Initial articulations of a subculture: The performativities of dress and young Muslim males in Kasaragod, Kerala, on Instagram

Faced with myriad societal norms, children must decide which norms to accept and which to reject. These decisions hold consequences for how norms change over time. Decisions about norms are particularly salient for religious children in pluralistic societies, who encounter norms both from their own as well as from other religious and non-religious communities. Although children follow norms and disapprove of their violation from early in life, this should not be taken to mean that children approve of the norms themselves: a person can disapprove of a norm that they follow and enforce upon others. The present study examined religious children’s views about the authorship, utility, changeability, and changeworthiness of norms. Ninety-seven Hindu and Muslim 9- to 14-year-olds (46 female and 51 male) in India were interviewed about familiar religious, moral, and conventional norms. As predicted, children’s views about whether a norm should be changed (its changeworthiness) were predicted by how good they perceived the norm to be (its utility). Also as hypothesized, children’s views about who, if anyone, could change a norm (its changeability) was predicted by their views about who made the norm (its authorship). Children distinguished between norms based on their perceived authorship, utility, changeability, and changeworthiness. Age and religious differences also emerged. Together, these findings elucidate how children come to accept or reject norms, which ultimately affects how norms persist, change, or disappear over time.

The presence of young diasporic Muslim musicians in new media is already significant, but also continually rising. The explosion of MySpace and Facebook pages for diasporic Muslim bands is a case in point. It is tempting to stop at this moment, basking in this concrete new media presence. However, presence does not always beget position. And in this case, young Muslim males continue to be othered, exoticized, otherwise marginalized online and offline. The online presence of ‘Taqwacores’, a transnational diasporic punk music scene, serves as a space where these marginal essentialisms are contested. In the face of post-9/11 and 7/7 Islamophobia, Taqwacores’ cyberspaces have been viewed as ‘safe’ outlets for progressive activist Muslims to discuss and organize. Though the Internet’s role in growing Muslim musical youth subcultures is important, it is critical not to let this overshadow the role of these virtual spaces as cocoons where young Muslim males (especially marginalized ones) can creatively and freely express themselves. This chapter explores the continuing circulation of pejorative essentialisms of diasporic Muslim males (especially as ‘terrorist’/demonic ‘other’) and underlines the possibility of cyberspaces to function as meaningful and progressive Muslim social worlds which challenge these essentialisms both online and offline (a case in point for the anti-Islamophobic leanings of the Taqwacores). Almost a decade after 9/11 and some years after 7/7, Islamophobia in the UK,US and other Western states sadly continues to flourish. Fuelled by the ongoing Anglo-American ‘War on Terror’, Muslims, especially young Muslim males, continue to be othered/marginalized at best and demonized/violently attacked at worst. Furthermore, the diverse cultures and cultural products of diasporic and non-diasporic Islamic cultures are reductively conflated with stereotypical invocations of an imagined, homogenous ultra-Orthodox Islam. This chapter examines the case of one subcultural scene in which young diasporic South Asian Muslim males are resisting these essentialisms through music which they term ‘Muslim punk’. This scene, known as the ‘Taqwacores’, began its life in suburban Boston, USA, but its most critical ‘spaces’ are mediated by the Internet. This chapter explores the online presence of the Taqwacores on social networking/social media sites – especially Facebook and Twitter – to understandhow new digitally mediated collective Muslim youth identities combine piety and protest in deterritorialized spaces within the Internet. Post-9/11 and 7/7, Islamophobia has been on the rise in the West (AshencaenCrabtree et al. 2008; Dunn et al. 2007; Malik 2006; Popoviciu and Mac an Ghaill 2004). Muslim men have been specifically demonized as being terrorist/ extremist (Virdee et al. 2006; Dwyer et al. 2008) or uncontrollably sexually aggressive (Hubbard 2005). In Britain, this has also resulted in institutional racism, including a sharp increase in the number of house arrests of Muslim men (Brittain 2009). In the US, violent and sometimes lethal attacks against Muslim men have risen sharply (Curiel 2008). The positioning of Muslims as a dangerous/unwanted ‘other’ has become pervasive, embedded within dominant Western media, political and religious discourses. Notably, Pope Benedict XVI in a speech at the University of Regensburg in 2006 framed Islam as a violent religion in stark opposition to the enlightenment of Western religious traditions.2 This construction of Islam as an essential dichotomous other has real consequences for young Muslims (Malik 2006). Media portrayals, as Poole and Richardson (2006) observe, continue to demonize Muslim males. In April 2009, the popular American TV show ‘Lie to Me’ ran an episode in which a Washington, DC-based mosque was accused of being home to an AlQaeda splinter cell. In the episode, all young Muslim males were sharply essentialized as terrorist/fanatical extremists. This Islamophobic gaze in America continues to retain staying power. As Curiel (2008: xii-xiii) observes, a Gallup poll in 2006 revealed that almost a third of those polled felt American Muslims were sympathetic to Al-Qaeda and a 2007 Newsweek poll showed that 41 per cent of those surveyed believe that ‘Muslim culture glorifies suicide’. The post-9/11 gaze grew to such a level that Mahmood (2002) felt compelled to write an anti-essentialist book entitled Islam Beyond Terrorists and Terrorism. In 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten controversially publishedcomics depicting the prophet Mohammed, including clear references to Islam as a religion of terrorists (Brun 2008). The publication of these led to widespread protests by Muslims around the world. Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2007: 154-7) argue that these media depictions of Islam collectively constitute a ‘mythology’, in which Islam and terror become conflated. Writing in the wake of the urban disturbances in the northern British cities of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001, Louise Archer (2001: 81) argues that ‘Muslim young men are increasingly being defined as militant and aggressive, intrinsically fundamentalist, ultimate Others’ (cited in Dwyer et al. 2008: 117). Following Foucault’s (Foucault and Sheridan 1972) theory of discursive relationality, Western Islamophobia has become constituted as a system of discursive statements, relationally networked and maintained through complex hegemonic structures of power. In this discursive system which continues to propagate ‘demonizingmythologies’ (Gomez-Pena and Pena 2005), Taqwacores, a transnational diasporic Muslim punk subculture, has served as one avenue for young Muslimmen to challenge dominant Islamophobic discourses and forge new identities which go beyond modes of binaristic thinking. Taqwacores’ cyber-spaces have been viewed as ‘safe’ outlets for progressive South Asian Muslims to discuss and organize. Though the Internet’s role in growing South Asian musical subcultures is important, it is critical not to let this overshadow the role of these virtual spaces as cocoons where South Asian youths (especially marginalized Muslim youths) may feel they can creatively and freely express themselves. In this research, respondents were interviewed through online methods,face-to-face ethnographic interviews and participant observation. A sample of interview participants was collected from Facebook and MySpace groups on Taqwacores, whose membership is published publicly on the Internet. The largest of these groups is ‘Taqwacore’ on Facebook, which has 462 members (at the time of writing) and of which I became a member. Respondents were also recruited through Twitter as well as through gatekeepers in the field. Thirty-seven face-to-face interviews were conducted in eight metropolitan US cities. In terms of the digital ethnographic component of this research, the interactions of members within Facebook/MySpace groups such as Taqwacore (text discussion, uploading of video/audio, etc.) have been observed. Both in offline and online interview work, respondents’ viewpoints on participation in Taqwacores through online spaces have been elicited. Respondents were asked to reflect on issues of identity, social marginalization, religious marginalization and ethnicity. Though membership of Taqwacores can be seen online, i.e. publicly, it remains a sensitive and marginalized subcultural scene. My research into the Taqwacores project has also involved maintaining aTwitter account through which I regularly send out tweets regarding my research – whether it is material I am reading, videos I am watching, research questions I am grappling with, or hypotheses I am investigating. Through Twitter, I also ‘follow’ individuals involved in the Taqwacores scene and read their tweets regularly. I maintain a project website which includes photographic images related to the project, visualizations and an archive of my tweets.3Through this process, I quickly realized that youths involved in Taqwacores are using this viral, instant and ubiquitous medium to bring a wide array of individuals both into Taqwacores as well as to keep interested individuals informed of the scene. The scene’s use of Twitter also enables Taqwacores to reach out to groups of individuals who may not feel comfortable attending concerts or events taking place in the scene (or who may face socio-religious barriers). For example, there are many more women Twittering about Taqwacores than you would see at most of their concerts. This use of Twitter highlights specific examples of how Taqwacores is challenging pejorative normative stereotypes of young Muslim Americans. This chapter is especially interested in how particular music websites, dis-cussion forums and social networking websites are facilitating the growth of the Taqwacores scene. By way of background, I will briefly introduce the punk scene and the Muslim diaspora before examining the Taqwacores scene.

This study presents efforts to mitigate the likelihood of violent victimization among a network of young males with varying degrees of criminal involvement and previous victimization. Already inhabiting an environment in which poverty, institutional segregation, drugs, guns, and gangs are prevalent, the young males’ risk of victimization is heightened by their volatile relationships, presence in crime-prone places and connection to illegal activities. Findings from ethnographic observations of violence management practices show that the young males’ interactions and whereabouts in the neighborhood are guided by knowledge of their neighborhood’s physical and administrative boundaries, built environment, and markers of place – all of which are used to demarcate places of belonging and relative safety. Broadening the conception of neighborhood conflict and violence management beyond their relation to identity performance and defended territory, this study articulates violence management as a contextually-informed skill set.

An analysis of contemporary constitutions indicates that the number of denominational states is slowly decreasing. However, we also encounter opposite tendencies. The model of a denominational, or a religious state is primarily characteristic for Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East and for a number of Southeast Asian countries. In the last decades, the number of Christian states and secular ideological states has declined signifi cantly. There is a stable group of states with Buddhism as a privileged religion. The religious constitutional norms of states of confession are generally characterised by a high degree of generality. Detailed provisions are seldom and denominational clauses are primarily included among the principles of the supreme constitution. Underlying the religious character of the state lies the rejection of the neutrality of the worldview. It is not possible, on the basis of the constitution alone, to reconstruct a detailed, universal model of a religious state. In the light of fundamental laws, the most common characteristics of religious states are: the negation of the neutrality of the state in worldviews, the acceptance of a particular religion as the offi cial religion, the rejection of the equality of religious associations, the requirement of a head of state to follow the state religion or belief, and the state support for a given confession. The constitutions of most religious states formally provide for religious freedom. In the fundamental laws of some Muslim states, the guarantees for this freedom are, however, silent. The Western political culture fails the characteristics of an organisational unity of the state or the religious apparatus. The socio-political reality of contemporary religious states indicates that this model of statehood cannot be a priori regarded as contrary to the principles of democracy and human rights.

Voyeurism seems creepy. This paper considers whether these feelings are well-founded. It identifies a variety of ethically troubling features, including harmful consequences, deceit, and the violation of various religious, legal, and conventional norms. Voyeurism is something of a moral misdemeanor that seems worrisome when associated with these other failings. However, because voyeurism remains troubling even in the absence of harm or deceit, we must pay special attention to the ways complex social conventions can be used to show disrespect for others. The discussion centers on the famous case of Lady Godiva and Peeping Tom, but much of the analysis applies to voyeurism more generally.

The development of Islamic law in Indonesia represents a historical, sociological, and juridical phenomenon that reflects the ongoing interaction between religious norms, customary practices, and the state legal system. Islamic law functions not only as a set of religious norms but also as a moral and philosophical foundation that shapes Indonesia’s social and legal structures. Since the arrival of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago in the 13th century, Islamic law has become an integral part of local society, particularly in family, inheritance, waqf, and commercial matters. Its influence expanded during the era of Islamic kingdoms, where Islamic law served as the foundation of governance and judicial systems, notably in the Sultanates of Aceh, Demak, and Ternate. During the Dutch colonial era, the position of Islamic law faced suppression under the receptie theory, which limited its validity to cases where it was accepted by customary law. This policy subordinated Islamic law to colonial and customary legal systems. Nevertheless, Muslim scholars and jurists persistently defended the relevance of Islamic law within Indonesia’s legal system. After independence, a new perspective known as receptio a contrario emerged, challenging colonial interpretations and affirming that customary law was valid only insofar as it did not contradict Islamic principles. Subsequent efforts focused on integrating Islamic law into the national legal system based on justice, humanity, and social welfare. The enactment of the Compilation of Islamic Law (KHI) in 1991 marked a significant milestone in codifying Islamic law for Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, institutions such as the Supreme Court, the Sharia Courts, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs have strengthened the implementation of Islamic legal principles within the state framework. Contemporary Islamic legal development in Indonesia also includes modern innovations such as fatwas issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Islamic banking regulations, and family law reforms grounded in the principles of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah. In the modern era, the expansion of Islamic law encompasses broader areas, including finance, environmental law, and public governance. These developments reflect the adaptability and dynamic nature of Islamic law in responding to societal changes. However, challenges remain in harmonizing Sharia principles with Indonesia’s pluralistic legal structure. Therefore, the development of Islamic law must proceed through gradual, systematic, and dialogical processes that uphold justice, public welfare, and the supremacy of law. This study employs a normative-historical and sociological approach with descriptive analysis based on literature, legislation, and scholarly research. The findings reveal that Islamic law in Indonesia is a living and evolving legal system that continuously adapts to social transformations while maintaining its foundational principles of justice and maslahah (public interest). Ultimately, Islamic law contributes significantly to the creation of a national legal system rooted in religious and moral values while reflecting the unique identity of the Indonesian nation

Circumcision: Is it worth it for 21st-century Australian boys?

Indonesia is not a religious state, nor a secular state because religion can not be separated from state affairs. Recognition of the existence of the state of religion in Indonesia is realized in the form of official recognition of certain religious institutions in the country as well as the adoption of values ​​and religious norms in the national system. However, the current phenomenon occurs sacrilege (desecration) to religion that is a violation of applicable law in Indonesia. According to the criminal law of defamation positive (desecration) religion can be imposed sanctions in the form of imprisonment. However, sanctions imposed for perpetrators of the desecration (penistaa) religion in the positive criminal law in Indonesia is relatively lower, it can be found on the article 156 of the Criminal Code which only impose sanctions in the form of imprisonment to five years so that these penalties do not give a deterrent to perpetrators of sacrilege religion. Whilst Islamic criminal law sanctions against perpetrators of sacrilege (desecration) religion with more severe sanctions by the death penalty. It is based on the opinion of the jurists who established that religious treason or blasphemy included in offenses (jarimah hudud) and the witnesses in the form of the death penalty. The imposition of severe sanctions for defamation (desecration) religion in Islamic criminal law aimed at protecting religion in order to avoid abuse (desecration) religion done by humans who make mischief on earth.

This study discusses the application of the concept of ijtihad in regulating modern reproductive technology in Indonesia using an Islamic law approach. The development of reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization (IVF), artificial insemination, and genetic engineering have raised various legal and ethical issues in Islam, particularly concerning the clarity of lineage (nasab), the legal status of children, and the validity of medical practices from a sharia perspective. Therefore, an in-depth analysis is needed to examine the role of ijtihad in establishing laws and regulations that align with Islamic principles. This research uses a normative legal research method with conceptual, legislative, and historical approaches. The data sources include primary legal materials such as the Qur’an, Hadith, and fatwas from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), as well as national regulations governing reproductive technologies, such as the Health Law and other related regulations. In addition, secondary legal materials from Islamic law literature and academic studies are also analyzed to understand the legal development regarding reproductive technology practices in Indonesia. The results of the study indicate that the concept of ijtihad plays a strategic role in shaping fatwas and regulations related to modern reproductive technologies. MUI's fatwa permits IVF practices as long as they are performed by a legally married couple and prohibits the use of sperm or egg donors due to its contradiction with the principle of nasab in Islam. National regulations have also accommodated Sharia principles by limiting reproductive technology practices to avoid conflicts with religious norms. However, challenges in the implementation of these regulations remain, such as differences in interpretation among scholars, insufficient oversight of medical practices, and the low level of public understanding regarding Islamic law in reproductive technologies.

This article discusses the integration of fiqh siyasa with the electoral system in the context of Muslim-majority countries. Islamic politics in Indonesia is an important part of the country’s political landscape, reflecting its pluralism and democracy. Islamic politics involves Islamic-based political parties and religious-based groups participating in elections, respecting religious freedom, minority rights, and encouraging interfaith cooperation. Using normative and comparative approaches, this study analyzes how Islamic principles such as deliberation, bai’at, justice, and accountability are applied in modern electoral practices. Case studies in Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, and Malaysia show that despite differences in approach, sharia values can still coexist with democratic systems. However, challenges such as money politics, vote manipulation, and tensions between positive law and religious norms are serious obstacles. Therefore, this article proposes a reconstruction of electoral law that is contextual but still based on Islamic values, by involving the active role of ulama, fatwa institutions, and Islamic parties in creating fair, honest, and dignified elections.

The conclusion of this study highlights the intricate interplay between religious and cultural aspects within Indonesian society, particularly in the context of Parit Baru village. The village's adherence to ancient customs like the Menjalang tradition and the Balimau Kasai Bathing tradition reflects a commitment to both religious values, primarily Islam, and the preservation of unique cultural practices. The Menjalang tradition, considered a silaturrahim practice, fosters family unity and forgiveness as a precursor to the holy month of Ramadan. Its alignment with Islamic teachings and emphasis on familial solidarity make it a meaningful practice. Similarly, the Balimau Kasai Bathing tradition, while not strictly obligatory according to Islamic teachings, maintains its significance in welcoming Ramadan. The tradition embodies the intersection of cultural heritage and religious observance, with the possibility of evolving into a Sunnah practice. This study underscores how local customs can harmonize with religious norms, enriching the diverse tapestry of Indonesian society while maintaining alignment with Islamic principles.

This study aims to analyze the mediating role of wara’ in linking Islamic ethics, religious norms, and environmental awareness to green halal purchase behavior among Generation Z consumers. A survey was conducted with 157 Muslim Gen Z respondents in South Sulawesi using convenience sampling and a five-point Likert scale. Data were analyzed using SEM-PLS (SmartPLS 4) through measurement and structural model assessments. The findings indicate that Islamic ethics significantly influence the formation of wara’, and wara’ serves as a mediator that strengthens green halal purchase behavior. Religious norms directly affect consumer behavior, while environmental awareness reinforces ethical consumption orientation. These results demonstrate that the internalization of moral and spiritual values contributes to more consistent sustainable consumption behavior. The study implies the importance of halal literacy programs, value-based education, and ethical marketing strategies to cultivate responsible, sustainability-oriented consumer behavior aligned with Islamic principles.

This paper discusses the theory of scientific criticism for the progress and development of science. Science and technology carry out a noble mission, namely for the happiness and good of mankind. In Islam it is also taught that to obtain the good of the world and the hereafter, it is necessary to have knowledge. Therefore, science must always be guarded with a view of life that is full of religious values, so that knowledge is absolutely felt for humans. In this paper, the author focuses on discussing the theory of scientific criticism in an Islamic perspective. Knowing this material is important because the key to the success of Islamic scholarship is the spirit of criticism among Islamic scientists. The main problem that the author discusses in this paper is the definition of scientific criticism in an Islamic perspective, Islamic principles and ethics of scientific criticism, and the function of scientific criticism according to Islam. The conclusion of this paper is that scientific criticism in an Islamic perspective is a response, a correction made by humans based on scientific arguments by looking at theories or practices that are in accordance with religious (Islamic) norms. The Islamic principles regarding scientific criticism are the principle of difference of opinion, ideas or ideas, the principle that criticism is based on benefit, and the principle that criticism must be voiced even though others hate it. The ethics of scientific criticism in an Islamic perspective is that criticism must be objective, rational, intended for a truth, openly expressed, and prioritize the benefit of scientists. The function of scientific criticism according to Islam is to foster critical power, foster an attitude of openness, form an open-minded attitude, and form a laughing intellectual personality.

The study of hyperpersonal communication behavior of Muslim couples through online love comes from observing the phenomenon of the activities of internet users of different sexes who interact socially, intensely, romance, even intimate even though they are not married. Despite the prohibition of Islamic religion about dating, problems have been found, that chat rooms on Facebook and Whastapp have indicated that love relationships are easier and more open than real life, often without barriers or religious norms, social status, education, physical differences, state , marital status, and age. In addition, online love has made it easy for people to find a partner (jodo), whether religious or not, can be used as an affair media for couples whose marital life is in disarray, and a media for disloyal acts to their partners. The approach used is Social Hermeneutics, Hyperpersonal Communication theory and the concept of Islamic relations. The methodology used by the communication mediated computer (CMC) method through online interviews of online couples in love in various characteristics and patterns of interaction or communication The results of the study suggest that in hyper-personal communication, Muslim couples through cyberlovers on Facebook and Watsapp construct self-presentation, self-attribution, and communication intensification. to his partner. These Muslim couples can play a role as selective senders, but they lack control over non-religious communication. As recipients, couples are less able to be balancing and adjusting their communication. In the channel, the pairs communicate asynchronously and synchronously where the informants send each other "intensive messages" or continuously without space and time. However, the nature of this online couple's relationship is not in accordance with the ta'aruf, khitbah and ghasiyah nau frame contained in Islamic values.

This study examines interfaith marriage and its impact on family economic rights from the perspectives of Islamic law and positive law in Indonesia, with a case focus on Sumedang Regency. Employing a qualitative phenomenological approach, the research involved semi-structured interviews with both traditional and modern Islamic scholars, along with an analysis of religious texts and statutory regulations. The findings reveal that the majority of scholars reject interfaith marriage based on Sharia principles and Article 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage. Nevertheless, some couples pursue such unions through administrative religious conversion or overseas ceremonies to obtain legal recognition. These practices often result in legal ambiguity regarding economic rights within the family—such as inheritance, joint property, and financial support—and may lead to familial disputes. Additional social consequences include identity confusion among children, community stigma, and potential conflicts within extended families. The study underscores the strategic role of institutions like Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) and the Office of Religious Affairs (KUA) in providing legal education and advocates the need for a responsive civil registration mechanism that acknowledges interfaith marriages while respecting Islamic legal principles. A contextual approach is proposed to bridge the tension between religious norms, legal certainty, and the protection of family economic rights.