Institutional Analysis of China’s Historic Success in Eradicating Absolute Poverty: A Perspective of Political Economy

A report of residents living in extreme poverty level in Banyumas Regency required local government’s response through Extreme Poverty Reduction Program. Such poverty alleviation program consequently necessitated swift provision from the regional budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah/APBD). On the other hand, no budget had been allocated for the program during the budget year and the APBD was limited. The purpose of this study is to examine the responses of regional budget policy to the extreme poverty issue based on online news articles related to the subject. The study was conducted using content analysis methods and systematic literature reviews. The results show that the Banyumas government's response in addressing extreme poverty issue is relatively satisfactory. The local government responded with a regional budget policy by funding the program through Unexpected Expenditure (Belanja Tidak Terduga/BTT) budget item. Part of APBD, BTT was allocated as non-cash extreme poverty alleviation expenditure, while cash social assistance was to be sought to from the provincial and central government. Local governments do not have adequate budgetary capacity to independently finance extreme poverty alleviation programs and therefore require major support from the central and/or provincial government. A synergy between local, provincial and central governments is thus needed to better manage regional extreme poverty alleviation initiatives.

Indonesia municiple solid waste life cycle and environmental monitoring: current situation, before and future challenges

The hierarchical and descending trust pattern among Chinese citizens toward governments at all levels, characterized by a stronger trust in the central government and a weaker trust in local governments, often leads to the “Tacitus trap” in local government governance. As a new platform for public participation and local government supervision, can TV political programs improve the trust pattern of “intimate central government and alienate local government,” and achieve a balance of trust between the central and local governments? Using data from the Social Consciousness Survey Data of Netizens 2018, we conducted an empirical analysis of the impact of TV political programs on residents’ trust patterns toward different levels of government. The results of this study show that: first, the opening of TV political programs can significantly narrow the trust gap between the central and local governments. This primarily achieved by significantly increasing the level of trust that residents have in the provincial government. Second, influence mechanism reveals that the introduction of of TV political programs can reduce the residents’ trust gap between central and local governments mainly by bolstering government transparency, fortifying government responsiveness, and boosting residents’ political efficacy. Third, the heterogeneity analysis indicates that TV political programs can significantly improve the trust gap between central and local governments among various groups, including women, youth, democratic party members and the public, high digitalization ability, residents in the east and provincial capital cities. Fourth, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the opening of TV political programs significantly increase residents’ trust in the central government but do not significantly raise residents’ trust in local governments. This may, to some extent, reinforce the trend of “intimate central government and alienate local government” among the public .

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to: Analyse the role of Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) in alleviating poverty in Karnataka, India. Identify the challenges faced by PRIs in implementing poverty alleviation programs. Explore potential solutions to overcome these challenges and improve program effectiveness. Provide recommendations for strengthening the role of PRIs in poverty alleviation efforts. Theoretical reference: This paper draws on several theoretical frameworks, including: heories of poverty alleviation, focusing on the role of local governance and community participation. Theories of decentralization and the devolution of power to local governments. Theories of social justice and equity, emphasizing the need to address the root causes of poverty. Theories of sustainable development, highlighting the importance of integrating economic, social, and environmental considerations. Method: This research is primarily a doctrinal study, relying on a variety of primary and secondary sources: Primary Sources: Statutory enactments: Constitution of India, 1950, Central Government Schemes implemented by PRIs, The Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993. Policy documents: National Rural Development Policy, Karnataka State Rural Development Policy, Poverty alleviation scheme guidelines. Secondary Sources: Statistical analysis: Government reports and data sets, Research reports and surveys, Research publications: Peer-reviewed articles and books on poverty alleviation, local governance, and development. Case studies: Examples of successful poverty alleviation programs implemented by PRIs. Results: This research identified several key challenges faced by PRIs in implementing poverty alleviation programs in Karnataka: Corruption: Misuse of funds and resources hinders the effectiveness of programs and prevents benefits from reaching the intended beneficiaries. Caste: Deep-rooted social inequalities limit access to resources and opportunities for marginalized communities. Lack of awareness: Many people remain unaware of available schemes and benefits, leading to underutilization of resources. Limited capacity: PRIs often lack the necessary skills and resources to effectively plan, implement, and monitor programs. Lack of coordination: Poor coordination between different levels of government and stakeholders can lead to delays, duplication of efforts, and inefficient resource allocation. Despite these challenges, the research also identified several promising practices and potential solutions: Transparency and accountability: Initiatives like social audits and public hearings can improve transparency and hold PRI officials accountable for program outcomes. Community participation: Engaging communities in program design and decision-making can ensure programs are relevant and address local needs. Capacity building: Training programs can equip PRI officials with the necessary skills and knowledge to manage programs effectively. Technology and innovation: Utilizing technology can enhance program efficiency, data management, and communication with beneficiaries. Partnerships: Collaborations with NGOs, civil society organizations, and private sector can contribute resources, expertise, and innovation. Conclusion: PRIs play a crucial role in alleviating poverty in India. While they face numerous challenges, there are also promising solutions and opportunities for improvement. By investing in capacity building, promoting transparency, fostering community participation, and embracing technology and innovation, PRIs can be empowered to become more effective agents of poverty alleviation in Karnataka and beyond. Implications of research: This research has several key implications for policy and practice: The need for strengthened capacity building for PRI officials to improve program planning, implementation, and monitoring. The importance of enhancing transparency and accountability in the allocation and use of resources for poverty alleviation programs. The necessity for increased community participation in program design and decision-making to ensure programs are responsive to local needs and priorities. The need for better coordination between central, state, and local governments to ensure effective implementation of poverty alleviation programs. Originality/value: This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge on poverty alleviation by: Providing a detailed analysis of the role of PRIs in Karnataka, India, a context that is often overlooked in research. Identifying unique challenges faced by PRIs in implementing poverty alleviation programs. Offering practical recommendations for strengthening the role of PRIs and improving program effectiveness. Contributing to the understanding of how local governance can be leveraged to achieve sustainable poverty alleviation.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to: Analyse the role of Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) in alleviating poverty in Karnataka, India. Identify the challenges faced by PRIs in implementing poverty alleviation programs. Explore potential solutions to overcome these challenges and improve program effectiveness. Provide recommendations for strengthening the role of PRIs in poverty alleviation efforts. Theoretical reference: This paper draws on several theoretical frameworks, including: heories of poverty alleviation, focusing on the role of local governance and community participation. Theories of decentralization and the devolution of power to local governments. Theories of social justice and equity, emphasizing the need to address the root causes of poverty. Theories of sustainable development, highlighting the importance of integrating economic, social, and environmental considerations. Method: This research is primarily a doctrinal study, relying on a variety of primary and secondary sources: Primary Sources: Statutory enactments: Constitution of India, 1950, Central Government Schemes implemented by PRIs, The Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993. Policy documents: National Rural Development Policy, Karnataka State Rural Development Policy, Poverty alleviation scheme guidelines Secondary Sources: Statistical analysis: Government reports and data sets, Research reports and surveys, Research publications: Peer-reviewed articles and books on poverty alleviation, local governance, and development. Case studies: Examples of successful poverty alleviation programs implemented by PRIs Results: This research identified several key challenges faced by PRIs in implementing poverty alleviation programs in Karnataka: Corruption: Misuse of funds and resources hinders the effectiveness of programs and prevents benefits from reaching the intended beneficiaries. Caste: Deep-rooted social inequalities limit access to resources and opportunities for marginalized communities. Lack of awareness: Many people remain unaware of available schemes and benefits, leading to underutilization of resources. Limited capacity: PRIs often lack the necessary skills and resources to effectively plan, implement, and monitor programs. Lack of coordination: Poor coordination between different levels of government and stakeholders can lead to delays, duplication of efforts, and inefficient resource allocation. Despite these challenges, the research also identified several promising practices and potential solutions: Transparency and accountability: Initiatives like social audits and public hearings can improve transparency and hold PRI officials accountable for program outcomes. Community participation: Engaging communities in program design and decision-making can ensure programs are relevant and address local needs. Capacity building: Training programs can equip PRI officials with the necessary skills and knowledge to manage programs effectively. Technology and innovation: Utilizing technology can enhance program efficiency, data management, and communication with beneficiaries. Partnerships: Collaborations with NGOs, civil society organizations, and private sector can contribute resources, expertise, and innovation. Conclusion: PRIs play a crucial role in alleviating poverty in India. While they face numerous challenges, there are also promising solutions and opportunities for improvement. By investing in capacity building, promoting transparency, fostering community participation, and embracing technology and innovation, PRIs can be empowered to become more effective agents of poverty alleviation in Karnataka and beyond. Implications of research: This research has several key implications for policy and practice: The need for strengthened capacity building for PRI officials to improve program planning, implementation, and monitoring. The importance of enhancing transparency and accountability in the allocation and use of resources for poverty alleviation programs. The necessity for increased community participation in program design and decision-making to ensure programs are responsive to local needs and priorities. The need for better coordination between central, state, and local governments to ensure effective implementation of poverty alleviation programs. Originality/value: This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge on poverty alleviation by: Providing a detailed analysis of the role of PRIs in Karnataka, India, a context that is often overlooked in research. Identifying unique challenges faced by PRIs in implementing poverty alleviation programs. Offering practical recommendations for strengthening the role of PRIs and improving program effectiveness. Contributing to the understanding of how local governance can be leveraged to achieve sustainable poverty alleviation.

Have economic growth and institutional quality contributed to poverty and inequality reduction in Asia?

Chinese Abstract: 地方财政预算权是地方分权的核心内容，决定了地方政府能否自主地治理，并对中央的权力形成有效制衡，因此，其变迁具有深远的宪政意涵。从《预算法》文本上看，作为整体意义上的地方政府拥有了一定的预算自主权，但是在当下中国的法律和政治实践中，该项自主权的实质范围如何、受到何种来自中央的限缩抑或自身如何扩张，则是纵向分权上的重大问题，本文正围绕这一核心问题展开.本文首先梳理并重构地方预算自主权这一概念的内涵，由此建立起一个的新分析框架。由于我国地方预算自主权是在分税制改革的背景下形成的，本文回顾了分税制改革前我国地方财政权力收放的历史，以及改革后形成的“收入集权、支出分权”的央地财政分权模式.之后，本文结合法律文本和政治实践，通过对地方预算自主权的内容进行细致的分项分析，将目前地方预算的自主程度概括为“预算程序地方分权，预算收入中央集权，预算支出地方部分分权”。在这一框架下，主要的地方预算收入和支出决策权仍保留于中央，地方只有执行权和有限的决策权，中央集权的特征仍然明显，加之转移支付制度尚不够完善，造成了目前基层地方政府普遍的财政困境和预算不自主的现状.最后，本文剖析指出，地方预算自主权不足的根源，不仅在于财政宏观调控体系背后的中央优越性假设，也在于单一制国家结构形式下中央掌握着权力收放的最终决定权，以及地方政府欠缺在中央层面的政治参与权.如欲真正增强地方预算的自主权，靠技术化的预算改革难以解决这一问题，而需要对央地之间的纵向宪政权力架构作出改革，使中央和地方关系走向权力配置法治化、府际纠纷解决制度化，并保障地方在中央的政治参与权和规范化的利益表达渠道、充实地方人大的自治权力，最终从“单中心”的中央集权体制逐步走向“多中心”的地方自治.（本文刊载于《行政法论丛》2016年第18卷和《中国公共预算研究（第五届学术会议论文集）》（2014 · 北京），中央编译出版社2016年版，并获2016年蔡定剑宪法学优秀论文奖提名奖。）English Abstract: The vertical decentralization between central and local government is a key element of a state’s constitutional structure. Meanwhile, the local fiscal and budgetary autonomy is the central outcome of decentralization, which determines whether a local government could rule autonomously and forms an effective check and balance on the central government’s power. Therefore, the transition in local budgetary autonomy bears a profound constitutional implication. To some extent, the Chinese Budget Law has authorized budgetary autonomy to the local governments as a whole. However, it remains unclear that in China’s current legal and political practice, what is the substantial scope of this autonomy? How is it restricted by the central government? How does it endeavor to expend actively? These significant questions are closely related with the constitutional decentralization between central and local governments. This article is built around these central questions.In the beginning, this article systemizes and reconstructed the connotation of the concept “local budgetary autonomy”, on which a novel analyzing framework is based. As the local budgetary autonomy in China was formed in the context of Revenue-Sharing System Reform, this article reviewed the history of China’s local fiscal power before the reform, and the fiscal model of “centralized revenue, decentralized expenditure” between the central and local governments. The aim of the reform is to strengthen the central government’s fiscal extractive capacity, and to give some freedom in fiscal expenditure to the local governments. A transfer-payment-centered local fiscal and budgetary system is thus formed, and its process of funds flow can be concluded as “(local government) collecting tax -- (local government) turning over its revenue -- (central government’s) transfer payment”. These characteristics have profound influence on the development of local budgetary power.Based on the legal texts and political practice, this article then analyzed each branch of the local budgetary autonomy in detail (procedural budgetary autonomy, budgetary revenue autonomy and budgetary expenditure autonomy), and concluded the current local status as follows: the procedural budgetary autonomy is decentralized, the budgetary revenue autonomy is highly centralized, and the budgetary expenditure autonomy is half-decentralized. Under this framework, the main decision-making power of local budgetary revenue and expenditure still belongs to the central government, and the local governments merely have the executive power. Therefore, the whole fiscal and budgetary system is still highly centralized. In addition, there are many drawbacks of the transfer payment system. As a result, it is quite common that the local governments are facing fiscal troubles and lacking in budgetary autonomy.Finally, this article analyzed the root cause of local budgetary autonomy, and puts forward its solution in constitutional reform. After the Revenue-Sharing System reform, the transfer payment regime has been the central part of local fiscal and budgetary system, of which the underlying logic is that, it is more efficient that the central government controls local governments’ fiscal structure by means of the transfer payment system than the local fiscal self-government, because the central government can reduce the financial fluctuation and the economic development unbalancedness among local governments. This logic has determined that the general design of revenue-sharing system and transfer payment reform is inclined to be centralized, which is the root cause of the insufficient in local budgetary autonomy and has a great impact on local governments budgetary power. To strengthen the local budgetary autonomy, the state should conduct a profound reform on its vertical constructional structure instead of a technical one. This constitutional reform should legalize the central-local relations, apply judicial methods to solve central-local conflicts, empower the autonomous power of local People’s Congress and ensure that local governments have political participation right in central government. The ultimate goal is to realize the transition from a “unicentric” centralized constitutional system to a “polycentric” decentralized one.

This two-part paper provides a theoretical framework for appraising trade-offs between alternative methods of delegating authority over the delivery of public services, on the targeting and cost-effectiveness of public spending programs in developing countries. Authority over these programs has to be delegated owing to absence of information at the central level concerning local needs and costs of specific communities. In a top-down centralized system, this authority is delegated to bureaucrats by a central government that has limited ability to monitor their performance with respect to either service delivery or cost control. In a decentralized system, it is allocated instead to elected local governments or client groups, which may be subject to capture by local elites. Both systems are thus prone to local corruption and lack of accountability. Part 1 of the paper studies the relevant tradeoffs in the context of a poverty alleviation program, whose aim is to deliver a private merit good available on competitive markets to the poor. Decentralization generally dominates with respect to inter-community targeting as well as cost-effectiveness. However, the ranking of intracommunity targeting under the two systems is ambiguous, and depends on the relative degree of capture that local and national governments are prone to, besides the nature of uncertainty and preferences of the good by the nonpoor. Part 2 of the paper considers an infrastructure service provided by a public enterprise which has a natural monopoly. In this context it is shown that decentralization dominates if the following four conditions are satisfied: (i) local governments are not vulnerable to capture; (ii) local governments have access to adequate local financing sources; (iii) there are no interjurisdictional externalities in service provision; and (iv) local governments have all the bargaining power and access to relevant cost information vis-a-vis public enterprise managers. Absent any one of these institutional conditions, however, decentralization may perform worse than centralization. The Appendix develops a model of electoral competition (adapted from Grossman-Helpman (1996)) where parties are prone to capture by special interest groups, which helps identify some of the institutional determinants of the degree of capture of local and central governments.

Poverty is still one of the main problems for developing countries, including Indonesia. Indonesia is one of the developing countries which has quite a large number of poor people and needs to be resolved and find a way out until now. Various poverty reduction programs have been continuously carried out by both the central government and regional governments. This research aims to describe and analyze the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Policy from a Political Economy Perspective in Lamongan Regency. The research results show that the implementation of the Poverty Alleviation Policy in Lamongan Regency from a Political Economy Perspective has gone quite well. the entire series of Lamongan Regency Regional Regulation Number 16 of 2021 concerning poverty alleviation, home care service programs, RTLH and HAMP. The success of the Poverty Reduction Policy is strongly supported by the Lamongan Regency Regional Government and related Regional Apparatus Organizations by prioritizing collaboration.

Urban and social policy are formulated and implemented within the structure of the relations between central and local governments. The achievement of central government goals often requires action by local governments. The agendas of local governments are often set by the problems and opportunities created by central government action. The relationship between central and local governments is often seen as a trend toward increasing local autonomy or increasing central control. Finance is often assumed to be the key, whoever controls the purse strings. In Great Britain, as in many other countries, the increasing financial dependence of local government on central government has fueled a debate over the effect of central government finance on the relations between central and local government. One side of the debate is characterized in the conclusion of the Layfield Committee on Local Government Finance: We too believe that in the end he who pays the piper calls the tune.' In support of the Layfield Committee's position, G. W. Jones, has argued that central finance serves to extend central control because, first, central finance gives central government bureaucrats an excuse to become involved in regulating local policy and, second, that dependence on central government funding orients local government politicians towards Whitehall and away from their constituents.2 Opposing the view that central government finance inevitably leads to central control of local government are Ashford3 and Dearlove.4 Ashford finds, in a study of the relation between central government aid to local authorities and local authority budgets, that the level of central government aid is not a good predictor of local activity. He goes on to suggest that the complexity of the relationship between central and local government may be a serious hindrance to central control. For both Ashford and Dearlove, the increasing financial role of central government does not inevitably translate into central control; they do not argue that central government is without influence over local government but that finance does not directly lead to control. This paper will argue that control is not one-dimensional, that there are areas of local autonomy that can develop (or that are maintained) despite central government control of finance. The argument will be made by explicating one set of conditions under which local governments maintain their autonomy and by examining a case in British policy in which the predicted results obtain. Understanding the conditions under which local autonomy develops helps us to predict what the central state can actually accomplish. Such an analysis can also

China's poverty reduction miracle and relative poverty: Focusing on the roles of growth and inequality

Poor oral health is a public health issue in the United States, disproportionately affecting people in poverty. This cross-sectional study investigates the impact of reducing absolute and relative poverty on the prevalence of periodontitis, caries, and dental pain among US adults. Data from 13,139 adults aged 30 to 70 y who completed dental examinations in the 2011–2018 National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys were used. Periodontitis and dental caries outcomes were assessed with the 2011–2014 surveys (n = 6,563). Assessment of absolute and relative poverty was based on the poverty income ratio established by the US Census Bureau. Hypothetical counterfactual scenarios were emulated to assess the impact of poverty reductions (10%, 25%, and 50%) on periodontitis, dental caries, and dental pain. A targeted minimum loss–based estimator was used to estimate the outcomes under each scenario adjusted for age, sex, race, comorbidity, and marital status. Reductions in absolute and relative poverty were associated with a lower prevalence of oral disease. A 50% reduction in absolute poverty would avert 1.1 million cases of periodontitis, 0.4 million individuals with dental caries, and 0.6 million dental pain cases. A similar reduction in relative poverty would avert 5.4 million cases of periodontitis, 3.8 million individuals with caries, and 2 million cases of dental pain. The greatest impact was seen with a 50% relative poverty reduction: 12% reduction in periodontitis (prevalence ratio [PR], 0.88; 95% CI, 0.85 to 0.92), 13% reduction in caries (PR, 0.87; 95% CI, 0.81 to 0.92), and 18% reduction in frequent dental pain (PR, 0.82; 95% CI, 0.73 to 0.91). These findings highlight the potential of poverty reduction, especially relative poverty, to significantly lower the US oral disease burden and emphasize policy importance for reducing income inequality to achieve equitable oral health.

Introduction to the Special Section: Poverty and Inequality in China

Key issues of intergovernmental fiscal relations arise in all three aspects of Viet Nam's poverty alleviation strategy: Broad-based growth, human resource development, and safety nets. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that pro-poor expenditures (such as local infrastructure, health care, and education) reflect the preferences, needs, and fiscal abilities of different localities. The central government can ensure a minimum social safety net throughout the country by designing intergovernmental transfers accordingly. A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct elements: (1) identifying who the poor are, where they are located, and what they do, (2) analyzing why they are poor, (3) developing policies to improve their standards of living (usually aimed at accelerating economic growth and improving their income-earning opportunities), and (4) supplementing income-improving policies with direct safety net policies to increase the poor's short-term consumption entitlements. The precise mixture of capacity-improving investments and safety net policies appropriate for any country will depend on the country's income level, the extent and nature of its poverty problem, and many other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that the poverty alleviation policies adopted reflect the preferences, needs, and fiscal abilities of different regions of the country. The nature of that decentralization depends on the country. Pro-poor services throughout Viet Nam are underfunded. This problem is particularly acute in the poorer areas. Improvements in the system of intergovernmental finances could help ensure that each level of government, even in the poorer provinces, is adequately funded - and provided with sufficient expenditure and revenue raising autonomy - to support local investments and their operation and maintenance. Since poor provinces are less able to mobilize additional local revenues to support services, well-designed intergovernmental transfers are particularly important. Provinces must play a greater role both in raising revenues and in allocating expenditures, with incentives built in to ensure that they do so responsibly and efficiently. Local governments must - if they are to be held accountable for their actions - have some responsibility for determining local tax rates. This will allow them to vary rates to collect more revenues to finance higher levels of public services if they so choose, and at the same time allow the central government to design its transfers in such a way as to ensure that local fiscal efforts are not discouraged by the receipt of such transfers. Richer provinces will tend to collect greater revenues. When transfers are needed to finance local spending in poorer areas, they should provide incentives for local revenue mobilization and allow for some degree of equalization. Services deemed of national importance (for example, a minimum level of education, health care, and social relief) can be promoted by designing specific-purpose transfers. These services must be identified and varying matching requirements established for different provinces depending on such factors as their own revenue base and the cost of providing services in that province. This paper - a product of the Country Operations Division, East Asia and Pacific, Country Department I - is part of a larger effort in the department to develop a comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy for Viet Nam. This paper was prepared as a background document for the Viet Nam Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report 13442VN, January 1995.

A Study of Local Government in Africa through Participatory Action Research (PAR)