Informational Party Primaries and Strategic Ambiguity

Abstract

While scholars have thoroughly explored the logic of two candidate electoral competition, much less has been accomplished in gaining an understanding of the role of party primaries. This paper presents an incomplete information model of primary and general elections and argues that party primaries do more than select party candidates. Party primaries serve an informational function. In an environment where candidates are uncertain about the preferences of voters, selection of desirable policy platforms is a risky, if not difficult, undertaking. Primary elections offer voters an early opportunity to signal their preferences to candidates. Before primary elections, the candidates, aware that information about voter preferences is forthcoming, have an incentive to remain ambiguous about their policy platforms. Early commitment makes them vulnerable to better informed candidates that they might face in the general election. The fully revealing equilibrium of the game yields a joint explanation of the role of party primaries and candidate ambiguity. Primaries aggregate information about voter preferences and candidate ambiguity has an option value.