA, to identify AF patients diagnosed between January 2005 and June 2010. Patient charts were sampled consecutively backwards by diagnosis date, from June 2010 until the target sample was reached. AF was identified based on ICD-9 code (427.31), from a sample of patients defined by any history of anticoagulant use. Data on demographic and disease-related characteristics, treatment patterns, health resource utilization, and international normalized ratio (INR) control were abstracted from diagnosis until June 2012. AF was categorized as chronic (persistent, long-standing or permanent) or paroxysmal. RESULTS: Among eligible AF patients (UAE, n=157, KSA, n=152), the mean age at diagnosis was 69 years in UAE and 66 years in KSA. Male patients comprised 52.9% of the UAE sample and 48.7% of the KSA sample. The majority were diagnosed with chronic AF (80.9% in UAE, 63.7% in KSA) and had a CHADS 2 score ≥2 at diagnosis (77.1% in UAE, 71.1% in KSA). Treatments prescribed to AF patients differed between countries: warfarin monotherapy was widely used in UAE (59.9%); while a variety of warfarin- and aspirin-based combination therapies were used in KSA, with no single dominant regimen. Warfarin + bisoprolol (12.5%) and aspirin + bisoprolol (10.5%) combination therapies were the most common regimens in KSA. Patterns of health care utilization also varied. In KSA, 29.6% of patients were hospitalized, and 30.9% visited the emergency room, compared to 8.9% and 11.5%, respectively, in UAE. Outpatient visits were more frequent in UAE, with a mean of 1.0 visits per patient per year, compared to 0.3 visits per patient per year in KSA. In both regions, the most common clinical outcome was ischemic/unspecified stroke, with an incidence of 7.0% in UAE and 5.3% in KSA. CONCLUSIONS: Patients with AF in UAE and KSA were relatively young compared to age distributions reported in other regions. Treatments and health resources used by AF patients varied between KSA and UAE. Warfarin monotherapy was widely used in UAE, while a variety of monotherapy and combination therapy regimens were used in KSA. Health care resource utilization was high in this population, particularly hospitalization rates in KSA. While some differences may result from differences in patient and disease characteristics, they likely also reflect variation in management strategies across the regions.

The relationship between military expenditures and economic growth has been widely studied in the literature. However, there are no studies focusing on the relationship between military expenditures and economic freedom in the literature. In countries with high levels of economic freedom, democratic regime transitions are more comfortable. Therefore, military expenditures are expected to decrease as potential internal turmoil, and external threats will be reduced in countries with high economic freedom. This study examines the relationship between military expenditures and economic freedom in 13 MENA countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey) during the period 1996-2018 by using panel data analysis. It was found that economic growth, tax burden, and trade freedom had a positive impact on military expenditures. It was also concluded that property rights, monetary freedom, government integrity, and investment freedom negatively affected military expenditures. Besides, it is understood that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between military expenditures and tax burden, property rights, monetary freedom, government integrity, investment freedom, and business freedom. On the other hand, there is a unidirectional causality relationship from economic growth to military expenditures and from military expenditures to trade freedom.