Abstract
We propose a measure of strategic complexity in repeated games based on the idea that strategies requiring more detailed information are more complex. Our measure often yields a more intuitive ranking of strategies than other measures. In repeated games, the simplest strategy which produces a given equilibrium path is a grim-trigger strategy. We characterize the set of Nash and perfect equilibrium payoffs in n-player repeated games in which preferences over game payoffs and complexity costs are lexicographic.
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