Infrastructural entanglement and cloud hyperscalers in contemporary warfare: Insights from Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan

The showdown with Iran on the nuclear issue may well be one of the most influential crises in the post-cold war era. Prevailing theories of asymmetrical interdependence, the backbone of orthodox understandings of globalization and post-modern cooperation, foster the expectation that Iran should comply with UN demands and stop its uranium enrichment programme. Why is Iran not backing down on its nuclear aspirations, despite its asymmetrical interdependence? In this article, we draw on the neo-liberal insights of R. Harrison Wagner to argue that contrary to conventional assumptions, asymmetrical interdependence is not enough for predicting bargaining outcomes. Rather, it is essential to ask how much the targeted state values the goods that it is being asked to forgo. Drawing on this central observation, Iran's non-compliance is much easier to explain, as are the most effective courses of action to deal with it. Iran is non-compliant, despite orthodox neo-liberal assumptions, because it values its nuclear options more than the costs being imposed on it, and likely to be further imposed, from non-compliance. This perspective suggests that policies based on manipulation of asymmetrical economic interdependence are unlikely to succeed. Outside actors must change the paradigm of the past 20 years, taking Iran's high resolve into account. The carrot-or-stick package must find carrots that are lucrative enough, and threats that are credible enough, to convey the high costs of non-compliance and the benefits of cooperation.

Is gold a preferable diversifier of cleaner equity risk across diverse scenarios? Evidence from multidimensional connectedness and spillover measures

A wedge strategy is a state’s attempt to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance. An asymmetric alignment consists of a great power (the alignment leader) and a small/middle power (the weaker ally). So when does the wedge strategy of a great power (a divider) towards a competitive asymmetric alignment work? I propose, based upon the ‘Crawford–Izumikawa debate’, an ‘interdependence theory’ of wedge strategies. In the case of an asymmetric alignment that is symmetrically interdependent, the wedge strategy of a divider that accommodates the weaker ally is most likely to succeed. However, a wedge strategy towards an asymmetric alignment that is asymmetrically interdependent is highly likely to fail. I evaluate the theory based upon four wedge strategies adopted in Cold War Asia through analysing American, Russian, and Chinese archival sources. As asymmetrically interdependent, the US–Japan and US–Taiwan alliances offset the impact of Chinese wedge strategies. Between 1955 and 1965, therefore, neither Chinese accommodation nor Chinese pressure could detach weaker American allies from the United States in East Asia. However, China successfully exploited the symmetric interdependence of the US–Pakistan alliance. Between 1962 and 1965, China’s accommodation of Pakistan prevented Pakistan from being used as an American base for containment purposes. Likewise, the Soviet Union took full advantage of the Sino–Vietnamese alignment’s symmetric interdependence, whereby Soviet aid to North Vietnam caused rifts in Sino–Vietnamese relations that eventually wrecked the Sino–Vietnamese alignment. According to the theory, therefore, given the asymmetric interdependence of the hub-and-spokes system, any Chinese attempts to weaken US-sponsored alliances in East Asia would not be effective.

Dramatic events of the spring of 1918 are important pages in the history of Ukrainian statehood. For the first time in the 20th century Ukraine faced the crisis caused by armed bands of Russian Bolsheviks, who, under the distorted slogans of “national self-determination”, refused to acknowledge Ukraine as an independent state. Soviet politicians proved to be as chauvinistic as their predecessors – Russian imperial bureaucrats. Upon signing peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk between Ukraine and the Central Powers on February 18, 1918, German Army started operations aimed to restore Central Rada to power. Ukrainian historiography considers this case primarily focusing on the activity of the Ukrainian Army and investigates operations of German and Austro-Hungarian forces quite fragmentarily. Even the recently published well-documented studies by Austrian scholars V. Dornik and P. Lib, as well as the Polish researcher V. Mȩdrzecki, did not provide a comprehensive coverage of these military operations. This article is aimed to study phase two of the German and Austro-Hungarian Armies’ march into Ukraine (February 20 – March 5, 1918). Initially, the plan of the German High Command did not envisage complete occupation of Ukraine. In the article, special attention is paid to the order of battle of the Central Powers’ armies that marched into Ukraine, their operational plans and tasks, as well as the battles that followed. This information should assist Ukrainian scholars in studying operations of the Ukrainian Army during the Central Rada period. Strategic situation as of March 5, 1918 determined further plans of the German and Austro-Hungarian commands and caused follow-up operations in eastern Ukraine during phase three (early March – late May 1918).

Modern Ukrainian historiography tends to consider the march of Central Powers’ armies into Ukraine as a mere sideshow caused by internal political and social processes. This view was also influenced by the overideological and factually incorrect Soviet scholarly heritage. Recently, valuable investigations have been published by the Austrian scholars V. Dornik and P. Lib, as well as the Polish scholar V. Medrzecki, with the use of new data from German archives of Munich, Dresden, and Stuttgart. However, some facts have been misinterpreted. At the same time, 1918 historical events cannot be correctly reconstructed without proper understanding of German and Austro-Hungarian military operations in Ukraine. Therefore, it is important to reconstruct the order of battle of German and Austro-Hungarian forces in Ukraine, to study operations aimed to expel Bolsheviks from the territory of Ukrainian People’s Republic and the progress of the following occupation of Ukraine. The objective of the article is to study the first phase of the Central Powers armies’ march into Ukraine (February 18–20, 1918). At that moment, plans of the German High Command were not specified, and total occupation of Ukraine was not considered yet. Advance in Ukraine was a part of the Faustschlag operation, commenced on February 18, 1918, and aimed to conquer Baltic region and Belarus. Initially, only 6 divisions were employed; they were considered sufficient to restore the power of Central Rada and to help Ukrainians fight Bolsheviks. Phase one lasted only for two days (February 18–20, 1918). During those days it became apparent that German divisions would meet no organized or tough opposition. Therefore, offensive turned into hot pursuit along railways and principal roads. On February 20, 1918, German High Command started phase two of the operation, aimed at capturing Kyiv and restoration of power of the Ukrainian government.

Purpose - to identify changes in indicators of stress-regulatory systems in adolescents during military operations in Ukraine. Materials and methods. 243 children and adolescents (130 boys and 113 girls) aged 10-17 years were examined. The level of cortisol (C), prolactin (PRL) and serotonin (S) was determined in blood. Two groups of patients were formed: the first group included 203 schoolchildren who were examined before russia’s invasion of Ukraine; the second group consisted of 40 adolescents examined after February 24, 2022. The indicators of the stress-regulatory systems of adolescents of two groups and the ratio of С/S and PRL/S were compared. When assessing differences, the Mann-Whitney test was used and the odds ratio (OR) was calculated. Results. The risk of developing a depressive state in a schoolchildren increased 24 times during the war in Ukraine. This is consistent with the detected changes in the stress-regulatory systems in the adolescents of the second group: the activation of the stress-realizing hormones - С and PRL and a simultaneous decrease in the level of C in the blood - an indicator of the stress-limiting system. Confirmation of the imbalance of stress-realizing and stress-limiting systems are high levels of adaptation coefficients: C/S and PRL/S. It was established that girls are most stress-sensitive to events related to changes in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal system during hostilities in the country. In girls, the levels of C and PRL, C/S and PRL/S coefficients increase, and the concentration of serotonin decreases by 2 times. Conclusions. The obtained results indicate a violation of adaptation and compensatory mechanisms in adolescents during the war. This is the basis for the emergence and progression of various diseases, including post-traumatic stress disorder. The research was carried out in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Declaration. The study protocol was approved by the Local Ethics Committee of the participating institution. The informed consent of the patient was obtained for conducting the studies. No conflict of interests was declared by the authors.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance and international organization comprising North American and European countries. It is generally considered to be among the most powerful, long-enduring, and successful alliances of modern times. It has influenced both the study and practice of international security and politics for more than seventy years. Created in 1949 by twelve countries as a classic treaty-based mutual defense pact, its substantive focus, formal organization, and membership grew steadily from its earliest years. The legacy of World War II and the trials of the Cold War dominated NATO’s first four decades, when the organization’s first secretary general described its purposes for Europe as keeping “the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks accelerated the post–Cold War transformation of NATO’s political and military functions. Yet the central issue in politics among the allies has often been the “burden sharing” or distribution of costs and benefits. The United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have often wielded outsized roles in such politics, though NATO decisions are taken by consensus traditionally. The endurance of NATO after the Cold War and through many crises is one of the great puzzles in the academic discipline of international relations, and the Alliance is a common object of study in all the main theoretical schools of thought. While NATO’s political structures resemble other international organizations, its standing multinational integrated military structure is unique. Its military policy and strategy evolved with thinking about deterrence in the nuclear age. NATO first embarked on “out-of-area” military operations in the Balkan civil wars of the 1990s, but its largest and longest-running mission began in 2003 with its involvement in Afghanistan, far from its original geographic area of concern. NATO has entered into political and military partnerships with dozens of countries around the world, and its enlarged membership reached thirty countries in 2020. Its global ties add to a longer-standing debate about trans-Atlanticism versus autonomy in European security. NATO and the European Union give important context to one another, though their institutional collaboration has not always been as close as their greatly overlapping membership and neighboring headquarters in Belgium might suggest. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 inaugurated a period of increased tension with NATO, though the Alliance has alternated deterrence and dialog in its relations with Russia both during and since the Cold War. Primary sources and archival material about NATO are increasingly accessible.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the role of illicit finance in shaping Russian foreign policy. This paper introduces a novel approach by conceptualising the link between illicit financial flows (IFF) and Russian foreign policy. Previous research has assumed that economic activities, often involving illegality, are central to Russia’s global influence strategies but has struggled to explain how this plays out and its consequences. Drawing on empirical evidence, we explore how IFF underpin Russia’s political interference, information campaigns, and military operations. First, we show that IFF are integral to Russia’s foreign and security policy, not as a primary driver but as a crucial tool in implementing policy. IFF support Russia’s political influence campaigns and information operations, often more effectively than state-run propaganda. Second, while strategic guidance is centralised, there is significant individual agency. Private backing is essential for political and ideological campaigns, enabling funders to pursue personal projects aligned with state interests. Third, the public and private realms are irretrievably blurred. Private actors often receive state contracts, and this “networked state” challenges classical political science models. We conclude that IFF are used as a revisionist tool in Russia, undermining international norms and creating structures that challenge the rules-based order.

The invasion of Ukraine and military operations around Ukrainian nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities have prompted us to search for radiocaesium in mosses from the Kopački Rit Nature Park in Croatia, since mosses are known bioindicators of airborne radioactive pollution, and Kopački Rit is a known low radiocaesium background area. Sampling was finished in August 2023, and our analysis found no elevated radiocaesium levels. Kopački Rit therefore remains a suitable place for future detection of anthropogenic radioactive pollutants.

Asymmetric interdependence in the Czech–Russian energy relations

The dynamic environmental effects model (DEEM) is a sophisticated software architecture used to determine the environmental impacts on military and civilian operations. DEEM is an instantiation of the more general architecture, the dynamic information architecture system (DIAS). DEEM is being used in a number of applications relevant to training, test support, and operational support and decision making in both the DOD and civilian communities. In one application, DEEM is being used to determine the impact of the environment on military operations, such as the trafficability and mobility of forces. DEEM is also being used as the software framework controlling a theater level weather forecast model for the US Sir Force. In another application DEEM has been used as a tool for resource analysis in a disaster relief study. In this paper, we summarize the key features of DEEM and give a number of examples of how it is being used to support military and civilian applications.

<div class="htmlview paragraph"><i>CONSIDERATION of motor-transport maintenance in military operations requires a general conception of the national military organization for war. This the author outlines, describing the theater of war, its subdivisions, the zone of the interior, communications and combat zones, and the general character-commercial or military-of motor transportation in each zone. The Quartermaster General's responsibility, and the need for centralizing control of motor transport under his direction as provided in the National Defense Act, is indicated.</i></div> <div class="htmlview paragraph"><i>Maintenance personnel, tool and shop equipment, supplies and various functions are divided into five groups called “echelons,” a military term used to designate the groupings of troops, supplies, functions and military command from front to rear of an army. The operation of maintenance in the five echelons is described in detail, the echelons of maintenance being based upon the unit-repair and unit-replacement system in which a physical-and usually a geographical-separation of the function of repair from the function of replacement is emphasized. Hence, the time that vehicles are kept out of productive operation on the one hand and the interference of vehicle operators with shop management and production on the other hand are minimized. The dissipation and waste of spare parts incident to the old system of “vehicle repair and overhaul” are avoided by maintaining a well-balanced reserve of spare unit-assemblies in unit-repair and unit-replacement shops. The unit-repair and unit-replacement system is provided for in motor-vehicle procurement wherein standardization of unit assemblies with maximum interchangeability is considered coincidentally with performance requirements.</i></div> <div class="htmlview paragraph"><i>In conclusion, the diverging trends in commercial and military motor-transport are indicated and the need for cooperation and coordination in national defense is stressed.</i></div> <div class="htmlview paragraph"><i>In the discussion,<span class="xref">*</span> it is stated that the Army's maintenance system is complete, down to the last detail, and that the governing principles should have a very practical interest for the commercial motor-transport operator. Standardization of units and parts is discussed, the scope of maintenance design-possibilities is outlined and Army and civilian operators' problems are contrasted. Simplified design is advocated.</i></div> <div class="htmlview paragraph"><i>Applying echelon maintenance to commercial fleets is outlined, fourth and fifth-echelon functions are explained, and it is stated that skilled mechanics are not needed in the Army's scheme. The application of motor-vehicles to military use is treated, a parallel is drawn between Army and commercial maintenance plans, the importance of front-wheel drive is emphasized, and means for avoiding confusion while still maintaining motor-vehicles in war are outlined rather specifically.</i></div>

Rules of Engagement (ROE) constitute a structured framework guiding the use of lethal force within specific operational contexts, blending legal, policy and operational considerations. Primarily, they empower commanders to oversee military operations effectively while providing soldiers with clear directives for conduct on the battlefield. ROE align with the security protocol theory, defining a set of rules that rationalise and legitimise complex security measures and their enforcement. As a sui generis code of conduct, ROE function as a security protocol within military operations, serving as a normative system facilitating the implementation of legal and strategic objectives. Unlike generic protocols, ROE are intricately shaped by political goals, military requirements and legal norms, manifesting as detailed operational guidelines. Thus, ROE serve as a code facilitating the application of law and the pursuit of political and military aims during operations. This paper seeks to elucidate the nature and significance of ROE in contemporary warfare, exploring their compatibility with the security protocol model and examining any unique attributes that distinguish them within this framework.

In 1945, Albert Hirschman proposed that countries can use asymmetric trade relations as a weapon of political influence at the direct expense of the security of their trading partners. This paper argues that Hirschman’s theory of asymmetric interdependence can be applied to the contemporary case of European-Russian gas relations given that Russia uses its monopoly on gas to promote its regional political and security interests. At the same time, we argue that Hirschman’s concepts of ‘supply effect’ and ‘influence effect’ must be reevaluated in light of the deepening economic interdependence in European gas trade. By exploring three different types of dependent states, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Germany, we find that the interdependent network of trade relations in Europe, and the shared vulnerability and political influence of European gas importers, have weakened both types of economic statecraft. Yet, more indirect and diffuse forms of political influence are possible through forging ties of asymmetric interdependence.

The overall task of this paper is to outline some foundations of a critical theory of digital capitalism. The approach of the Critique of Political Economy is taken as the starting point for theorising (digital) capitalism. First, the paper discusses selected classical definitions of capitalism. Theories of digital capitalism must build on definitions and theories of capitalism. If capitalism is not only an economic order but a societal formation, the analysis of capitalism is the analysis of economic exploitation and non-economic domination phenomena and their interaction. Theories of digital capitalism should also address the question of how class, racism, and patriarchy are related in the context of digitalisation. Second, the author introduces a notion of digital capitalism that is based on Marx’s approach of the Critique of Political Economy. Third, the paper engages with one influential contemporary approach to theorising capitalism, Nancy Fraser’s Cannibal Capitalism. The author discusses what we can learn from Fraser’s approach to theorising digital capitalism. Fourth, the author discusses existing understandings of digital capitalism that can be found in the academic literature. These definitions are compared to the understanding advanced in this article. Fifth, the paper discusses the relationship of the notion of digital capitalism from a Critical Political Economy perspective in comparison to the notions of the network society/informational capitalism (Manuel Castells), surveillance capitalism (Shoshana Zuboff), and platform capitalism (Nick Srnicek). Sixth, the paper reflects on the relationship between digital capitalism and violence as we live in a (digital) age where a new World War is all but uncertain. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.